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This thesis builds upon three separate papers that focus on investigating antecedents 
of organizations’ proactive environmental strategy (PES) in the context of China. The 
first study presents the differential incentives for the proactive environmental strategy 
(PES) in China, including case companies with three different ownerships. Analytic 
induction applied to data collected from 10 case firms revealed the key motivation for 
private-owned enterprises (POEs) is executives’ long-term orientation, while guanxi 
with local government incentivizes the provincial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to 
conduct PES, in contrast to the competitive motivation for PES in another SOE 
affiliated to state-owned key enterprise. The foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) adopt 
the PES driven by a diverse set of motives. Specifically, ecological responsibility has 
been greatly identified as the salient motives in favor of two foreign firms’ PES, in 
opposition to another FIE’s adopting PES which is merely motivated by competitive 
advantage. Furthermore, by comparing with prior studies, the differences include (1) 
whether the positive impact of competitiveness on firms’ PES built on the premise of 
possessing ecological responsibility, and (2) whether political ties (referred to guanxi 
in China) act as a driving force for provincial SOEs’ and the barrier for POEs’ PES. 
 
The second study, drawing on upper echelons theory, investigates the direct impact of 
two dimensions of managerial environmental awareness (EA) on proactive 
environmental strategy (PES), and the moderating role of three individual dimensions 
of firms’ entrepreneurial orientation (EO), namely, innovativeness, proactiveness, and 
risk-taking, in the main relationship. Our empirical results, based on a sample of 228 
Chinese manufacturing firms, show that both of the two dimensions of EA, namely, 
environmental risk awareness (ERA) and environmental cost-benefit awareness 
(ECA), are positively and significantly related to PES, and that the positive 
relationship between ERA (ECA) and PES is strengthened (weakened) for firms with 
high levels of innovativeness and for firms that are less oriented towards risk taking. 
Unexpectedly, the results reveal that the interaction between proactiveness of EO and 




suggest that there are multiple types of complex cognition within organizations, and 
greater attention paid on both individual and organizational cognitions are playing a 
critical role in favor of firms’ PES.  
 
Drawing upon social capital theory, the third study examines the effects of managers’ 
political ties (PTs) on proactive environmental strategy (PES), and integrates the two 
dimensions of managers’ environmental awareness (EA), namely, environmental risk 
awareness (ERA) and environmental cost-benefit awareness (ECA), as the contingent 
roles in this direct relationship. Using the data collected from 228 manufacturing firms 
in China, our findings indicate that the managers’ PTs positively matter in firms’ PES, 
and such a positive relationship between PTs and PES is strengthened (weakened) for 
those executives with higher ERA (ECA). 
 
Keywords:  Proactive Environmental Strategy; Entrepreneurial Orientation; 
Environmental Awareness; Environmental Risk Awareness; Environmental Cost-



















Global interest in proactive environmental strategy 
        Since the World Commission on Environment and Development Report 
(WCED) 1of 1987 (known as the ‘Brundtland Commission Report’) was published, 
corporate executives and management scholars have been struggling with the fringe 
questions of why and how companies need to integrate environmental concerning into 
strategic decision-making (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Unlike the negative 
traditional role of organizations being the “problem” and the governments being the 
“solution”, the Brundtland Commission Report coined the “sustainable development2” 
and poisoned a positive role of corporate in managing its relationship with the natural 
environment. Since then the business leaders and management researchers have 
increasingly turned their attention to the role of corporate environmental strategy 
(CES) in the repertoire of strategic management. 
        In choosing CES, firms confront a series of strategic approach portrayed along a 
continuum, ranging from reactive/remediation to proactive/prevention (Sharma, 2000; 
Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). At one stance of the continuum, reactive environmental 
strategy (RES) merely conforms to regulatory requirements in the way of taking “end-
of-pipe” pollution control solutions. Whereas proactive environmental strategy (PES), 
on the other extreme, is a corporate approach which implies the anticipation the future 
environmental requirements and trends, and the alternation of the firm’s operations to 
prevent rather than to reduce adverse environmental impacts (Aragón-Correa, 1998; 
Sharma, 2000; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Hence, it could be argued that the firms 
striving to sustainable development are inclined to formulate and implement a PES 
(Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Examples of PES 
include ISO140013 certificate (Christmann & Taylor, 2001), resources recycling and 
1 World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future (Brundtland 
Commission Report), Oxford University Press, New York, 1987. 
2 Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. (WCED, 1987) 
3  ISO14001 is short for International Organization for Standardization 14001, the international 




                                                          
application of renewable resources (Fryxell & Lo, 2003), the development of eco-
friendly products/services/process (Klassen, 2001), implementing eco-technological 
innovations (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009) and environmental policies (Henriques 
& Sadorsky, 1999), application of benchmarking and accounting procedure (Nash & 
Ehrenfeld, 1997), setting the objectives of environmental performance and disclosing 
environmental information (Hart, 2005), performing environmental audits, training 
employees in pro-environmental activities, and linking employee compensation to the 
environmental performance (Welford, 1998). 
        In light of above pro-active and preventive measures, the purpose of PES is thus 
to create wider value for both shareholders and multiple stakeholders through ensuring 
effective environmental protection (Darnall, Henriques, & Sadorsky, 2010). However, 
few companies have shown a willingness to integrate environmental concerns at such 
proactive/highest level (Banerjee, 2001), only if they have a better understand of the 
motives and benefits of the PES. As the accurate knowing of the motives behind any 
strategy is particularly significant for the successful strategy formulation (Hitt, Ireland, 
& Hoskisson, 2016), and the distinct level of CES occurred within the firms depending 
on managerial perceived importance of environmental issues, corporate managers 
ought to preciously understand why they had better conduct a PES before this strategy 
could be developed in the best approach. In other words, to motivate more PES among 
firms, we must firstly know “why” and “how” some firms take more proactive stances 
while other counterparts lag behind. 
        Since the most salient question of what drives firm strategic actions has always 
occupied a central position in the strategic management literature (Nadkarni & Barr, 
2008), the organization and the natural environment scholars thereby have been in the 
significant efforts to broadly examine ‘why’ and ‘how’ firms should engage in PES 
over past two decades. Concretely speaking, several studies have answered such two 
core questions from the resource-based view, institutional theory, stakeholder theory, 
dynamic capability theory and upper echelon theory and so forth, contending that the 
environmental regulations/rules from government (Powell & DiMaggio, 2012), the 
primarily perceived importance of stakeholders norms (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999), 
the concerning of community (Banerjee, Iyer, & Kashyap, 2003), organizations’ focus 




as the macro-level factors of PES. Centering on the individual-level, top managers’ 
mindsets (Flannery & May, 2000), and leadership (Egri & Herman, 2000), managerial 
interpretations of environmental issues as opportunity rather than threat (Sharma, 
2000), environment attitudes (Cordano & Frieze, 2000) and managers’ business ties 
(Jiang, Wang, Zhou, & Guo, 2020) have been evidenced as the micro determinants in 
prompting firms’ PES. Moreover, an empirical study drawing on resource-based view 
proposes the interaction effect of firms’ entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and intensity 
of government regulations on organizations’ PES adoption (Menguc, Auh, & Ozanne, 
2010).  
        To date, various disciplines have provided distinct theories and paradigms for 
exploring PES antecedents (Etzion, 2007) at different levels and in various context 
(Sharma & Sharma, 2011). However, causing the worldwide scholarly interests, the 
Western developed countries geographically dominants the environmental proactivity 
studies (Delmas & Toffel, 2008) by employing data from Western businesses. Since 
the effectiveness of corporate strategy depends on the specific environment (Sharma, 
2000), and environmental management is not a universal prescription or a one-size-
fits-all method (Barnett, 2007), the national context is thereby of greater importance 
as the contingency (Matten & Moon, 2008) for PES studies. Consequently, it is no 
surprising that governmental regulations, stakeholder norms, and the mindsets of 
managers have different effects on PES between China and Western society (Liu, Guo, 
& Chi, 2015). Thus it can be seen that the national context might cause antecedents to 
differently impact a firm’s pursuit of PES. Along with this thought, it is worthwhile 
and interesting to examine the factors that influence firms’ PES in developing regions, 
like China, as the largest emerging economy in East Asia and world’s second largest 
economy (Ye & Zhang, 2011).  
 
Proactive environmental strategy and the context of China 
        Despite the increasingly scholarly interests in investigating the motives of PES, 
there is a scarcity of research centering on the context of China. Under the contrasting 
contexts of Western countries and China, the key drivers of PES in Western firms 




        First, the dominant predictors drawing from institutional- and/or stakeholders 
perspectives mainly focus on exogenous drivers (Delmas & Toffel, 2004), such as the 
government regulations and stakeholder norms. These two perspectives largely over-
emphasize the isomorphic effects that all corporates respond to, and lack the clarity 
of the specific mechanism that how decision makers input the subjective interpretation 
of external pressures into the focal firms. This is because the way how the corporates 
respond to external pressure is derived from the managerial interpretations regarding 
information inputs (Peng & Liu, 2016). Moreover, of particular significance is the 
more complete and perfect environmental regulations in Western countries (Escobar 
& Vredenburg, 2011), which strongly requires Western firms to abide by (Christmann 
& Taylor, 2001). Nevertheless, firms in China tend to lack the incentives to comply 
with environmental rules. Relatedly, an empirical study conducted by Wang, Wijen, 
and Heugens (2018) has found that the lack of  enforcing mechanisms in Chinese local 
government, and the government officials’ general priority of economic improvement 
over environmental issues hugely relaxed firms’ environmental burden. Therefore, it 
can be proposed that both institutional and stakeholder perspectives might provide an 
extremely limited ability in explaining the internal motivation of firms’ PES (Aragón-
Correa & Sharma, 2003) since such scholarship placed huge emphasis on the powerful 
external pressures. Likewise, in less-developed countries, regulations and stakeholder 
demands have been recognized as less important drivers in relation to firms’ PES 
(Beckman, Colwell & Cunningham, 2009). Moreover, in the Chinese context that 
potentially suffers from institutional voids, firms pursues a PES owning to powerful 
external pressures seems highly questionable. This is in line with Delmas and Toffel’s 
(2004) argument that the institutional and macro-level perspectives cannot explain 
why firms involved in the same institutional pressures choose the different CES. 
Second, apart from the dominant institutional and stakeholder perspectives, the 
bulk of scholarship drawing from the resource-based view (RBV) have suggested that 
firm-specific resources and capabilities (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003) could drive 
firms’ PES. However, such RBV scholarship heavily paid attention to organizational 
outcome by adopting PES rather than the adoption’s antecedents (Chen, Lai & Wen, 
2006) in the developed countries, contending that the development of capabilities is a 




on PES adoption put more emphasis on internal valuable resources possessed by the 
focal firms, and equally regarded the presence of rare resources and core capabilities 
as their utilization in terms of firms’ pro-environmental practices. In essence, using 
resources, referring to recent RBV studies, has been asserted to be contingent upon 
resource orchestration (Simon & Hitt, 2009) that managers need to proactively exploit. 
Moreover, regarding the valuable resources and core capabilities in the firms, the 
organizations’ boundary-spanning activities to a larger extent plays a critical role in 
developing the valuable resources and capabilities in a given situation. For instance, 
maintaining good relationship with suppliers, buyers and government officials (Peng 
& Luo, 2000)  might be regarded as an important conduit on firms’ core capabilities. 
Hence, social capital embedded in organizations drawing from RBV lens could be 
firmly viewed as a valuable, unique, and intangible resources leading to significant 
advantages (Tsang, 1998). Indeed, of particular interest in China where institutional 
void are prevalent, business leaders’ good networking with politicians significantly 
affects the corporate strategy (Keim & Hillman, 2008), let alone the under-addressed 
firms’ PES in this study. 
        In addition, beyond the market-related environment, firms are deeply embedded 
in the nonmarket environment consisting of social and institutional arrangements in 
terms of managing their interface with salient stakeholders (Porter & Kramer, 2002). 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), in particular, has become one of the strategic 
approach for firms to differentiate themselves from competition and ultimately obtain 
the certain ends (Duanmu, Bu, & Pittman, 2018). In this scenarios, a growing number 
of firms are in a great effort to improve environmental performance, acting as a unique 
form of organization-level product differentiation device with the additional attribute 
attractive to the market (Bagnoli & Watts, 2003). As such, the instrumental CSR, a 
positivistic approach (Scherer, 2018), has been increasingly undertaken by corporates 
to enhance the firm performance (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Distinct from above 
means-end perspective of CSR, the political CSR also could strengthen the business-
government relationship, especially in China where the government sits at the top of 
CSR pyramid. Therefore, issuing CSR report has been greatly laid the emphasis in 




officer (CSO) in the top management team (TMT) could increase firms’ CSR actions 
(Mattern & Moon, 2008).  
        Furthermore, it has been well-argued that firms are more likely to mimic industry 
peers’ behaviors in face of environmental uncertainty. In this vein, when some of the 
leading corporates adopt PES, other firms in the same industry are prone to conduct 
the same behaviors (González‐Benito & González‐Benito, 2006), since most firms 
tend to use social comparison as the basis for decision-making (Haunschild & Miner, 
1997). Empirically, Yang, Wang, Hu & Gao (2018)’s initial work documented that 
the number of listed firms would positively impact both RES and PES in the nonlisted 
firms, wherein the superior performance of listed firms largely motivates the PES for 
those nonlisted firms.  
Third, since firms can be seen as an organization of human resources, the firms’ 
adoption of PES is thereby a part of consciously chosen strategy resulting from the 
decision makers’ conscious assessment of options (Ransom & Lober, 1999). Hence, 
the engagement in PES is an outcome of choices made by executives that possess the 
power and managerial discretion to shape the environmental conduct (Bansal, 2003). 
In line with recent call for microfoundations of corporate sustainability (Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012) and the individual-level factors are capable of informing firms’ PES 
adoption (Papagiannakis, Voudouris, & Lioukas, 2014), extant studies proposed the 
individual-level factors such as managerial belief and values that positively motivate 
firms’ PES. Most notably, since managers are inclined to devise business strategies 
based on their cognition (Gavetti, 2005), and organizational profiles to a higher degree 
demonstrate the characteristics and processes of executives (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984), these studies largely explore the endogenous factors of top managers, like their 
background and personalities. By using demographic data as proxies for representing 
managerial cognition, researchers have not detailed the mechanism of how managerial 
cognition influences environmental decision-making. 
Overall, insights about determinants of PES adoption in China are critical. Given 
that firms in China, as in most developing countries, engage in PES despite relatively 
weak pressures from external environmental forces, this study attempts to provide an 
alternative explanation of PES adoption by examining the internally driven motives. 




Gaps, objectives and research questions 
        Along with aforesaid arguments, the prior limitations of predicting PES that this 
study aims to deal with are expressed in the following perceived gaps. An immediate 
gap observed in the Chinese context is a lack of in-depth investigation regarding the 
motivators in favor of firms’ PES. Hence, the first objective of this study is to examine 
the differential incentives for PES adoption from our multiple case companies. In seek 
to address this gap, there is a need for a qualitative research pointing to the research 
question as: 
 
What motivates firms’ proactive environmental strategy in China? A 
qualitative study from top managers’ views 
 
Followed the first study, a quantitative research investigates the direct impact of 
two dimensions of managerial environmental awareness (EA), namely managerial 
environmental risk awareness (ERA) and environmental cost-benefit awareness 
(ECA), on firms’ PES adoption. Moreover, as previous studies on this subject paid 
little attention to the constraints imposed by organizational cognitive paths, which 
referred to the factor like strategic orientation. Strategic orientation is characterized 
by futurity, proactivity and risk-taking of a firm, which equips firms to adopt PES. 
Entrepreneurial orientation (EO), however, is pronounced as a firm-level strategic 
orientation consisting of innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness (Miller, 1983). 
A most cited research from Aragón-Correa and Sharma (2003) highlighted that the 
approach to prevent pollution need to be incorporated into entrepreneurial features of 
the firm. This represents that firms are not likely to pursue PES unless they encourage 
the entrepreneurial activity. In order to fulfil this objective, the second research topic 
is proposed as: 
 
Top managers’ environmental awareness and proactive environmental 
strategy: The moderating role of entrepreneurial orientation 
 
        Regarding the significance of managers’ political networking with governmental 




PES. Moreover, because the value of ties is contingent on special contextual factors, 
this study makes a further step to integrate two dimensions of managers’ EA, namely 
ERA and ECA, into the analysis. Driven by this objective, the third research topic is 
developed:  
         
Top managers’ political ties and proactive environmental strategy: The 
moderating role of environmental awareness 
 
Key constructs in this thesis 
Proactive environmental strategy 
        CES is the corporate strategy that a firm carried out to deal with its relationship 
with natural environment (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Sharma, 2000). Several 
research on CES has provided various classifications, indicating that firms' response 
to environmental issues varied along a continuum (Agarwala, 2005). Specifically, the 
work from Hunt and Auster (1990) has identified five typologies of the environmental 
programs, evolving from “beginner” to “proactivist”. Building on the resource-based 
theory of the firm, Hart (1995) developed a more grounded typology of CES in terms 
of four environmental approaches: the end-of-pipe approach, pollution prevention or 
total quality management, product stewardship, and sustainable development. A most 
cited work from Sharma and Vredenburg (1998) classified CES into a continuum that 
ranges from reactive to proactive, which was similarly represented as a continuum 
aligned with reactive, defensive, accommodative and proactive strategy (Henriques & 
Sadorsky, 1999). By its very definition that CES is a firm’s selection of the width and 
depth of environmental-friendly practices and activities, four types of a CES was 
suggested as reactive, focused, opportunistic and proactive strategy (Lee & Rhee, 
2007). 
        As abovementioned, numerous classifications of CES have been outlined in the 
previous studies. Referring to Aragón-Correa (1998)’s indication, such these schemes 
are built on the continuum ranging from reactivity to proactivity, which acts as a well-
formulated and broadly-utilized scheme set forth in the studies. Nevertheless, some 
authors have criticized this scheme, arguing that firms might adopt reactive positions 




(González‐Benito & González‐Benito, 2006; Kolk & Mauser, 2002). However, 
in spite of differences in terminology, the typology of CES applied in this thesis relies 
on the Sharma (2000)’s continuum that ranges from reactive to proactive. The reactive 
environmental strategy (RES) responds to changes in environmental regulations and 
stakeholder pressures by means of defensive lobbying and passive adoption of an end-
of-pipe pollution control approaches (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003), while a PES 
reflects a pattern of voluntary environmental initiatives beyond the compliance with 
environmental regulations through altering firm operations, processes, and products 
to prevent negative environmental impacts (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Sharma 
& Vredenburg, 1998). 
        Given the potential of PES to alleviate the negative effects of business activities 
on natural environment, organizational theorists and practitioners have paid greater 
attention to figure out the factors that prompt firm’s pursuit of PES (Sharma & Sharma, 
2011). One stream of research dominantly emphasizes the governmental regulations 
(Clemens & Douglas, 2006) and stakeholder pressure (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003) as 
motives of firms’ PES. Another body of studies investigates the endogenous drivers 
of corporate PES at organizational and individual levels. The organizations’ focus on 
customers, competitors, and technologies (Schmitz et al., 2019), institutional pressure, 
business performance improvement, business practices and market pressure and 
benefits (Vishwakarma, Nema, & Sangle, 2018), and organizational capabilities 
(Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998) at the organizational 
level, and the individual level factors including managers’ mindsets (Flannery & May, 
2000) as well as leadership (Egri & Herman, 2000), managerial interpretations of the 
environmental issue as opportunity rather than threat (Sharma, 2000), environment 
attitudes (Cordano & Frieze, 2000) and managers’ business ties (Jiang et al., 2020) 
have been associated with organizations’ PES adoption. 
        In addition, several studies has observed the realized outcomes of PES, including 
cost reduction, efficiency and productivity improvement (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008; 
Hart, 1995), legitimacy enhancement (Bansal & Clelland, 2004), the development of 
new market opportunity and easier accessing to the markets (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008), 
and differentiated products (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995b). 





        The individual concern has been argued as the key motivation for environmental 
responsiveness (Bansal & Roth, 2000). It is thereof expected that those who are aware 
of environmental issues and are concerned about the impact of their businesses on the 
natural environment are more likely to reduce the impact of their business activities. 
Environmental awareness (EA), which represents human being’s consideration and 
knowledge of the impacts of the businesses on the environment, is a prerequisite for 
acquiring the idea of environmental protection (Chen & Lou, 2003). Thus it is notably 
regarded the EA as the initial step in motivating human being to solve environmental 
problems (Ramsey, Hungerford, & Volk, 1992). Individuals with higher EA are more 
likely to conduct an environmental-friendly manner (Sekhokoane, Qie, & Rau, 2017). 
Previous studies have indicated that EA acts as a key predictor of pro-environmental 
behaviors in relation to environmental responsibility or practices (Qu, Liu, Nayak, & 
Li, 2015), and the green/environmental/ecological innovation (Gadenne, Kennedy, & 
McKeiver, 2009; Hillestad, Chunyan, & Haugland, 2010; Peng & Liu, 2016; Yu, Sun, 
& Chen, 2019),  
        EA is inherent in human nature, whereas the concept first becomes formalized in 
the late 1960s (Roth, 1992). Since then, numerous studies have attempted to interpret 
its exact meaning, which is yet to be reached because interpretations depend greatly 
on individual ideology. Although managers’ EA has been suggested as a key predictor 
of pro-environmental behaviors (Qu et al., 2015), a number of extant studies generally 
manifest EA as a single dimensional construct. Such defined approach to identify EA 
have limitations as it could capture only a part of this construct. Due to the complexity 
of human being’s cognition, EA, as conceptualized in recent studies, ought to be the 
multi-dimensional construct. 
        Referring to Gadenne et al. (2009)’s initial work, EA is explicitly divided into a 
general awareness and an awareness of costs and benefits related to the environmental 
issues. Based on the foregoing study, an empirical study adopts two categorizes of EA 
as the moderator in the relationship between environmental practices and sustainable 
development performance of Chinese eco-industrial park projects (Qu et al., 2015). 
Reliance on these insights triggers the further classifications of the term EA in Peng 




awareness (ERA) and environmental cost-benefit awareness (ECA). Specifically, the 
former ERA reflects the extent to which executives are conscious of firm’s negative 
impacts on the natural environment, implying the ethics and morality of executives in 
respect to dealing with business-natural environmental interface. The ECA, grounded 
by self-interest, demonstrates the managers’ recognition of potential cost reduction 
and/or profit improvement by means of environmental initiatives. 
        Obviously, EA, a special managerial cognition, has been suggested to encompass 
two dimensions rather than being a single dimensional construct (Gadenne et al., 2009; 
Peng & Liu, 2016). However, because managers tend to devise strategies derived from 
cognitions and perceptions (Gavetti, 2005), where the managerial attention has been 
focused on (Kaplan, 2011). Hence, these two distinct dimensions of EA respectively 
illustrate how managers perceive the corporate negative impacts on the environment, 
and their prediction of potential economic outcomes via environmental practices. By 
this very manifestation, this study strives to adopt EA’s two sub-dimensions, namely 
ERA and ECA, into the analysis in seeking to provide a holistic consideration of EA. 
 
Entrepreneurial orientation 
        Entrepreneurial orientation (EO), generally portrayed as a strategic posture, has 
become one of the most built constructs in entrepreneurship and broader management 
research (Wales, 2016). Although the historical roots of EO could be dated back to 
the works from Khandwalla (1977) and Mintzberg (1973), it was until Miller (1983)’s 
foundational publication that provided much needed clarity to management scholars. 
In this initial work, Miller (1983) conceived of EO as the simultaneous exhibition of 
three sub-dimensions, namely innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. Among 
them, innovativeness refers to a tendency to engage in creativity and experimentation 
through the introduction of new products/services, thereby deviating from established 
practices (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), risk-taking involves engaging in high-risk actions 
with chances of high returns, and also taking bold activities in uncertain environments 
(Covin & Slevin, 1989), and proactiveness refers to an opportunity-seeking, forward-
looking behavior that characterized by the introduction of new products and services 





In general, theorists would not call a firm entrepreneurial if it changed its technology 
or product line ... simply by directly imitating competitors while refusing to take any 
risks. Some pro-activeness would be essential as well. By the same token, risk-taking 
firms that are highly leveraged financially are not necessarily entrepreneurial. They 
must also engage in product market or technological innovation (p.780). 
        Building on Miller (1983)’s insights, a large stream of research has addressed the 
concept of EO accompanying with several ongoing ontological questions (Anderson, 
Kreiser, Kuratko, Hornsby, & Eshima, 2015). For example, the two predominant but 
diverging conceptualizations of EO have emerged4 (Covin & Lumpkin, 2011). One 
dominant conceptualizations conceived EO as a unidimensional construct that EO can 
be regarded as a sustained firm-level attribute represented by the singular quality that 
innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness have in common (Covin & Slevin, 
1989; Miller, 1983). The second is a multidimensional conceptualization based on the 
Lumpkin and Dess (1996)’s view of EO as a set of independent dimensions with each 
owns the respect effect. Recent theorizing posits such two conceptualizations can co-
exist in line with Covin and Lumpkin (2011)’s suggestion: 
Both conceptualizations of the EO construct can lead to theoretically and practically 
significant contributions to the EO knowledge base, and no compelling need to 
encourage the adoption of one EO conceptualization at the expense of the other (p.863). 
        As both conceptualizations are unquestionably legitimate (Covin & Miller, 2014), 
and responding to the recent call that the individual dimension of EO has a different 
association with other variables (Kreiser & Davis, 2010; Kreiser, Marino, Kuratko, & 
Weaver, 2013), our study takes a formative view of EO in examining the differentiated 
relationships between each sub-dimension and other key variables. 
        Furthermore, several meta-studies have suggested the positive and direct linear 
effect of EO on firm performance (Rauch et al., 2009). However, this direct linearity 
seems both spurious and ambiguous that should be questioned (Andersén, 2010) due 
to the complexity of “performance” as a multi-dimensional concept (González-Benito 
4 In the work of Covin and Wales (2012), they assert that “Overall, one might say that the Lumpkin 
and Dess’s (1996) conceptualization of EO is more domain-focused – that is, it specifies where to 
look for EO – whereas the Miller (1983) conceptualization of EO is more phenomenon-focused – 




                                                          
& González-Benito, 2005). As stated, the term “sustainable development” coined by 
WECD and the vital role of managers postulated in reaching this goal thereof catalyze 
a paradigm shift in today’s business. In this case, the new image of EO should convert 
to sustainable performance56 that includes financial and non-financial performance 
(Yan, Cao, Dong, & Han, 2018). On the other hand,  the direct association of EO and 
business performance is an over-simplification (Rauch et al., 2009) and little is known 
about the casual configuration of EO and other variables (Wales, Gupta, & Mousa, 
2013), such as business strategy (Rauch et al., 2009; Wales et al., 2013).  
        Regarding a PES, the main focus of this thesis, it reflects a pattern of pro-active 
actions, preferences, and decision-making involving in voluntarily managing the 
business-the natural environmental interface (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Thus in 
nature, the PES seems as entrepreneurial, innovative, and risky as it extends beyond 
environmental laws (Darnall et al., 2010; Sharma, 2000). Based on these assumptions, 
managers’ receptivity regarding pollution prevention will increase when firms possess 
more of an EO (Menguc et al., 2010) as their upper echelons. 
 
Political ties7 (Guanxi in China) 
Nonmarket strategy literature has generally declared that corporate executives 
may become political active with the purpose of obtaining the favorable public policy 
(Hillman & Wan, 2005), particularly in developing and transition economies. During 
times of transitional change, managers are likely to rely on network-based strategies, 
informal ties, and relational governance mechanisms, such as guanxi in China, to 
construct substitutes for the absent or weak formal institutions (Peng, Sun, Pinkham, 
& Chen, 2009), which is characterized as so-called institutional voids. However, when 
5 This argument is originated from the Author’s one published article titled “Is Entrepreneurial 
Orientation A Good Predictor of Sustainable Performance?” in Journal of Asia Entrepreneurship 
and Sustainability, 2018, 14(3), 124-165. 
6 By gliding sustainability into the mainstream areas of EO, the Author’s study re-conceptualizes the 
EO in light of sustainability and advance the new image of EO as the good predictor of sustainable 
performance instead of financial performance. 
7  Political ties (PTs) involve interlocking ties formed through formal personal service of senior 
managers as government and political officials or vice versa, and informal ties such as managers’ 
social relationships with politicians and bureaucrats. In this study, I focus on the informal ties rather 




                                                          
examining the role of networking in such an institutional void context, the mainstream 
research primarily centers on the managerial political ties (PTs) with governmental 
officials and regulatory entities (Faccio, 2006; Peng & Luo, 2000). 
Managerial PTs, defined as the executives’ boundary-spanning activities and 
their interpersonal connections with governmental officials in industrial bureaus and 
supporting organizations like tax bureaus, state banks, and commercial administration 
authorities (Peng & Luo, 2000). Better networking with politicians and governmental 
officials, because of its own strengths of reducing uncertainty and transaction costs, 
managing resource dependencies, and offering preferential access to information and 
policy influence (Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011), has been greatly valued and actively 
cultivated by executives as an effective means of coping with institutional voids. In 
China, ties are the deeply ingrained institution over 5,000 years (Li, Poppo, & Zhou, 
2008), and ties with political actors have led to a unique type of relational outcome 
named guanxi. Guanxi is a unique characteristic of Chinese society (Davies, Leung, 
Luk, & Wong, 1995), involving the “drawing on a web of connections to secure favors 
in personal and organizational relations” (Park & Luo, 2001). Therefore, guanxi has 
been regarded as the lifeblood of business transaction in China (Boisot & Child, 1996). 
Moreover, the performance effects of managerial PTs has attracted an increasing 
attention in both strategic management and organizational literatures. Several research 
findings have suggested the importance of PTs to firms survive (Faccio, Masulis, & 
McConnell, 2006), firms’ financial returns and market value (Hillman, 2005) and firm 
performance via enhanced legitimacy (Hillman, 2005). The most cited work from 
Peng and Luo (2000) indicates that PTs could lead to the organizational growth and 
performance in China. In addition, close ties with political actors could also facilitate 
firms’ collaborations with universities or institutions serving as critical channels for 
the acquisition of advanced knowledge and core technologies in Chinese firms (Zhang, 
2006). Ties may also provide intangible benefits such as influencing policies and rules 
(Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi, & Cannella Jr, 2008), facilitating market entry (Agrawal 
& Knoeber, 2001), and hindering competitors’ entry (Dean & Brown, 1995). 
However, social network theory cautions that ties are not always advantageous 
(Li et al., 2008). A burgeoning stream of literature has disclosed the “dark side” of the 




to yield not only opportunities, but also act to constrain firms (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). 
For example, in order to obtain resources, managers must undertake the governmental 
interference on employment (Sheng, Zhou, & Li, 2011) by compelling firms to hire 
unqualified or poorly-skilled employees in important posts (Chung, 2011). Reliance 
on PTs may also severely block a firm’s information flow due to the frequent position 
changes and rotations of political affiliates (Tsang, 1998). Furthermore, seeking-rent 
behaviors can be attributed to the political pressure exerted by governmental officials 
(Faccio, 2006), and the shortage of common shared interest between executives and 
their connected politicians also has a negative influence on strategic management and 
firm performance (Sheng et al., 2011). Additionally, PTs are costly to establish and 
maintain (Boubakri, Cosset, & Saffar, 2008), and time consuming (Fan, 2002). 
        Furthermore, the effectiveness of ties has been assumed to be contingent on some 
important contextual factors, such as firm ownership (Park & Luo, 2001), industrial 
growth (Peng & Luo, 2000), and market forces (Li et al., 2008). An empirical research 
conducted by Li et al. (2008) showing that managerial PTs positively affect domestic 
firms’ performance, whereas the effect is curvilinear for foreign firms. Also the heavy 
utilization of PTs would decrease the profitability of foreign firms in China (Li, Zhou, 
& Shao, 2009). Additionally, PTs studies, although insightful, further need to examine 
its impact on business strategy (Zhu & Chung, 2014), given the fact that managers’ 
political connections could impact the firms’ strategic decisions (Zhou, 2013), and 
networking with governmental officials is firmly believed to influence organizations’ 
strategic choices (Peng & Luo, 2000).  
 
Structure of this thesis 
        This dissertation consists of three separate articles pertaining to the antecedents 
of organizations’ PES adoption. 
        First study/Chapter1 sets out to explore the key success determinant/antecedent 
for a firm’s pursuit of PES in the context of China, by utilizing the quantitative method, 
semi-structured interview with top manager/environmental manager/CEOs in ten case 
firms. Contrary to quantitative methodology, multiple-case study has been ensured to 
have its unique advantage of “getting closer to constructs and being able to illustrate 




through a qualitative approach could unveil the hidden information in participants’ 
mindsets, as the exploratory study is carried out in a natural state without intervention 
and manipulation. Of particular referring to Ashley and Boyd (2006)’s review on the 
methodology adopted in environmental management studies, nearly two-thirds works 
(most of ‘Management’ and ‘People’ studies) depend on social surveys and interviews 
for the data collection8. As falling within ‘Management’ and ‘People’ scopes, utilizing 
the qualitative method in our study is well suited for addressing the motivations of 
participants related to PES.  
        Aligned with this presume, this study identified the ten participants depending 
on theoretical considerations (Miles & Huberman, 1994), and those respondents are 
intentionally sampled (Creswell John, 2007). Moreover, the selection of participants 
is based on convenience (Robinson, 2014) and the usage of multiple-case study could 
increase the validity and generalizability of robust findings (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). Primary data from telephone/wechat/ face-to-face interview in Cantonese, and 
secondary data gathered from corporate public documents, like public issued reports, 
environmental reports, policy declarations, news report and website, are both used to 
offer a holistic picture of PES. The interviews were all taped-recorded and transcribed, 
and follow-up phone call with corresponding informants was conducted if there is 
missing data. 
        We conducted a qualitative study of the motivations in driving PES in China, 
involving firms with three different ownership. Analytic induction applied to data 
indicated that the key motivation for private-owned enterprises (POEs) are managers’ 
long-term orientation, whereas the guanxi with local government incentivized the 
provincial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to adopt PES, in contrast to the competitive 
motivation for PES in another SOE affiliated to state-owned key enterprise. The 
salient motives for two foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) has been identified as the 
individuals’ ecological responsibility, in opposition to another FIE driven by 
competitive advantage. By comparing with prior studies, the differences include (1) 
8 “The key outcome of this study is that nearly two-thirds of the research examined relied on social 
surveys and interviews to collect data; that is, most of the 'Management' and all of the 'People' 
studies, while 'Economic' studies, traditionally associated with a rational perspective, also witnessed 




                                                          
whether the significantly positive impact of competitiveness on firms’ PES with the 
premise of being motivated by ecological responsibility firstly, and (2) whether the 
political ties (called guanxi) is beneficial for firm’s PES in China. 
        Second study/Chapter2 carries on examining the direct impact of ERA and ECA, 
two dimensions of managers’ EA (Gadenne et al., 2009; Peng & Liu, 2016), on firms’ 
PES, and the moderating effects of three dimensions of EO, namely, innovativeness, 
proactiveness, and risk-taking. Relying on managerial and organizational cognition 
theory (Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan, 2011; Walsh, 1995), executives’ cognitive or mental 
systems would influence their attention focus on and the subjective interpretation of 
business environment, and impact their response to external environmental changes. 
In addition, given the fact that organizational cognition plays an essential role in 
affecting environmental decision making (Sharma, 2000), this study integrates firms’ 
EO, a firm-level strategic orientation in pursuit of the strategy making practices, 
managerial philosophies, and entrepreneurial nature of corporate behaviors (Anderson, 
Covin, & Slevin, 2009), as the moderators between ERA/ECA and PES, in form of 
three independent dimensions, innovativeness, risk-taking, and proactiveness. 
        Regarding PES, it is regarded as a pattern of pro-active activities, preferences, 
and decision-making in managing business-natural environment interface (Sharma & 
Vredenburg, 1998). Thus it could be assured that PES is entrepreneurial, innovative, 
and risky as it goes beyond what is required by environmental regulations (Darnall et 
al., 2010; Sharma, 2000). Hence, the interplay of EA and EO in explaining firms’ PES 
seems to be reasonable and, in doing so, we theoretically and empirically contribute 
to the environmental management literature by examining how the two dimensions of 
EA facilitate firms’ PES, and identifying whether the impact of EA on PES will be 
strengthened or weakened under varying conditions with different levels of EO’s three 
dimensions. The empirical results based on a sample of 228 Chinese manufacturing 
firms, show that both of the two dimensions of EA, ERA and ECA, are positively and 
significantly related to PES, and that the positive relationship between ERA (ECA) 
and PES is strengthened (weakened) for firms with a higher level of innovativeness 
and for firms with a lower level of risk taking. Unexpectedly, the interaction between 
proactiveness and ERA (ECA) does not significantly impact PES. The findings also 




the consideration of both individual and organizational cognitions is significant in 
firms’ PES. 
        Third Study/Chapter3 investigates the effect of top managers’ political ties (PTs) 
on PES, and integrates the two activators, ERA and ECA of top managers’ EA as the 
moderators into the above relationship. To provide a holistic view of PTs, this study 
systematically analyzes the both positive and negative effects of PTs in relation to the 
PES in response to competing theories (i.e., “helping hand/bright side” or “grabbing 
hand/dark side”).  
        Moreover, although researchers and practitioners contend that PTs matter, less 
addressed is their contingent value (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). In line with the argument 
that the effectiveness of ties might be contingent on crucial contextual factors (Li et 
al., 2008), this study further regards ERA and ECA, two distinct dimensions of EA 
(Gadenne et al., 2009; Peng & Liu, 2016), as the PTs’ contingency, which is inspired 
by the significance of managers’ cognition, and underlying values in influencing the 
organizations’ strategy (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The empirical study based on a 
sample of 228 Chinese manufacturing firms revealed that managers’ PTs could 
significantly and positively affect firms’ PES, whereas the ERA positively moderates 
the relationship of PTs and PES, and ECA plays a negative moderating role in such 
relationship. 
 
Scope of this thesis 
        As aforesaid earlier, the majority of PES studies has tend to investigate Western 
societies (Delmas & Toffel, 2008), and the antecedents of PES might be different in 
China versus Western countries, because of its distinct institutional context and less-
developed national business systems (Chan, 2005). In addition, as the second largest 
economy and largest emerging market in the world, China, is of particular interest (Ye 
& Zhang, 2011) due to the paucity of study on environmental responsibility related to 
tremendous economic growth (Gao, 2009). Moreover, there is not a one-size-fits-all 
approach in environmental management. Thus, China undoubtedly provides an ideal 
context to explore the antecedents of PES aligned with our first research topic. 
        In second study, China is chosen as the research context background. First, the 




severity of environment condition and the protective responsibility of ecosystems. In 
the central government’s 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development 
in 2016–2020, protecting environment has been among six priority tasks, the “Green 
Concept” is involved in Five Development Ideas, and 16 environmental projects are 
shown in the 100 Dominant Projects of the Five-Year Plan. Moreover, building and 
practicing the idea of “lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets”9 was 
further facilitated in the “Report to the 19th Communist Party of China National 
Congress”10. The nation has expressed the determination to work with international 
community to realize the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and build a clean 
and beautiful world, as the partial content from the congratulatory letter for ecological 
forum11 sent by President Xi:  
“China highly values ecological and environmental protection," the president said. 
“Guided by the conviction that lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets, 
the country advocates harmonious coexistence between humans and nature, and sticks 
to the path of green and sustainable development.” 
        Second, entrepreneurship, as the vehicle of economic and societal transformation, 
could be viewed as an effective approach for resolving the global problems (Drucker, 
1986). In China, the entrepreneurship has been firmly appealed as the key motivation 
for entrepreneurs to participant in the ecological civilization construction, which is 
sustained by entrepreneurs’ sense of nation12 and corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Third, the new regulations clearly demand listed firms on the Corporate Governance 
Index and Shenzhen Stock Exchange 100 Index to issue CSR annual reports, and now 
numerous corporates voluntarily provide the reports (Wei, Shen, Zhou, & Li, 2017). 
As a result, business managers, such as Pony Ma, the leader of Tencent, are taking 
part in various environmental programs like China Pingan’s Low Carbon Action. In 
9 “Lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets” is translated into “绿水青山就是金山银
山” in Chinese. 
10 The 19th Communist Party of China National Congress was opened in 18th October, 2017. 
11 Chinese President Xi Jinping has sent a congratulatory letter to the Eco Forum Global Annual 
Conference Guiyang 2018, which opened in the capital of southwest China's Guizhou Province in 
7th July, 2018. 




                                                          
light of these arguments, the context of China would help to better understanding the 
role of top managers’ EA in pursuit of a firm’s PES. 
        It is no doubt that China presents an important yet idiosyncratic setting to study 
the PTs. First, ties are deeply ingrained institution in China over 5,000 years (Li et al., 
2008), and national economic activities are tightly embedded in the networks and ties 
of interpersonal relations (Uzzi, 1997). Being a special form of business-government 
relationship, managers’ PTs play a significant role in helping reducing the uncertainty 
and transaction cost, obtaining the governmental assistance (Li et al., 2008), managing 
the resource dependency and influencing the policy (Lux et al., 2011). As such, most 
managers to refer to ties as ‘lifeblood’ of business transactions (Xin & Pearce, 1996). 
Second, China has not become free markets yet (Zhang, Qi, Wang, Zhao, & Pawar, 
2019) because of less predictable and clear rules for market competition (Hoskisson, 
Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000). In this situation, cultivating ties with political actors has 
been highly valued by Chinese entrepreneurs aiming to substitute for missing formal 
institution and to achieve preferred outcome. Third, environmental issue has become 
the dominant topic on the political agenda in China Yuan, Bi, and Moriguichi (2006). 
Government at various levels have been setting various regulations and market-based 
approaches to encourage entrepreneurs to implement environmental practices (Lo & 
Fryxell, 2005). As such, China, a government-dominated transitional economy with 




Chapter 1: What Motivates Firms’ Proactive Environmental Strategy 
in China? A Qualitative Study from Top Managers’ Views 
 
Abstract: We conducted a qualitative study of the motivations in driving proactive environmental 
strategy (PES) in China, involving firms with three different ownerships. Analytic induction applied 
to data collected from 10 case firms revealed the key motivation for private-owned enterprises (POEs) 
is executives’ long-term orientation, while guanxi with local government incentivizes the provincial 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to conduct PES, in contrast to the competitive motivation for PES in 
another SOE affiliated to state-owned key enterprise. The foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) tend to 
adopt PES motivated by a more diverse set of drivers. Ecological responsibility has been identified 
as the salient motives in favor of two foreign firms’ PES, in contrast to another FIE merely motivated 
by competitive advantage. By comparison with prior studies, the differences include (1) whether the 
positive impact of competitiveness on firms’ PES should be built on the premise of being primarily 
motivated by ecological responsibility, and (2) whether the political ties (referred to guanxi in China) 
act as the driving force for provincial SOEs’ and the barrier for POEs’ adoption of PES. 
 
Keywords: Proactive environmental strategy; Guanxi; Industry peer; Competitiveness. 
 
Introduction 
The efficient mitigation of environmental burden heavily requires corporates to 
utilize proactive environmental strategy (PES) to prevent the negative environmental 
impacts (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). As such, investigating “why” firms should 
proactively manage its business-natural environment interface has gained attention in 
the management literature over past two decades (Sharma & Sharma, 2011). Broadly, 
this “why” question has been answered in terms of institutional-, organizational-, and 
individual-level motives through the lens of various theories and paradigms (Etzion, 
2007), contending the government-enforced regulations (Powell & DiMaggio, 2012), 
stakeholder norms (Darnall et al., 2010; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999), organizational 
capability (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998), as well as 
the concerning of local community (Banerjee et al., 2003) as the macro-level drivers, 
and the individual determinants such as managers’ mindsets (Flannery & May, 2000) 




issues as opportunity rather than threat (Sharma, 2000), and managers’ business ties 
(Jiang et al., 2020). Besides, the interplay of firm’s entrepreneurial orientation (EO) 
and governmental regulations’ intensity was proposed in Menguc et al. (2010)’s work. 
Although greater effort has been making to answer the ‘why’ question, such an 
impressive amount of studies to predict the PES is limited. In particular, most studies 
shed light on Western societies (Delmas & Toffel, 2008), which does not absolutely 
reflect the firms’ PES in developing countries. We speculate that a well examination 
on PES and its antecedents in various institutional contexts is significant given that 
global environmental problems ask for contingent approaches. In fact, the profiles of 
national culture are firmly believed to affect the corporate strategic decisions (Franke, 
Hofstede, & Bond, 1991) as an influential contingency for both strategy formulation 
and implementation (Mattern & Moon, 2008). Focusing on PES, the national context 
has been suggested to impact the managers’ environmental attitudes and values (Park, 
Russell, & Lee, 2007). Examples of its importance are the greater variation of ISO 
14000’s diffusion across countries (Corbett & Kirsch, 2004), and the findings from 
Liu et al. (2015)’s study, implying that top managers’ mindsets, stakeholders norms, 
and government regulations generate different effects on PES between China and 
Western countries. Along with this premise, we predict the investigation of PES and 
its antecedents in distinct contexts is critical given the fact that traditional culture and 
historical factors are able to explain the PES differences (Li & Peng, 2008).  
As aforesaid, it is meaningful to investigate why firms favor PES in non-western 
countries. Since research on contingencies is of significance in the environmental 
management field (Schmitz et al., 2019), therefore, regarding the national context as 
a vital contingency would enable us to better understand whether previously identified 
predictors of PES remain effective in other regions. To enrich the “why” answers, this 
study chooses to address the above research topic in China, the world’s second largest 
country along with increasing significance in global economy (Ralston, Egri, Stewart, 
Terpstra, & Kaicheng, 1999). The reasons for choosing this nation as our study setting 
are as followed. First, Western societies and China have extremely distinct cultures 
that might impact the PES and its antecedents (Liu et al., 2015). Specifically, Chinese 
dialectical thinking possesses three principles, consisting of “change (the universe is 




true), and holism (everything in the universe is connected)” (Peng & Nisbett, 1999), 
Western dialectical thinking, conversely, is prone to be synthetic, emphasizing “the 
law of identity (everything must be identical to itself), non-contradiction (the same 
thing cannot be both true and false), and the law of the excluded middle (everything 
is either true of false)” (Peng & Nisbett, 1999). Thus it can be seen that those two 
types of cognitive mode are extremely different. Second, China has under-developed 
and incomplete environmental regulations (Li & Peng, 2008), while the majority of 
Western firms adhere to the stringent and well-developed environmental legal systems 
that strongly affect the environmental behaviors (Christmann & Taylor, 2001). Third, 
in terms of Chinese culture, it is no surprise that the Confuciansim, one of traditional 
cultures, has largely affected business decision making (Ip, 2009). The concepts 
nurtured by Confuciansim, such as “Morality and Profit” (义利) and “Worshipping 
the Mean and Valuing the Harmony” (尚中贵和), are in line with China’s ecological 
civilization and the methods for business survival. Therefore, Confucianism, to some 
extent, would have an invisible impact on environmental decision making, which is 
dubbed as “corporate social responsibility (CSR) with Chinese characteristics”. Lastly, 
there does not exist a universal prescription and a one-size-fits-all approach in the 
realm of environmental management (Barnett, 2007). And a hallmark of transition 
economies is the coexistence of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and nonstate-owned 
enterprises. Of particular interest in China, SOEs’ managers are inclined to fulfill the 
government expectation in contrast to those of nonstate-owned enterprises, such as 
private-owned enterprises (POEs) and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). Taken 
together, China is an ideal research context for our study. 
In addition, in light of exploratory nature of this research topic, and in accordance 
with the call from Ashley and Boyd (2006) that “nearly two-thirds of environmental 
management research centered on ‘management’ and ‘people’ relied on social survey 
and interviews to collect data”, this study applies the qualitative approach via semi-
structured interviews with top manager/environmental manager/CEOs from 10 cases 
in China as this study embracing ‘management’ and ‘people’. Multiple-case study is 
an exploratory approach carried out in a natural state without any intervention and 




Notably, this study is a timely research as it provides the insights into the driving 
forces of PES in case companies with different ownership. Moreover, we try to clarify 
how those observed motivations differ among various samples. Comparing our results 
with those found in prior studies, the differences and similarities would be further 
discussed. 
The remainder of the study is as follows. First section reviews a piece of extant 
literature. The second section presents the research methodology and qualitative data 
analysis. The interview results will be discussed in next section, followed by the cross-
case comparative analysis and the comparison between our derived motivators and 
antecedents suggested in prior studies. The final section draws the main conclusions, 
limitation and future studies. 
 
Literature Review 
Increasingly negative effects of business on the environment has urged managers 
to develop corporate environmental strategy (CES) (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003), 
to deal with business-natural environment interface (Sharma, 2000). However, firms’ 
CES could be reactive and proactive (Agarwala, 2005; Sharma, 2000). Firms focused 
on sustainable development are more likely to adopt PES (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 
2003) to prevent negative environmental impacts (Aragón-Correa, 1998) rather than 
merely control the pollution. Examples of PES consist of ISO 14001 (Christmann & 
Taylor, 2001), resources recycling and utilizing renewable sources (Fryxell & Lo, 
2003), developing environmental-friendly products and processes (Klassen, 2001), 
initiating eco-technological innovations (Berrone & Gomez-Mejia, 2009), executing 
environmental policies (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999), utilizing benchmarking and 
accounting procedure (Nash & Ehrenfeld, 1997), setting environmental performance 
goals and disclosing the information (Hart, 2005), auditing environmental condition, 
organizing employees training of pro-environmental behavior and linking employee 
compensation to environmental performance (Welford, 1998). 
What motives firms’ PES? It is critical to understand why some firms adopt PES 
while others are not willing to. Indeed, scholars have paid a great deal of attention on 
investigating PES antecedents guided by different theories and paradigms (Aragón-





Institutional-level antecedents of PES 
Business actions are notably embedded in a network of stakeholder relationships. 
Stakeholders, defined as “any group or individual who can affect or is influenced by 
firms’ goals” (Freeman, 2010), is classified into primary and secondary groups. 
Primary stakeholders, due to its direct stake in the firms (Donaldson & Preston, 1995), 
positively react to firms’ environmental actions through filing suit against the way 
managers are doing business (Darnall et al., 2010). Whereas the corporate buyers and 
suppliers are inclined to echo by cancelling purchase or selling agreements, stopping 
delivery of raw materials, or seeking other substitutes. Inside the firms, employees in 
favor of environmental protection tend to seek positions or continue the employments 
(Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999). In a case of showing dissatisfaction is to engage in the 
public whistle-blowing to expose firm’s omitted environmental practices (Henriques 
& Sadorsky, 1999).  
Indirect involving in commerce transactions (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), 
secondary stakeholders comprises of public interest group, such as environmental and 
community organizations, labor unions, and industry associations (Etzion, 2007), and 
environmental regulators who are powerful to launch legal requirements and inspect 
firms’ compliance with stringent laws (Fineman & Clarke, 1996). Thus, under these 
scrutinization (Hart, 1995), firms ought to improve their reputation and maintain 
legitimacy through transparent communication.  
Moreover, institutional pressure is also regarded as a main motive underlying the 
adoption of PES (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003). In most studies, governments-enforced 
laws and rules have been suggested to exert potential control on firm’s PES (Powell 
& DiMaggio, 2012). Firms abiding by environmental regulations protect themselves 
from political risks, particularly when their offenses are costly (Berrone, Fosfuri, 
Gelabert, & Gomez‐Mejia, 2013). For example, Chinese government and Western 
authorities would incentivize proactive environmental protection (Liu et al., 2010) to 
stimulate the firms’ adoption of ISO 14001 certificate. 
What’s more, different regulation systems also play a significant role in affecting 
the antecedents of PES. That is, managers commonly have different cognitions toward 




Silverman, 2010). In comparison with Western societies’ environmental regulations 
systems (Escobar & Vredenburg, 2011), China’s regulatory system is less-developed 
(Chan, 2005) accompanying with lower environmental standards and imperfect 
regulations (Christmann & Taylor, 2001). Some Chinese firms that meet international 
requirements often employ more PES contrasting with others that meet local standards.  
          
Organizational-level antecedents of PES 
The organization and the natural environment research have broadly figured out 
several capabilities that prompt firms’ PES. Specifically, these capabilities includes 
organizational learning, shared vision, cross-functional integration, strategic 
proactivity, and constant innovation (Aragón-Correa, 1998; Christmann, 2000; Hart, 
1995; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). Organizational learning, a fundamental way to 
develop inner capacities related to competitive advantage (Bontis, Crossan, & Hulland, 
2002), has been  to be in supportive of PES through cross-functional knowledge 
transferring. Firms with a strategic proactivity capabilities are inclined to develop 
processes and routines in order to capture new opportunities (Aragón-Correa, 1998). 
Besides, collaborating with multiple stakeholders in seeking effective way to handle 
environmental problems could help firm to develop PES (Hart, 1995).  
In addition, from resource dependence theory, the director interlocks with firms 
providing knowledge-intensive business services are positively associated with PES 
adoption (Ortiz-de-Mandojana, Aragón-Correa, Delgado-Ceballos, & Ferron-Vilchez, 
2012) relying on an empirical study of US electric firms. In another study using the 
samples from larger firms, it has indicated that larger-sized enterprises are more likely 
to choose the PES (Aragón-Correa, 1998).  
 
Individual-level antecedents of PES 
Extant studies that examine the determinants of firms’ PES predominantly adopt 
an institutional or stakeholder perspective (Céspedes-Lorente, de Burgos-Jiménez, & 
Álvarez-Gil, 2003; Delmas & Toffel, 2004a; Rueda‐Manzanares, Aragón‐Correa, 
& Sharma, 2008). These studies over-stress the significant role of stakeholder’s norms, 
however, firms’ reacting to external pressure is derived from managerial interpretation 




stakeholder perspective could satisfactorily explain the internal driving forces for 
firms’ PES (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). This is well evidenced in Sharma and 
Vredenburg (1998)’s empirical study showing a variety of CES among 99 firms in the 
same institutional context. In line with argument that institutional and macro-level 
perspectives cannot explain the different strategies chosen by firms in the same 
institutions (Delmas & Toffel, 2004a), studies transferring from macro to micro-level 
would make us accurately grasp the behavioral drivers behind the environmental 
strategies (Papagiannakis et al., 2014).  
With respect to PES, top manager’s personal attitude toward natural environment 
is influential in response to environment issues (Williams & Schaefer, 2013). Relying 
on Value Belief Norm theory, personal attitude and moral norms is stressed as the key 
motives of pro-environmental behavior (Cordano & Frieze, 2000; Stern, Dietz, Abel, 
Guagnano, & Kalof, 1999). Moreover, managers possessing environmental strategic 
mindsets are likely to adopt PES (Flannery & May, 2000; Marshall, Akoorie, Hamann, 
& Sinha, 2010) and favor firms’ PES (Lin & Ho, 2011). The reflection of managers’ 
environmental leadership (Egri & Herman, 2000), manager’s interpretation of this 
issue (Sharma, 2000), and their business ties (BTs) (Jiang et al., 2020) are beneficial 
for firms’ PES pursuit. 
Apparently, multiple works have suggested diverse motivations of PES, coupling 
with a higher percentage of studies in Western countries (Delmas & Toffel, 2008). By 
contrast, few individual-level factors consisting of ecological motivation, managers’ 
BTs, managerial interpretation of environmental issues, and family ownership and 
internal environmental training on the organizational-level have been indicated as the 
predictors of firms’ PES in China (Dou, Su, & Wang, 2019; Jiang et al., 2020; Liu et 
al., 2010; Walker, Ni, & Huo, 2014; Yang, Wang, Zhou, & Jiang, 2019). With this 
premise as a reference, there is a growing need for studying environmental strategy in 
various contexts (Kang & Lee, 2016) like China as an emerging market. 
However, firms in emerging market often lack incentives to comply with the 
environmental regulations due to weak governmental capacity. In a qualitative study 
conducted in China, Wang et al. (2018) found that the lack of enforcing mechanisms 
in local government and the priority of economic development over environmental 




firms. Thus it can be implied that the institutional and macro-level perspectives cannot 
satisfactorily explains the internal drivers for firms’ PES in the emerging market. In 
response to Delmas and Toffel (2004)’s call, institutional perspective cannot explain 
why firms subject to the same institutional context choose different environmental 
strategies. Therefore, given that firms in emerging market engage in PES despite from 
the external environmental forces, scholars have recently argued that investigation at 
the individual level would allow us to better understand behavioral drivers that inform 
the environmental decision making of key players (Papagiannakis et al., 2014).  
Furthermore, prior research argues that the engagement in PES, a result of choice 
made by managers, is driven by their attitudes towards the natural environment (Ervin, 
Wu, Khanna, & Wirkkala, 2013) because managers tend to devise strategies based on 
their cognition and perception (Gavetti, 2005). However, managers’ cognition is of 
significance in face of uncertainty and managers are more inclined to make sense of 
ambiguous signals from the environment. Sensemaking portrays the process by which 
managers, in face of uncertainty and ambiguity, develop subjective representations of 
firm’s environment that allow them to construct strategic choice and subsequent firm 
actions (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991). With respect to PES, it clearly reflects how top 
managers perceive the importance of environmental protection and balance the costs 
and benefits of adoption environmental initiatives. Along with this thought, this study 
largely conducts the in-depth interview with executives in seek to explore the drivers 
of firms’ PES in China, which is better aligned with the emerging research stream that 
calls for paying attention to the microfoundations of corporate sustainability (Aguinis 





Table1.1 The antecedents of PES in reviewing articles 
# Author(s) Country Method Industry Antecedents Journal 
1 Henriques and 
Sadorsky (1996) 





Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management 
2 Sharma and 
Vredenburg 
(1998) 
Canada Interview 7 firms 
 
Oil/gas industry 
Organizational capability Strategic Management 
Journal 
3 Sharma (2000) Canada Questionnaire 99 firms  
Oil/gas industry 
Managerial interpretations of 
environmental issue as opportunity 
Academy of Management 
Journal 











Leadership Academy of Management 
Journal 




Interview 53 firms Competitiveness 
Legitimation 
Ecological responsibility 
Academy of Management 
Journal 
6 Buysse and 
Verbeke (2003) 
Belgium Questionnaire  
 




Stakeholders pressure Strategic Management 
Journal 







S&P 500 firms Liability threats  
Consumer/investors/public pressure 






USA Interview 19 managers 
Wine industry 
Personal attitudes and subject norm 
Local regional and community 
association 
Command-and-control mechanisms 





Table 1.1 The antecedents of PES in reviewing articles (Continued) 











372 Skiing resort 
sectors 
Organizational capability Canadian Journal of 
Administrative Sciences  



















Journal of Management 
Studies 




Questionnaire  325 firms 
Multiple industry 
Interaction between entrepreneurial 
orientation and government 
regulations intensity 
Journal of Business Ethics 
12 Liu et al. (2010) China Questionnaire 132 firms 
 
 
Viewing environmental issues as 
opportunities 
Internal environmental training 
Journal of Environmental 
Management 




Family firms Attitudes towards environmental 
preservation 
Subjective norms regarding firm as a 
vehicle 
Perceived behavior control regarding 
ability to build firm’s capabilities  















Table 1.1 The antecedents of PES in reviewing articles (Continued) 























Sharing information with employees  
Promoting employee collaboration 
Organization & Environment 
17 Singh, Jain, and 
Sharma (2014) 





buyers and suppliers/services 
pressure 
Journal of cleaner production 
18 Walker et al. 
(2014) 
China Questionnaire 161 firms  
Multiple industries 
Ecological motivation 
Regulatory stakeholder pressure 




Spain Questionnaire 143 environmental 
consulting firms 
Managers’ attitudes towards 
sustainable development  
Short‐term firm performance 
Business Strategy and the 
Environment 
20 Liu et al. (2015) Western 
countries 
China 
Meta-analysis 68 studies Governmental regulations 
Stakeholder norms 
Managers’ mindsets  
Management and 
Organization Review 
21 Pinzone, Lettieri, 
and Masella 
(2015) 
Italy Questionnaire 63 healthcare firms Stakeholder pressure  
Employee commitment 




Table 1.1 The antecedents of PES in reviewing articles (Continued) 
# Author(s) Country Method Industry Antecedents Journal 
22 Ryszko (2016) Poland Computer-
assisted 
interview 
292 firms Interorganizational cooperation  
Knowledge sharing 
Polish Journal of 
Environmental Studies 
23 Yang, Wang, 
Hu, and Gao 
(2018) 
China Questionnaire 1391 nonlisted firms Superior performance of listed firms Business Strategy and the 
Environment 
24 Yang et al. 
(2019) 
China Questionnaire 935 listed firms  Managers’ perceived business and 
social pressures 
Journal of Business Ethics 
25 Dou et al. (2019) China Questionnaire 454 private firms Family ownership Journal of Business Ethics 




349 energy sector  Customer/competitive/technological 
orientation 
Organization & Environment 
27 Tatoglu et al. 
(2020) 
Turkish Questionnaire 519 firms  
Multiple industries 
Customer-focus 
Differentiation strategy pursuit 
Subject to greater strategy-oriented 
Stakeholder focus 
British Journal of 
Management 
28 Jiang et al. 
(2020) 
China Archival data 
Questionnaire 

















There is a general divide between two methodological approaches available for 
utilization by scholars, namely, qualitative and quantitative methods. However, 
quantitative method is restricted to the set of concrete items or stalemates designed 
by the researcher (e.g. rating their agreement to prescribed statements numerically). 
In contrast to this method, qualitative research, a typical kind of exploratory study, 
tend to utilize researcher as the tool to explore social phenomenon in the natural 
situation. Thus it can be seen that such kind of approach encourage the participants 
to provide rich responses and facilitate a deeper investigation of the issue by means 
of asking less pre-defined and open-ended questions (Biggerstaff, 2012). 
The core characteristics of qualitative research can be regarded as the in-depth 
study conducted through field investigation, open interviews, participatory and non-
participatory observation, case exploration, and other approaches. In environmental 
management field, a number of studies, such as case studies conducted by Lawrence 
and Morell (1995) examining proactive environmental management. In terms of our 
research topic, since it mainly focuses on the “why” question, and the aim is to seek 
for answers to the “why” questions from personal interviewing with key participants. 
In addition, our exploratory research obviously falls into ‘management’ and ‘people’ 
in the environmental management field that could adopt social survey and interview 
to collect data (Ashley and Boyd, 2006). Moreover, single case study possibly leads 
to some potential biases like misjudging the representativeness of a single event 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1986), and inevitably exaggerates the salience of a datum 
due to its ready availability, multiple-case approach is thus beneficial for guarding 
against observer biases. 
Taken together, this study applied an interview-based multiple-case approach, 
which appears as the most suitable methodology for addressing the “why” questions 
(Pratt, 2009). Case study, an empirical inquiry contemporary phenomenon in its 
real-life contexts, especially when phenomenon-context boundaries are not evident 
(Yin, 2017), is thus the logical approach for this study (Leonard-Barton, 1990). In 
the meantime, due to its unique advantage of being closer to constructs and able to 
build direct and causal relationship (Siggelkow, 2007), case study could provide a 




this approach can generalize robust findings in contrast with single one (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007).  
 
Samples 
The criteria of selecting participants is generally driven by theory itself rather 
than statistical sampling (Miles & Huberman, 1994). In theoretical sampling, cases 
are selected to highlight theoretical issues and to refute of challenge the theory being 
tested. To ensure the logic and coherence (Miles & Huberman, 1994), we adopt a 
purposive approach reflecting all respondents are intentionally selected (Creswell 
John, 2007). Choosing participants built on convenience is also legitimate for our 
study (Robinson, 2014). Key informants include general managers/environmental 
managers/CEOs who are responsible for strategic decision-making. Seeking to 
achieve our research aims, the questionnaire is designed to understand drivers for 
adoption of PES in firms, clearly separating into two sections. The first part shows 
the profiles of participants as indicated in Table 1.2, and four questions around the 
topic in the second section (See Appendix 1). 
 





Gender Ownership # of employees Industry 
Respondent 1 GM 20 Male Private-owned 500 Chemistry 
Respondent 2 EM 25 Male Foreign-invested 2900 Semiconductor 
Respondent 3 EM 15 Female Foreign-invested 180 Printer 
Respondent 4 EM 20 Female Foreign-invested 4000 Processing 
Respondent 5 EM 20 Male State-owned 12000 Wine 
Respondent 6 EM 7 Male Private-owned 1400 Medicine 
Respondent 7 EM 1.5 Male Private-owned 1400 Bio-
pharmaceuticals 
Respondent 8 EM 15 Female Private-owned 53531 Milk 
Respondent 9 GM 32 Male State-owned 679 Wine 
Respondent 10 EM 16 Male State-owned 2100 Active carbon 
Notes: To preserve anonymity, the company names are not revealed.  
      GM=General Manager, EM=Environmental Manager. 
 
This study also contemplated trying to identify environmental pioneers in the 




natural environmental interface. We conform to the following criteria. Firstly, they 
have issued annual environmental or sustainable development report. Secondly, 
they are the firms that possess wide national recognition in the environmental field. 
Finally, they adhere to ISO 14001 Norm as a reflection of environmental proactivity. 
Complying with three criteria, this study consists of cases belong to different sectors 
including chemistry, printing, wine, semiconductor, medicine and processing, and 
so on. Moreover, the selected firms consist of four POEs, three FIEs, and three SOEs. 
 
Data collection 
Primary and secondary sources of information are both used to in our study. 
For secondary data, sustainability/environmental reports, newspapers and journals, 
corporate public documents, and web pages were taken into consideration. These 
information served to confirm the reliability of the interviewees’ responses. Primary 
sources as in-depth interviews through telephone/wechat/face-to-face, observation 
are utilized for identifying distinct motivators in each case company’s PES. On 
average, each interview lasted approximately between two and three hours and was 
carried out in Cantonese. Anonymous survey and confidentiality were granted. Such 
technique provides a stronger validation of the results.  
 
Data analysis 
Data analysis followed multi-step as follows. First, the authors personally 
contact each participant through phone call, and demonstrate the chief purpose of 
interviews. Meanwhile, the interviewer place the emphasis on the authenticity of 
information from respondents. Second, the authors identify the interview time with 
key informants, and explain the information needs to be transcribed and handwritten. 
In addition, follow-up phone call would be conducted if few data were missing. 
Third, secondary data was collected and triangulated with data drawn from the 
interviews to enhance reliability. Lastly, first-hand summary was discussed with 






Two important themes in strategy management over the last 20 years have been 
the role of top management (Lewin & Stephens, 1994), and the strategic decision 
making (Rajagopalan, Rasheed, & Datta, 1993). Given that corporate managers are 
the producers of firms’ strategies, the strategic decision making is not independent 
of managerial cognition and decision-making features (Dess, 1987). Meanwhile, 
how top managers define the strategy is highly related to the way they interact with 
strategy making. Aligned with this suggestions, the interviews have been initially 
conducted with the question of “How do you define PES?”, and key factors will be 
identified through our in-depth interviews. 
 
The meaning of PES 
As we know, there is no consensus on the meaning of strategy among both 
scholars and practitioners (Markides, 2001). With regard to PES, it has been defined 
as intangible managerial routines and organizational innovations that require firms’ 
commitments to improve environmental condition (Hart, 1995), or voluntary 
environmental practices as waste reduction and pollution prevention at its source 
(Aragón-Correa & Rubio-Lopez, 2007). Another definition from Liu et al. (2015) 
regards the PES as “firms’ voluntary environmentally protective strategic plans and 
action arrangements going beyond requirements”. 
In reality, most respondents describe PES as the concept of “circular economy” 
(循环经济), which means the particular pollutants, such as solid, gas, water and other 
liquid wastes, might be re-utilized as the primary raw materials for the new products. 
Abiding by such idea, the so-called “turn waste into treasure” (变废为宝) could be 
eventually realized in reality. Moreover, proactive environmental practices could be 
viewed as an effective means of coping with business risk as respondent 1 suggested: 
 
 “It is no doubt that environmental issues have become a worldwide topic. In my opinion, the 
particular emission resulted from the current production process sometimes could be utilized as the 
raw material for the new product. Take CO2 emission for example, such emission seems like the 
by-product in my company. However, my proactive decision is to intensively collect the CO2 and 




photosynthesis in greenhouse big shed (温室大棚). With such high concentration of CO2, the crops 
will grow fast. In the end, we are able to achieve ‘zero carbon emissions’.” (Respondent 1) 
 
Besides, numerous studies have classified the environmental strategy into the 
reactive strategies and proactive ones (Aragón-Correa, 1998). Nevertheless, some 
authors criticized this view by arguing that firms could adopt reactive strategies in 
face of environmental threats, and could take advantages of proactive postures at 
certain moments (Kolk & Mauser, 2002), as respondent 2 commented:  
 
“In my mind, a firm’s environmental strategy is a dynamic and complex process, which means 
there is no boundary between PES and reactive environmental strategy (RES) that bases on the 
compliance in the firm.” (Respondent 2) 
 
Motivators of firms’ PES 
Through in-depth interviews with key informants, they extensively provide the 
accurate motivation related to firms’ PES adoption. Table1.3 summaries the coding 
findings arising from analysis of qualitative data. 
 
Strategic vision 
Given today’s growing uncertainty, there is a current consensus that business 
direction is enhanced by strategic vision (Doz, Hamel, & Prahalad, 1989). In 
essence, strategic vision is an articulation by executives toward the organization’s 
desired future and is integral to the strategic planning process (Bennis & Nanus, 
1985). The advantages taken from strategic vision, particularly for firms involved 
in turbulent environment, have been assumed as offering ‘sense of whole’ for 
business (Morris, 1987). 
Paying attention to organizations’ PES, the strategic vision is firmly assumed 
as an influential factor. Some respondents indicated that the environmental concerns 
should be the core part of business, which is required to be aligned with strategic 





“The environmental consideration on my organization’s strategic level could contribute to 
‘build to last’ (Collins, Collins, & Porras, 2005). In my mind, I am a forward-looking manager with 
the question ‘how long the firm could survive’ in the brain. Thus, my long-term orientation to some 
extent stands for the firm’s strategic vision. Guided by such idea, the products standards always 
conform to the European Norms, including the environmental standard. As such, the project team 
in my company has to bear these in mind when starting a new product.” (Respondent 1) 
 
 “It does have either reactive or proactive environmental posture in the firm. For our company, 
we adopt the PES in terms of wasted water, air, noise and solid wastes. Though it needs to hugely 
invest in environmental management, the development concept that ‘our products are not backward 
in at least 10 years’ encourages us to voluntarily initiate environmental measures going beyond the 
governmental regulations.” (Respondent 6) 
 
“In my company, our goal is to live longer for providing the cost-effective medicines for the 
patients. Thereby, we have been focusing on dealing with business-environment relationship. For 
example, in the realm of excretion of nitrogen and phosphorus, we always proactively carry on 
corresponding environmental policies, and has been keeping grasping the latest regulations. Thus 
it could be said that it is the strategic vision motivates us to do so.” (Respondent 7) 
 
“In 2007, our younger general managers primarily put forward the corporate sustainability and 
pointed out that ‘social value is greater than economic value’. Since then, all the employees have 
been pursuing the concept of sustainable development, and our company was awarded the title of 
‘2020 Best Practice for Sustainable Development’ in 2020. Because of these merits, the socially 
responsible investors are willing to become our major shareholders, which is beneficial for long-
term growth. In addition, only the terminology of ‘sustainable development’ is a universe language 
in the world, which can help to promote brand image and improve corporate reputation, and in turn 
enhance customer’s perception of our products to the higher degree.” (Respondent 8) 
 
Furthermore, the strategic globalization layout adopted by parent company in 
host countries also probe the branches’ environmental images. Multinationals are 
incentivized to generate environmental standards beyond governmental regulations 




standard could reinforce a multinational’s transparency, reputation and legitimacy 
(Dowell, Hart, & Yeung, 2000). This might be positioning the parent company as a 
“global company”, according to statement of respondent 3: 
 
 “It was really appeared as an international company through the strategic globalization. Thus, 
we are responsible for building an environmental-friendly company in China, because other 
branches worldwide are in an effort to proactively cope with environmental degradation. Now, we 
are in the leading position among the entire industry peer firms.” (Respondent 3) 
 
Managerial cognition 
The discipline of strategic management could be assured as a behavioral and 
cognitive science amongst its academic foundations (Frith & Tapinos, 2020). Along 
with this thought, some scholars have called to focus on the micro-level factors in 
exploring behavioral motives (Papagiannakis et al., 2014). That is, top managers’ 
personal values and underlying belief are positively related to strategic choice and 
such a tendency confirms the statement that ‘how firms react to natural environment 
depends on the way how managers predict it’ (Peng & Liu, 2016). 
However, although most executives assure the environmental management as 
an additional costs (Simpson, Taylor, & Barker, 2004), the competitive advantage 
generating from cost-benefit analysis is argued to significantly affect the firms’ PES, 
from the explanation below: 
 
 “From the very beginning, we are inclined to bear in mind about the business. As protecting 
the environment seems as an externality that requires investments in many aspects, such as 
purchasing costs for cleaner material and technological appliances, and financial benefits resulted 
from invests are not obtained directly. In this situation, each time when we make environmental 
decisions, the cost benefit analysis is the first step, and only if the return on investment could be 
generally predicted that we would devote organization’s resources to adopt PES. Take the water 
resource recycling as instance, in 2019, we installed the water reuse system in our manufacturing 
plant, with the achievement of 137 ton water saving every day and 50,000 tons water saving in the 




cleaning products. More importantly, it is also beneficial for us to improve firm’s reputation/image, 
which favor a more profitable exploring of marketing opportunities.” (Respondent 2) 
 
“Although my company is a state-owned enterprise, the proactive approach for dealing with 
environmental issues stems from the cost-benefit analysis, which means our measures in managing 
business-natural environment interface is aiming at reducing costs” (Respondent 10) 
 
Likewise, the core value shared by the firm is more likely to play a crucial role 
in making business strategy. In our interview, the respondent 3 specifically explains 
firm’s environmental protection system, including wasted recycling system, and re-
manufacturing of consumable, laminating machines and accessories. Such proactive 
environmental activities derived from founders’ corporate social responsibility 
management philosophy. With this guideline, numerous environmental indicators 
are wholly integrated into business performance assessment, such as energy using, 
discharged waste water, CO2 emission, and recoverability rate of recycled resources. 
The notion from some respondents as followed: 
 
“The values shared by the firm and often formulated in the firm’s vision likewise play a role 
in affecting the strategy. Guided by our founder’s CSR concepts, we integrate such an effective and 
operational thought into firm. Moreover, to ensure implementation effects, business performance 
assessment systems encompasses the larger portions of environmental performance indicators in 
our company. On this point, truly successful initiation of green change in our organization depends 
on the CSR organizational culture shaped by our founder.” (Respondent 3) 
 
“For any company, profit should come first. However, with respect to the environmental 
protection, we spend almost 6 million RMB last year on developing environmental programs. From 
this view, I would take greater pride in our kind-hearted business based on the benefits for future 
generations. For example, we insist on regularly developing the 5 years’ Environmental Plan, and 
specify all the indicators related to pollution prevention, such as CO2 emission, utilization rate of 
clean energy, and recycling of wasted water, and so on. Inside our factory, the solar streetlights 
have been installed and the garbage classification idea has been promoted toward not only ourselves 





Guanxi with local government 
In transition economies, such as China, network-based strategy has been highly 
recognized as a substitution for missing formal institutions in business. Reliance on 
close interaction between business and government is beneficial for helping firms 
obtain governmental assistance (Li et al., 2008), such as the environmental subsidy 
or the chance to design governmental policy. The following statement supports this:  
 
“In our company, obtaining the environmental subsidy from government is no doubt to support 
the environmental management. Moreover, being affirmed as an environmental-friendly model 
firm, we enjoy greater opportunities in participating the environmental standards designing for the 
certain bureau, with purpose of improving general environmental condition in this industry.” 
(Respondent 3) 
 
“Poisoning ourselves as an environmental-friendly company, as you know, we spend almost 
6 million RMB on implementing environmental programs in 2019. However, due to the connection 
with local government, the subsidy obtaining from government is of course able to alleviate 
financial expenses more or less.” (Respondent 4) 
 
 “Because my wine company is state-owned, governed by local government. The leader’s job 
career is tightly related to the environmental management. Thus, my firm is much more aware of 
the importance of environmental issues, and we have invested a lot in practicing environmental 
activities beyond compliance. For example, we have introduced a new environmental protective 
approach called ‘Environmental Housekeeper’ (环保管家), which refers to the advanced model of 
‘Third-party Environmental Pollution Control’. By doing so, we are seeking to establish industry 
benchmark accompanying with the outcome of leading position in environmental management 
domain across this regions. (Respondent 5) 
 
“As a state-owned enterprise, we should naturally undertake the social responsibility as the 
forerunner or predecessor in various aspects like employment of promotion, protecting the 
environment and so forth. With respect to PES, we never keep a ‘wait-and-watch’ attitude due to 






Business activity is involved in a connection of stakeholder relationships. It is 
common for firms to interact with industry peer when making decision, and their 
peer-firms in turn play a significant role in shaping a variety of corporate decisions 
(Chen & Ma, 2017). As such, respondent 1 absolutely agrees that industry peer plays 
a significant role in affecting a focal firm’s PES. In particular, the peer firms are of 
great importance in the focal firm’s investment decisions (Chen & Ma, 2017), such 
as the introduction of new product in chemistry industry. For example: 
 
        “In the chemistry industry, we do consider our two industry leading peers home and abroad. 
For me, I am always bound to pay an honored visit in those excellent enterprises, for the better 
understanding of production process and wastes disposed approach in peer firms. Specifically, 
before launching new products, information imperfection and being unsure of the likelihood of the 
environmental outcomes are the core considerations. In this scenario, the advanced experience in 
coping with environmental pollution from an excellent private peer firm would largely strengthen 
my own confidence in making invests into new products development.” (Respondent 1) 
 









Environmental issue is part of the business, and should be placed on 
strategic level. (Respondent 1) 
Our product are not falling behind in at least 10 years. (Respondent 6) 
Our goal is to live longer for providing the cost-effective medicines. 
(Respondent 7) 
The socially responsible investors are willing to become our major 
shareholders, which is beneficial for long-term growth. (Respondent 8) 
Globalization 
layout 
We need to conduct PES in China, because other branches worldwide 






We integrate founder’s CSR concept into business. (Respondent 3) 
My company spend 6 million RMB in 2019 on environmental programs 
without caring about the economic returns. (Respondent 4) 
Expected 
competitiveness 
When we make environmental decisions, the cost-benefit analysis is the 
first step, and unless the return on investment could be predicted that 
we would adopt PES. (Respondent 2) 
Our measures in managing business-natural environment interface is 




Obtaining environmental subsidy from government is in favor of firms’ 
PES. (Respondent 3/4) 
We have opportunities in participating the environmental standards 




“Because the characteristic of my wine company is state-owned, which 
is governed by local government. The leader’s job career is tightly 
related to the environmental management. (Respondent 5) 
With respect to PES, we never keep a ‘wait-and-watch’ attitude due to 
our government places greater emphasis on sustainability in current 





I am always bound to pay an honored visit in excellent peers, for better 
understanding of production process and wastes disposed approach in 
their firms. (Respondent 1) 
 
Discussion 
Cross-case comparative analysis 
        Motivators experienced by each individual case company are mapped out in 
Table1.4 to better compare the PES drivers across case companies. The table clearly 
presents that all the four POEs would adopt PES consistently driven by executives’ 
long-term orientation. Good networking with local government has been suggested 
as the mere motivation for both two wine SOEs’ pursuit of PES, in contrast to the 
state-owned case 10 motivated by expected competitiveness. As for FIEs, two cases 
of three regards the managers’ ecological responsibility as the major driver, arming 
with the minor importance of guanxi with local government. Besides, the strategic 
globalization is also assumed as the influential factor in favor of printer firm’s PES. 
Furthermore, interviewee from case company merely motivated by competitiveness 
expected that their pro-environmental behaviors led to the cost saving or improve 
the profitability. 
 
Table 1.4 Cross-case overview of observed motivators 
Case companies 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Ownershipa POE FIE FIE FIE SOE POE POE POE SOE SOE 
Industryb Chem Semic Prin Proc Wine Medi Bio-p Milk Wine Ac-c 
Strategic Vision           
Long-term 
orientation 
√     √ √ √   
Globalization layout   √        
Managerial 
motivation 
          
Ecological 
motivation 
  √ √       
Expected 
competitiveness 
 √        √ 






  √ √ √    √  
Industry peer           
Learning from peer  √          
a) POE is short for private-owned enterprise, FIE is short for foreign-invested enterprise, SOE is short for 
state-owned enterprise. 
b) Chem is short for chemistry, Semic is short for semi-conductor, Prin is short for printer, Medi is short for 
medicine, Bio-p is short for bio-pharmaceuticals, Ac-c is short for active carbon. 
 
As summarized, companies with different ownership experienced the various 
drivers for their PES. In light of above findings, long-term strategic orientation acts 
as the dominant predictor in favor of POEs’ PES. As organizational strategic posture 
could be directly influenced by decision makers’ preference point based on strategic 
reference point theory (Fiegenbaum, Hart, & Schendel, 1996), and of central in such 
theory is the  “time” dimension (Fiegenbaum et al., 1996), the POEs therefore tend 
to inherently possess a long-term orientation due to their desire to pass on a healthy 
business to later generations (Brigham, Lumpkin, Payne, & Zachary, 2014). Four 
POEs’ managers reported this: “My company is a typical family firm, and the long-
lived mission prompts us to compete more on environmental issues beyond the price 
and quality, catering to the business trend worldwide.” Thus, putting attention on 
building relationships with major stakeholders could help to create a positive future 
for private firms (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon, & Very, 2007), adopting PES in sampled 
POEs is undoubtedly supported by business leaders’ long-term strategic orientation.  
Moreover, it is well-known that the SOEs, governed by Chinese government, 
tend to be operated by government intervention through controlling ownership and 
appointing managers (Zhou, Gao, & Zhao, 2017). Managers of SOEs are likely to 
seek not only business performance, but also the social objectives (Heath & Norman, 
2004) in terms of social responsibilities (Van der Laan Smith, Adhikari, & Tondkar, 
2005). Because environmental protection has been on the political agenda in China 
(Yuan et al., 2006), it is reasonable to assume that those SOEs would be in favor of 
PES motivated by their inherent networking with government, like the cases of two 
wine government-owned firms.  
Surprisingly, company 10, also a typical SOE, has executed the PES driven by 
competitiveness rather than guanxi with local government. To further search its 




led enterprise. As we know, central governments possess broader nationwide rights 
and authority, compared with local governments in China. Hence, the differences in 
getting access to scare resources between local and central governments would lead 
to the heterogeneity in ties and outcomes for politically connected firms (Nee, 1992). 
Specifically, ties with central government, formulated at national level, is superior 
to the local ties formed at sub-national level such as provinces. In this scenario, such 
company, subsidiary of a certain national state-owned group, are likely to be more 
directed by central government, and indirectly takes advantage of the benefits from 
its head quarter’s guanxi with central government. For such, it is perhaps useless to 
maintain guanxi with local government, as the environmental manager from case 10 
expressed: “We only pay greater attention to the competitiveness through PES, and 
never consider the guanxi with provincial government officials.” 
In addition, our research also looked at the PES’s determinants of FIEs located 
in China. The founder’s ecological responsibility has been indicated as the dominant 
motivator of PES in case 3 and 4, arming with the slight significance of their good 
networking with local government. Firms motivated by ecological responsibility 
always pointed to a single individual who has championed the ecological responses 
(Bansal & Roth, 2000). As two respondents indicated, “It was the right thing to do 
from our top managers’ standpoints.” Thus the proactive environmental decision is 
based on the values of founder in printer firm and the director of processing case. In 
addition, the slight impact of guanxi on PES for these two firms is consistent with 
argument that foreign firms are less likely to utilize ties to the same extent that the 
domestic firm can (Li et al., 2008). Besides, the strategic globalization also plays a 
crucial role in promoting PES in case company 3. 
Competitiveness, in contrast to ecological responsibility, resulted in the greater 
emphasis of the cost-benefit analysis of environmental proactivity. For example, the 
respondent from foreign case 2 echoed: “Once my firm could achieve the economic 
benefits or reduce the costs through proactive environmental activities, the inputs in 
environmental projects would be approved.” Thus, firms motivated by competitive 
advantage overemphasized the concerns epitomized by phrases like “costs”.  
As noted, the data analysis suggested the main motivation for POEs is the long-




local governments and the state-owned firm directed by national group places a 
huge emphasis on the competitiveness instead of guanxi with regional government 
when pursued PES. The salient motivation for two FIEs has been recognized as 
managers’ ecological responsibility, which is different from competitiveness being 
another FIE’s PES driver. 
 
Comparative analysis with findings in prior literature 
Given the better understanding of PES’s antecedents in previous literature, as 
shown in Table 1.1, this part highlights the differences and similarities regarding 
the presence of influential factors of PES with those stand out in the extant studies. 
 
Strategic vision 
Greater uncertainty always accompanies with the outcomes of incorporating 
environmental practices into firms’ decision-making (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). 
Hence, a firm is always required to have long-term orientation with respect to PES 
pursuit. The four POEs, being our samples, are consistently argued to favor the PES 
with the motivation of long-term strategic orientation. Indeed, compared with non-
family-owned firms, family-owned enterprises have been largely believed to have a 
long-term temporal perspective (Anderson & Reeb, 2003). Moreover, the majority 
of Chinese private firms tend to have family involvement in ownership (Dou et al., 
2019), and the four respondents from private-owned samples regard their firms as a 
kind of family firms, our interview findings are partially consistent with the result 
from an empirical work based on 454 Chinese private firms conducted by Dou et al. 
(2019). In this prior research, both long-term orientation and family commitment 
are recognized as the key elements for family ownership to exert influence on firms’ 
PES (Dou et al., 2019). 
Moreover, the motivation of strategic globalization highly emphasized by one 
FIE in our study is in consistence with an empirical study from Aguilera-Caracuel 
et al. (2012), indicating that the complex experience of environmental international 
diversification would positively influence firms’ PES. This is probably because the 
multinational companies could benefit from knowledge transfer between different 




inclined to meet the most stringent requirements prevailing in the relevant countries 
which causes the reflection of environmental proactivity in terms of systematic 
policies in many nations (González‐Benito & González‐Benito, 2006). Thus 
it can be seen that our interview findings largely correspond to the previous results. 
 
Managerial motivations 
The observed managers’ ecological motivation in supporting PES of two FIEs 
points to a single individual who championed the ecological reaction. The printer 
company’s green operation, for example, has been largely affected by its founder’s 
CSR operational concept. In this case, its proactive environmental decision-making 
is built on the values of powerful individual, as the founder of our printer case. This 
is just in line with the argument that managers’ psychological motivation is a driving 
force to firms’ greener operation (Bansal & Roth, 2000). The individual concern for 
the natural environment, as indicated in two authors’ work, has been illustrated as a 
source of ecological motivation the same as that of directors in our two case FIEs. 
Furthermore, a motivation arising from expected competitive advantage results in 
greater attention paid to the cost-benefit analysis of ecological responses, like the 
cases 2 and 10 in this study.  
In sum, contrary to our interview findings, an empirical research, based on the 
sample of 161 Chinese firms, has indicated that executives’ ecological responsibility 
is the critical predictor of firms’ PES, whereas the competitive motivation could not 
be in favor of PES adoption (Walker et al., 2014). Therefore, it needs to be further 
examined whether the competitive advantage enables firms to adopt PES in China, 
and essentially, whether the ethical motivation and competitive advantage could be 
mixed or co-exist behind the proactive environmental actions of companies. 
 
Guanxi with local government 
Maintaining guanxi with local government has been found to be an important 
factor affecting two provincial SOEs’ PES in our survey. In China, SOEs, governed 
by central or local governments, generally hold objectives diverging from simple 
profit maximization. Conversely, SOEs need to incorporate environmental quality 




agenda in China (Yuan et al., 2006). Hence, it is the political ties (PTs), as so-called 
the Chinese guanxi that drives SOEs’ pursuit of PES.  
In contrast to China, the complete political, economic, educational, and labor 
system of Western countries would prevent executives from acting opportunistically 
rather than the objectives of managers in grasping political opportunities in China 
(Fryxell & Lo, 2003). It is reasonable that there is the scarcity of research examining 
the impact of PTs on PES in the West. However, an empirical work from Jiang et 
al. (2020) indicated that managers’ PTs play a negative role in pro-environmental 
actions in Chinese hotels. A feasible explanation of the inconsistent findings is that 
the sampled cases’ operations are directly and immediately affected by government 
intervention (Zhou et al., 2017), as the majority of Chinese companies involved in 
hotel industry are still be privately-controlled. Hence, those managers would limit 
their social activities with governmental officials at various levels to avoid inside 
trade. 
In light of above analysis, managers’ PTs act as the influential driver behind 
the PES in our two sampled SOEs, whereas it has been addressed to be the barrier 
for Chinese hotels’ PES. Concerning about the executives’ PTs, it generally consists 
of formal business-political ties such as senior managers serving officially in the 
governments, and the informal ties such as social relationship between politicians 
and business leaders (Siegel, 2007). Regarding the SOEs, their senior managers’ 
PTs have been mostly developed through current or previous personal service in the 
governmental authorities, or through politicians currently or previously working as 
the senior managers in the firms. Thus it can be easily understood that the managers’ 
PTs in SOEs is the good predictor of firms’ PES in China. However, the boundary-
spanning links between private firms and governments might be formed through the 
social relationships, such as the PTs that hinder the PES in Jiang et al. (2020)’s work. 
Hence, it is interesting to further investigate the role of informal PTs playing in the 
SOEs’ PES pursuit. Additionally, due to the benefits that PTs could provide, it needs 







Firms have been assured to mimic the behaviors of other organizations in the 
same industry. Surprisingly, the industry peer, as the significant factor, has been 
mostly overlooked in the extant PES studies (Yang et al., 2018). The main reason 
for this is derived from the difficulty to identify the peer in the certain industry and 
set out the analysis unit as well as level. However, the initial work from Yang et al. 
(2018) proposed that when the listed firms in a certain industry perform better, the 
nonlisted firms involving in the same industry would actively enhance the invests 
in PES. Hence, the interview finding from respondent 1 is partially consistent with 
the aforesaid result with respect to impact of peer firms on its own PES pursuit. This 
supports the claim that managers have greater willingness to use social comparison 
as their convinced basis in decision making process (Haunschild & Miner, 1997).  
Nevertheless, the underlying intention behind the emphasis of the influence of 
industry peer appears the difference between our interview results and the previous 
findings. Specifically, when asked why the interviewee 1 working in chemical firm 
emphasizes the critical role of its industry peer, he indicated that it seems as the best 
means of reducing the trial and error costs in terms of environmental inputs. Notably, 
the prior work conducted by Yang et al. (2018) suggested that only the nonlisted 
firms would be proactively incentivized to adopt PES upon observing the superior 
performance of listed firms in the same industry. As a whole, it is worthwhile to 
answer the question of which driver, better business performance of peers or the 
reduction of uncertainty, influences the focal firms’ choice of PES. 
 
Conclusion 
To promote firms’ PES, previous studies have investigated the antecedents at 
different levels of analysis and in varied contexts (Sharma & Sharma, 2011). While 
a number of extant studies have a heavier focus on Western societies than on Asian 
countries (Delmas & Toffel, 2008). Moreover, there is no universe prescription or 
one-size-fits-all method in tackling environmental problem (Barnett, 2007). Thus it 
could be presumed that the antecedents of PES might be different between multiple 
countries. China, the world’s second largest economy, presents an interesting setting 
to examine PES because of the need to balance its economic improvement with the 




firms adopt PES by identifying motivations, and to illustrate the similarities and 
differences upon cross-case analysis and the comparison with prior findings. 
Based on semi-structured interviews with 10 respondents, our results suggested 
the key motivation of adopting PES in private-owned firms is long-term orientation, 
whereas the guanxi with local government plays a crucial role in favor of two SOEs’ 
PES. In contrast, the other one SOE affiliated to state-owned key enterprise places 
the greater emphasis on the competitiveness in terms of PES. The salient motivation 
for two FIEs has been recognized as the ecological responsibility, contracting to the 
competitiveness as the mere driver in another foreign firm. Moreover, guanxi with 
local government to a minor extent encourages the executives of two foreign firms 
to utilize PES in addition to their underlying ecological responsiveness. 
Comparing our data with prior literature, the motivations observed in the case 
companies mostly correspond to the antecedents in the prior studies. However, the 
differences include (1) whether the significantly positive impact of competitiveness 
on firms’ PES on the premise of being motivated by ecological responsibility firstly, 
(2) whether the political ties (called guanxi in China) is beneficial for SOEs’ PES, 
while act as the barrier for POEs’ PES adoption. 
This study advances twofold contribution in PES studies. First, the utilization 
of first-hand accounts of key players in terms of PES adoption would shed light on 
practitioners’ actual experiences about what determines their PES. For example, the 
identification of influential antecedents such as guanxi with local governments and 
industry peer would enrich the answers to the ‘why’ questions. Second, comparing 
the motivators from the extant studies with the derived antecedents from specialized 
environmental-friendly firms in our multiple-case study, the comparison showed the 
motives generally corresponded well. Whereas the competitive advantage could be 
viewed as the individual factors in favor of a firm’s PES.  
Our study has important practical implications as well. First, managers’ long-
term orientation is significantly related to private-owned firms’ PES. Therefore, for 
those leaders of private-owned or family business pursuing long-term development 
need to align environmental orientation to their values and visions salience. Second, 
as the industry peer play a critical role in affecting firms’ PES, the environmental 




which the entire industry might become environmental-friendly. Third, although the 
motive of competitive advantage is related to one foreign corporation and a state-
owned enterprise, it is therefore feasible for managers to regard PES as opportunity 
(Sharma, 2000). That is, managers could be inspired of seizing market opportunities 
from addressing environmental issue (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). Fourth, guanxi, a 
unique type of ties in China, has been argued as the sole determinant in our case of 
two wine state-owned enterprises. For those manages of nonstate-owned enterprises, 
two types of Chinese political connections, namely the National People’s Congress 
(NPC), the only legislative body, or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), advisory board for government, could provide a seat for those 
managers as the members in political councils. As such, they might be inclined to 
voluntarily implement environmental activities. 
This study has several limitations leading to future research. First, ten case 
companies make our findings tentative in nature, and the geographical context of 
China limits the generalizability. Future studies could select multiple samples in 
various countries to generalize the conclusion. Second, single-respondent interview 
based on self-report is acknowledged as a useful research tool. While as a successful 
strategy formulation requires the involvement of manages of all levels (Mintzberg, 
1990), thus the opinions from middle-level as well as front-line managers is helpful 
for better understanding of this topic in future. Third, this study mainly focused on 
the drivers of firms’ PES, future research therefore need to explore the barriers that 
largely hinder firms’ adoption PES. Fourth, as motivations have been mixed in cases 













Chapter 2: Top Managers’ Environmental Awareness and Proactive 
Environmental Strategy: The Moderating Role of Entrepreneurial 
Orientation 
 
Abstract:  Drawing on upper echelons theory, this study examines the direct impact of the two 
dimensions of managerial environmental awareness (EA) on proactive environmental strategy 
(PES), and the moderating role of the three dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation (EO), namely, 
innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking, in the main relationship. Our empirical results, 
based on a sample of 228 Chinese manufacturing firms, show that both of the two dimensions of 
EA, namely, environmental risk awareness (ERA) and environmental cost-benefit awareness 
(ECA), are positively and significantly related to PES, and that the positive relationship between 
ERA (ECA) and PES is strengthened (weakened) for firms with high levels of innovativeness and 
for firms that are less oriented towards risk taking. Unexpectedly, the results reveal that the 
interaction between proactiveness and the two dimensions of EA does not significantly impact the 
corporate PES. These findings suggest that there are multiple types of complex cognition within 
organizations, and the consideration of both individual and organizational cognitions are playing a 
critical role in favor of firms’ PES. 
 
Keywords: Proactive Environmental Strategy; Environmental Awareness; Entrepreneurial 
Orientation; Chinese manufacturing industry. 
 
Introduction 
How to manage the business-natural environment interface has become a “hot” 
issue for organizations’ strategic decisions, and an increasing number of scholars 
are calling for enterprises to adopt proactive instead of reactive environmental 
strategies to tackle the environmental issues (Aragón-Correa, Marcus, & Vogel, 
2020; Menguc et al., 2010; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). A proactive 
environmental strategy (PES) is a pattern of voluntary environmental practices that 
go beyond the environmental regulations (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003), which 
potentially accompanies with the development of firms’ competitive advantages by 




Hart, 1995, 2005; Hart & Milstein, 2003). Therefore, scholarly interest in examining 
the antecedents of PES has been growing substantially during the last two decades 
(Aragón-Correa et al., 2020; Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003).  
Getting insights from the previous reviews that address the antecedents of CSR 
or nonmarket strategies (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012), the predictors of PES generally 
correspond to three levels, namely, the institutional or stakeholder level, the 
organizational level, and the individual level. The extant studies in this field tend to 
focus on the institutional and organizational predictors of PES (Aragón-Correa et 
al., 2020), such as the stakeholder legitimacy pressure related to three institutional 
pillars, the regulatory, normative, and culture-cognitive pillars, and organizational 
resources and capabilities through the lens of institutional theory and the resource-
based view. 
However, as Papagiannakis et al. (2014) suggested that considerable attention 
should be paid on the individuals who are responsible for environmental decision-
making, allowing to better understand the behavioral drivers behind the 
environmental strategy. Armed with this call, the psychological characteristics like 
top managers’ environmentally-friendly strategic mindsets (Flannery & May, 2000), 
managerial interpretation of environmental issues (Sharma, 2000) has been argued 
to impact the firms’ pursuit of PES by adopting upper echelon theory (Hambrick, 
2007). Since it is difficult to obtain executives’ psychological data to test managerial 
cognition, the vast majority of these studies use demographic data as proxies for 
describing the psychological characteristics of executives. However, such approach 
is still deemed to be limited in enabling us to clearly understand the effects of 
managerial cognition on their decision making. Furthermore, a majority of earlier 
works, although insightful, neglect the constraints of organizational cognitive paths, 
which are reflected in factors such as organizational culture and strategic orientation. 
As such, this current study examines the direct impact of managerial cognition (i.e., 
EA) on PES as well as the moderating effect of organizational cognition (i.e., EO) 
into the aforementioned relationship.  
        However, although managers’ EA has been suggested as a key predictor of pro-
environmental behaviors (Qu et al., 2015), such as environmental responsibility and 




and ecological innovation (Gadenne et al., 2009; Hillestad et al., 2010; Peng & Liu, 
2016; Yu et al., 2019), these extant literature mostly manifest the EA as the single 
dimensional construct. Recent research recognizes that EA is a multi-dimensional 
construct due to the complexity of human being’s cognition. For example, referring 
to Gadenne et al. (2009)’s initial work, managers’ EA is explicitly categorized into 
environmental risk awareness (ERA) and environmental cost-benefit awareness 
(ECA) in Peng and Liu (2016)’s subsequent study. More concretely, the former 
ERA reflects the extent to which managers are aware of the firm’s negative impacts 
on the natural environment, and the ECA, grounded by self-interest, demonstrates 
the managers’ recognition of potential cost reduction and/or profit improvement by 
means of environmental initiatives. By this very definition, this study adopts EA’s 
two dimensions, namely, ERA and ECA, into the analysis. Relying on managerial 
and organizational cognition theory (Kaplan, 2008; Kaplan, 2011; Walsh, 1995), 
executives’ cognitive or mental systems would influence their attention focus on 
and the subjective interpretation of business environment, and then impact their 
reaction to external environmental changes. Along with this thought, the predictors 
shaping executives’ mindset might affect the strategic decision and organizational 
behaviors. Thus, we assume that the two types of EA, namely ERA and ECA, would 
influence the PES of the focal firms. 
       Besides, given the fact that organizational cognition plays an essential role in 
affecting environmental decision-making (Sharma, 2000), and the adoption of PES 
is closely related to firms’ strategic posture (Aragon-Correa, 1998) anchored in the 
firm’s strategic orientation, this study further examines the moderating role of firms’ 
entrepreneurial orientation (EO) between ERA/ECA and firms’ PES. Specifically, 
EO is a firm-level strategic orientation that captures organization’s strategy-making 
practices and methods, managerial philosophies, and strategic behaviors that are 
entrepreneurial in nature (Anderson et al., 2009). As such, top managers’ receptivity 
regarding pollution prevention would increase when firms possess an EO. In other 
words, executives tend to enhance the proclivity of protecting natural environment 
when the EO is pervasive and prevalent in the firms. In the past conceptualization 
of EO, innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking have been identified as its core 




describes a firm’s tendency to participate in creativity and experimentation through 
the introduction of new products/services, and also depart from established business 
(Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), risk-taking involves engaging in high-risk actions with a 
possibility of high returns and taking bold activities in the uncertain environments 
(Covin & Slevin, 1989), proactiveness represents an opportunity-seeking, forward-
looking behaviors characterized by introducing the new products and services ahead 
of competitors and acting on future needs (Rauch et al., 2009). These three sub-
dimensions of EO could be viewed as independent component (Lumpkin & Dess, 
1996) which is in line with the recent call on the investigation of association between 
each sub-dimension and other key outcome variables (George, 2010), especially in 
the context of transitional economies. 
Regarding PES, it is viewed as a pattern of pro-active activities, preferences, 
and decision-making in managing business-natural environment interface (Sharma 
& Vredenburg, 1998). Thus it can be assured that PES is entrepreneurial, innovative, 
and risky as it exceeds much beyond what is required by environmental regulations 
(Darnall et al., 2010; Sharma, 2000). Particularly, adopting PES largely requires the 
acquisition and installation of creative technologies (Russo & Fouts, 1997), and the 
development of proactive organizational capabilities (Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998). 
As such, firms are not likely to pursue a PES unless their upper echelons emphasize 
entrepreneurial activities (Menguc et al., 2009). Aligned with Aragon-Correa and 
Sharma’s claim, proactive strategies such as pollution-prevention approaches need 
to be integrated into the entrepreneurial dimension of a firm. That is, firms’ higher 
EO lays the foundation for exerting the PES (Menguc et al., 2010) as it entails huge 
risk and considerable uncertainty, and requires an innovative (Aragon-Correa, 1998; 
Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003). Consistent with above-mentioned argument, the 
interplay of managers’ EA and firm’s EO in explaining PES thus seems reasonable. 
In doing so, we theoretically and empirically contribute to the environmental 
management literature by means of examining how the two dimensions of managers’ 
EA facilitate firms’ PES, and also identifying whether the effect of EA on PES will 





        The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literatures and 
formulate the hypotheses. The methodology and data collection are outlined in 
Section 3, followed by a presentation of the empirical results in Section 4. The final 
section draws the main conclusion and implications. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses  
        For reference, we develop a conceptual model as shown in Figure 1 to delineate 
the proposed framework. In addition, this study further relates each dimension of 
EO to the abovementioned relationships to examine moderating effects. 
 
Figure 2.1 The conceptual framework 
Environmental awareness (EA), synonymous with environmental concern or 
environmental consciousness, is inherent in human nature. Since this concept first 
becomes formalized in late 1960s (Roth, 1992), numerous studies have attempted 
to interpret its exact meaning, which is yet to be reached because interpretations 
largely depend on individual ideology. Although numerous studies in business and 
management disciplines argue that EA is a key predictor of environmental decisions 
in relation to consumers, employees, and enterprises (Cheema, Afsar, Al-Ghazali, 
& Maqsoom; del Brio & Junquera, 2002; Huang, Lin, Lai, & Lin, 2014; Kikuchi-
Uehara, Nakatani, & Hirao, 2016; Lin & Chang, 2012; Liu, Anderson, & Cruz, 2012; 




EA have limitations because it captures only a part of this construct. Recent studies 
suggest that EA ought to be a multi-dimensional construct owing to the complexity 
of human being’s cognition. A highly cited article from Gadenne et al. (2009) first 
classified EA into environmental cost-benefit awareness and general environmental 
awareness. The subsequent work conducted by Peng and Liu (2016) further divided 
EA into environmental risk awareness (ERA) and environmental cost-benefit 
awareness (ECA) respectively. The ERA reflects the extent to which managers are 
aware of the firm’s negative impacts on the natural environment, implying the ethics 
and morality of executives in respect to dealing with business-natural environmental 
interface. By contrast, the latter ECA describes the prediction of cost decreasing 
and/or profit achieving regarding environmental issues. With this premise as a 
reference, this study elaborates on the different mechanisms of ERA and ECA on 
fostering PES based on upper echelons theory. 
Upper echelons theory holds that corporate strategic choices and performance 
levels are partially predicted by personal values, traits and experiences (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984). This theory proposes that executives’ characteristics serve to filter 
and distort information in three steps. That is, managers’ personal values, traits and 
experiences tend to affect their field of vision or the focus of attention (the directions 
they look and listen), selective perception (what they see and hear), as well as the 
interpretation (how they attach meaning to what they see and hear) (Hambrick, 
2007). Guided by this three steps, we will elaborate on how ERA and ECA affect 
PES in the following part. 
 
Top managers’ EA and PES 
First, executives with greater EA are more likely to notice the environmental 
issues (Peng & Liu, 2016). It has been implied that top managers’ internal pressure 
is critical for adopting environmental practices by firms (Delmas & Toffel, 2004b). 
Some scholars have stated that firms are more likely to adopt environment-friendly 
practices if their concerns on environmental issues are closer to that of the firm's 
CEO (Martin, Muûls, De Preux, & Wagner, 2012). Due to the implicit merits of 
environmental initiatives, they are not likely to attract the decision makers’ attention 




& George, 2015; Simon, 1957), is the starting point of human decision-making 
process (Ocasio, 1997). Accordingly, executives owning EA would draw attention 
to environmental issues because they are more sensitive and knowledgeable about 
related topics (Gadenne et al., 2009). Specifically, executives with greater ERA tend 
to pay more attention to the adverse impacts of business activities on the natural 
environment, and better understand the environmental legislation relevant to their 
businesses as well as the best environmental practices in their industry. On the other 
hand, managers having greater ECA are sensitive to the potential business value or 
opportunities in relation to environmental issues. They are thereby inclined to regard 
environmental initiatives implementation as a useful mean of improving production 
efficiency and product differentiation with environmental attributes for the purpose 
of enhancing profitability (Gadenne et al., 2009; Peng & Liu, 2016). Therefore, 
regardless of whether managers possess higher ERA or ECA or are excellent in both, 
they would allocate attention to the environmental issues due to altruism/morale or 
egoism/self-interest.  
Second, as business leaders with higher EA naturally focus on environmental 
issues, they are more likely to perceive and interpret environmental issues positively 
(Peng & Liu, 2016). In line with Kocabasoglu, Prahinski, and Klassen (2007)’s state, 
only those executives who fully realize the importance of environmental protection 
would allocate the valuable resources to implement environmental practices. More 
concretely, managers with greater ERA tend to experience a high level of perceived 
environmental pressures from salient stakeholders because they are knowledgeable 
about environmental policy, their competitors’ reaction to environmental 
requirements and their negative environmental impacts (Peng & Liu, 2016). As such, 
they are likely to equally prioritize environmental performance and profitability 
(Gao & Bansal, 2013). By contrast, managers with higher ECA are concerned more 
about potential economic gaining from environmental issues (Peng & Liu, 2016). 
Thereby, they might proactively interpret the environmental initiatives, and are less 
sensitive to the underlying risk from environmental countermeasures. 
Third, as argued above, managers with higher EA would positively interpret 
environmental issues, they are bound to adopt PES to meet external environmental 




importance of clean production in their organizations, and prefer to implement PES 
such as pollution prevention initiatives instead of end-of-up cleanup (Zhang et al., 
2015). Empirical research has suggested that top managers’ environmentally-
friendly mindsets are beneficial for firms’ PES (Flannery & May, 2000; Marshall et 
al., 2010). However, managers with greater ECA is more likely to be the first mover 
in green market. Previous literature shows that environmental proactivity can reduce 
costs by decreasing compliance costs, avoiding legal liabilities, reducing waste, and 
improving efficiency and productivity (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008). Meanwhile, PES 
might improve a firm’s legitimacy (Bansal & Clelland, 2004) and strengthen its 
reputation (Miles & Covin, 2000).  
Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 1a and 1b as follows: 
 
H1a: The ERA of top managers is positively related to firms’ PES adoption. 
H1b: The ECA of top managers is positively related to firms’ PES adoption. 
 
EO as the moderator 
Originated from the strategic choice literature (Child, 1972), EO represents a 
firm’s strategic posture in capturing the entrepreneurial decision-making styles, 
methods, and behaviors (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996), composing of three dimensions, 
namely, innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking (Covin & Slevin, 1989; 
Miller, 1983). In other words, entrepreneurial firms would enable top managers to 
exhibit a propensity to take calculated risks, be innovative, and demonstrate 
strategic proactiveness (Covin & Slevin, 1989). These dimensions of EO may vary 
independently of each other in a given context (Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). In the 
following section, we discuss the moderating effects of EO’s three sub-dimensions 
(i.e., innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking) between top managers’ EA and 
their pursuit of PES. 
 
The moderating role of innovativeness 
Within the EO framework, innovativeness is characterized by supporting new 
ideas, creativity, experimentation, and developing new products, services as well as 




Dess, 1996). However, the implementation of proactive environmental activities in 
the organization is supposed to transform the ways of thinking and running business. 
Involved in this transformation, executives is obliged to place heavy emphasis on 
the substantial eco-innovation (Zhang & Walton, 2017), including both technology 
like ecological products and processes innovation, and non-technology innovation 
in the realm of managerial style, business model and local community (Cheng, Yang, 
& Sheu, 2014; Jenkins, 2009). In light of these challenges, entrepreneurial firms are 
capable of innovating on the internal activities, processes and procedures to pursue 
the PES. For example, those firms may have a higher propensity in eco-innovations 
(Klewitz & Hansen, 2014), such as projects related to eco-design (Bos‐Brouwers, 
2009), eco-efficiency (Aragón-Correa, Hurtado-Torres, Sharma, & García-Morales, 
2008), and cleaner production (Altham, 2007; Cheng et al., 2014). Moreover, these 
innovative initiatives might improve productivity, the manufacturing process (King 
& Lenox, 2002), and board community (Hansen, Sondergard, & Meredith, 2002), 
which in turn maintain an environmentally responsible standard. Taken together, 
firms with greater innovativeness is likely to promote firms’ PES adoption. 
However, top manager’s EA is divided into ERA and ECA as abovementioned. 
The former ERA is significantly and positively related to ecological products and 
process innovation (Peng & Liu, 2016). Therefore, executives enjoying higher ERA 
are in an effort to benefit whole stakeholders outside of their own firms, coupling 
with their core values of changing the world and searching the best answers to social 
issues. Thus it can be addressed that those executives tend to make commitment to 
seek the long-term business success. Meanwhile, the long-term rather than short-
lived nature of EO has been suggested in several studies. On the innovativeness part, 
it naturally owns a general trait of long-term orientation with a certain amount of 
heroism and social responsibility, which seemed to be better aligned with the long-
term orientation of executives’ ERA. Besides, innovativeness is beneficial for 
establishing and integrating sustainability values in new products and processes 
(Belz, 2013), especially the most green practices and environmental commitments 
(O'Neill & Gibbs, 2016). With this premise, it is reasonable to predict that ERA and 




Contrary to ERA, ECA is significantly and positively related only to ecological 
product innovation (Peng & Liu, 2016). For executives with higher ECA, 
environmental performance is merely used to reduce the costs or gaining profits. In 
other words, even in the absence of external pressures, firms are more likely to adopt 
PES as long as executives believe that such strategy can contribute to their financial 
performance. Therefore, such these executives are more pragmatic and self-interest 
as they concern more about environmental investment and economic return through 
conducting PES. In this sense, the underlying logic of ECA contradicts the trait of 
innovativeness, which highly emphasizes the nature of long-term orientation. As a 
result, it reasonably assume that the interactive effect on PES exerted by ECA and 
innovativeness are contradictory.  
Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 2a and 2b as follows: 
 
        H2a: The positive relationship between ERA and PES is stronger for firms 
with a high level of innovativeness.  
        H2b: The positive relationship between ECA and PES is weaker for firms with 
a high level of innovativeness. 
 
The moderating role of proactiveness 
Proactiveness is characterized as the opportunity-seeking and forward-looking 
behaviors that introduce the new products/services ahead of competitors, and also 
anticipate the future demands (Covin & Slevin, 1989; Rauch et al., 2009). By doing 
so, proactiveness could enable firms to better adapt to social mutations (Anderson, 
1998). Moreover, proactive firms are more likely to decentralize the environmental 
decision-making, passing it to line managers and framing them discretion to predict 
future strategies (Sharma, 2000) by strategically monitoring markets, customers, 
and governmental requirements. We thus argue that the interactive effect between 
proactiveness and EA is a substitute for rather than a complement of PES driver 
because PES in nature is embedded in proactiveness. Hence, either proactiveness or 
the EA is enough for firms’ PES. 
Specifically, executive with higher ERA might simply be motivated to pursue 




about environmental regulations together with the best environmental practices in 
their industry (Gadenne et al., 2009). Moreover, proactive firm is supposed to enable 
executives to know about the government regulations, it is reasonable to assume 
that proactive firms may create a synergy when executives possess a high degree of 
ERA.  
Similarly, as top managers having ECA are inclined to purse financial returns 
or reduce costs via PES implementation, and the PES in nature is hugely embedded 
in proactiveness characterized by the development of new market opportunities and 
better access to markets (Ambec & Lanoie, 2008), thus the capability of discovering 
new market opportunities endowing by proactive firms seems as the synergy aligned 
with the ECA of executives. The characteristics and goals of “prospector” firms, as 
measured on the entrepreneurial dimension, have been assumed to be similar to the 
firms asking for PES in the choices of products, markets, and competitive measures 
(Aragón-Correa, 1998). 
Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 3a and 3b as follows: 
 
H3a: The positive relationship between ERA and PES is stronger for firms 
with a high level of proactiveness.  
H3b: The positive relationship between ECA and PES is stronger for firms 
with a high level of proactiveness.  
 
The moderating role of risk-taking 
Regarding risk-taking in the EO framework, it involves taking bold actions by 
venturing into the unknown, engaging in high-risk activities with a chance of high 
returns, and/or committing significant resources to ventures in uncertainty (Covin 
& Slevin, 1989), such as investing in projects with uncertain outcomes (Lumpkin & 
Dess, 1996). Along with this premise, we argue that the basic logic behind ERA 
conflicts with that of risk-taking. By contrast, the logic behind ECA and risk-taking 
are compatible. Therefore, the interaction of ERA and risk-taking negatively affect 
PES, whereas the interaction of ECA and risk-taking positively impact PES.  
Top managers possessing ERA thereby prefer PES due to their underlying risk 




as a potential contributor to controlling or avoiding risks and as a risk in its own 
right. That is, embracing PES by executives with greater ERA is in seek to reduce 
their firms’ levels of environmental risk, while the principles of risk-taking are in 
opposition to this. Therefore, risk-taking is likely to weaken the positive relationship 
between ERA and PES.  
Contrary to ERA itself, executives with ECA emphasize economic returns via 
pro-environmental activities and are inclined to adopt PES to create the first-mover 
advantages (Hult & Ketchen Jr, 2001) by lowering the cost, improving productivity, 
or selling pollution control technology. However, it seems costly for firms to adopt 
the PES, and the return from environmental invests would take some time (Aragón-
Correa et al., 2008). Moreover, the justification of environmental investments seems 
complicated due to executives’ bounded rationality, and the additional costs of 
green products could not be directly transferred to the customers (Bianchi & Noci, 
1998). All these could perhaps pose some business risk. In light of these uncertainty, 
entrepreneurial firms that exhibit a high level of risk-taking behaviors is helpful for 
those managers with high ECA overcome their concerns about these vast barriers. 
Thus, the ability of risk tolerance is likely to strengthen the positive relationship 
between executives’ ECA and PES.  
Therefore, we propose Hypothesis 4a and 4b as follows: 
 
H4a: The positive relationship between ERA and PES is weaker for firms that 
exhibit a high level of risk-taking.   
H4b: The positive relationship between ECA and PES is stronger for firms that 
exhibit a high level of risk-taking.   
 
Methodology 
Sample and data 
We selected the manufacturing firms in Shanxi province, a typical resource-
based region in China to test our hypotheses. Shanxi has been facing a dilemma of 
economic development and environmental protection, which presents a fascinating 
empirical setting for this study. Labeled as the town of coal (Zhang & An, 2018), 




over past decades (Yang & Teng, 2018). In the year 2010, Chinese government has 
introduced the resource-based economy transforming policy in Shanxi to construct 
a resource-efficient and environmentally-friendly society by adjusting the industrial 
structure in this region. And the Shanxi government has been taking active measures 
to tackle industrial pollution and has made significant achievements in this regard. 
In 2015, the Chinese premier announced the national “Made in China 2025” 
initiative, which was intended to transform the manufacturing industry from low-
cost to high-value stances. Green and sustainable development has been widely 
recognized in China as a key strategic objective to achieve within next two decades. 
Thus, Shanxi is a natural experiment lab to test our hypotheses. 
Our questionnaire was initially developed in English and double back-
translated into Chinese (Brislin, 1980). Back translation by two competent scholars 
was conducted to avoid potential bias and ensure validity (Churchill Jr, 1979) with 
their capabilities in both languages and substantial research experience in relevant 
fields. Moreover, we conducted in-depth interviews with 12 top managers from 
manufacturing firms in Lvliang and Jincheng cities of Shanxi province in April 2019. 
According to interviews’ response, we refined indicators through two rounds of the 
modification to reach better clarity. After we finalized the questionnaire, we made 
an electric version of it on Questionnaire Star (https://www.wjx.cn/), a widely used 
online survey tool in China. The questionnaire on Questionnaire Star can be shared 
with targeted subjects via social media like WeChat, which has more than 1.2 billion 
users. The questionnaire includes three parts: the first two parts are mainly about 
firms’ as well as respondents’ profiles, and the scales of key constructs in this study 
are detailed in the last section. 
Based on our industrial network and local governmental support, we contacted 
almost 500 firms and invited their top managers to participate in our research. All 
of them agreed to support us once they received the research purpose and topic. We 
conducted a two-round online survey by virtue of sharing the questionnaire via 
social Media. The first-round survey was conducted between June and November 
2019 and received 234 responses. To check our results’ robustness in the first survey, 
we conducted the second survey from February to May 2020 and obtained 230 




and general managers. In total, a sample of 464 responses is well received. We 
retained only one record if more than one respondent from a given firm filled out a 
questionnaire. Additionally, we removed the responses with completion times of 




We adopted a reflective measurement model and multi-item scales to measure 
the study constructs (see Table 2.1). We measured all the constructs with reflective 
indicators and used a 7-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) 
to 7 (“strongly agree”). 
Proactive Environmental Strategy (PES). We used three indicators adopted 
from Wagner and Schaltegger (2004)’s work to measure PES.  
Environmental Awareness (EA). We used six items from Peng and Liu (2016)’s 
work to measure EA in accordance with its two dimensions, ERA and ECA. 
Entrepreneurial Orientation. Based on Miller (1983) and Covin and Slevin 
(1989)‘s initial studies, each dimension of EO, namely innovativeness, risk-taking, 
and proactiveness was measured by three items. 
Control Variables. We also control for several firm-level and respondent-level 
variables based on prior studies and the potential disturbing variables influencing 
our research design. The firm-level control variable included firm age and size. Firm 
age was measured by firms’ operating time, while the size is measured by the natural 
logarithm of the number of full-time employees. The controlling variables on the 
respondent-level include gender (1=male, 0=female), age, tenure (working year in 
current affiliation), origin (native=1, nonnative=0), the number of years that the 
respondents had lived locally, and position (i.e., Chairman, Secretary of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) committee member, CEO or General Manager, 
Plant Manager, Vice General Manager). 
 
Validity and Reliability 
A confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted by AMOS 21.0 to assess 




suggested that the measurement model had an acceptable model fit (χ2 = 188.507, 
p =.000; χ2/df = 1.571; GFI = 0.920; CFI = 0.977; IFI = 0.977; RMSEA = 0.050). 
All factor loadings are greater than 0.60 and significant (Anderson & Gerbing, 
1988). In addition, no cross-loadings were identified, indicating the 
unidimensionality of the measures. The average variance extracted (AVE) estimates 
were greater than or equal to 0.50 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). These two findings 
supported the convergent validity of all constructs. All the constructs were measured 
by reflective indicators instead of formative indicators. We thus calculated the 
Cronbach's α and composite reliability (CR) value for each of the factors to access 
their convergent validity and reliability. All Cronbach's α and CR values exceeded 
the 0.7 benchmark, suggesting that all factors have good internal consistency. Taken 
together, the results of these tests implied that the measures had acceptable 
convergent validity and reliability. 
Table 2.1 shows the scale for the factor, the items’ standardized factor loadings, 
and the Cronbach's α and CR values for each factor. All correlations between our 
study constructs were below |0.7|, demonstrating the distinctness of the measures 
and their discriminant validity. Besides, the correlations between two constructs are 
less than the square root of the AVE estimates of the corresponding constructs for 
all the pairs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), indicating that these constructs had more 
internal correlation than external correlation and thus suggesting their discriminant 
validity. The results suggest that the constructs were distinct and that they exhibited 
evidence of discriminant validity. 
 
Table 2.1 Construct measurement and confirmatory factor analysis results (N=228) 
Constructs Measuring items 
Standardized 




Enterprises will strictly implement cleaner 
production even without external supervision. 
0.888 0.890 0.896 0.743 
Outlook on green development has incorporated into 
enterprise culture. 
0.912    
Enterprises input a large number of resources in the 
development of environmental protection 
technologies. 
0.780    
Environmental Risk 
Awareness (ERA) 
Top management team pays much attention to the 
adverse impacts of our firm's behavior on the natural 
environment. 




Top management team is very clear about how 
environmental legislation is relevant to our business.  
0.859    
Top management team is very clear about what 
represents “best environmental practice” in our 
industry. 




Top management team thinks that adopting 
environmental initiatives can improve sales revenue. 
0.807 0.917 0.921 0.795 
Top management team thinks that adopting 
environmental initiatives can reduce costs. 
0.920    
Top management team thinks that adopting 
environmental initiatives can improve production 
efficiency. 




In general, our firm favors a strong emphasis on 
R&D, technology leadership, and innovations. 
0.844 0.907 0.909 0.770 
Our firm favors “tried-and-true” procedures, 
systems, and methods. 
0.937    
Our firm is willing to try new ways of doing things 
and seeks unusual novel solutions. 
0.849    
 Proactiveness of 
Entrepreneurial 
Orientation (PRO) 
Our firm is among the first in the industry to 
introduce new products or services. 
0.809 0.899 0.914 0.782 
Our firm is the first to initiate actions to competitors, 
for which the competitors then respond. 
0.977    
Under uncertainty, our firm always adopts an 
adventurous and active attitude. 





Our firm strongly prefers high-risk projects (with 
chances of very high return). 
0.758 0.856 0.860 0.673 
Because of the nature of the environment, our firm 
always takes bold, wide-ranging strategic actions 
rather than making minor tactical changes. 
0.897    
When confronted with decisions involving 
uncertainty, our firm always adopts a proactive 
posture to maximize the probability of exploiting 
opportunities. 
0.799    
CFA Model Fit Summary: χ2 = 188.507, p =.000; χ2/df = 1.571; GFI = 0.920; CFI = 0.977; IFI = 0.977; 
RMSEA = 0.050 
Notes: All factor loadings of the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) are statistically significant. α = 
Cronbach’s alpha; CR = composite reliability; AVE = average variance extracted. 
 
Assessing common method bias 
Because the independent and dependent variables’ data were both measured by 
self-reported data from same respondents, there was a potential for common method 
bias (CMB). We followed the recommendation from Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, 





In term of pre-procedural methods to control CMB, we made three major 
efforts. First, we discussed our questionnaire with 12 top managers and two experts 
in the environmental management field and refined the indicators to ensure that all 
the items were clear enough to be understood. We also pre-screened the potential 
respondents to ensure they were knowledgeable about environmental management. 
Thus, we reduced the potential measuring error related to low content validity 
caused by a confusing presentation of indicators. Second, to increase the 
respondents’ participation in our survey, the survey questionnaire was shortened to 
a reasonable length. Meanwhile, the questionnaire was distributed anonymously, 
and we promised the findings would offer to them if they leave the email address in 
questionnaire. Third, this survey was distributed based on our social connections 
with managers in the target firms and received the support of local government 
officials who were responsible for the local governments where the target firms 
were located. In other words, the trust stemming from personal ties between 
researchers and respondents, as well as the power of authority, ensured our survey’s 
quality.  
Two post-statistical techniques are adopted to assess the impact of CMB on 
our results. First, Harman’s single-factor test was conducted to examine whether 
this problem affected our data. An exploratory factor analysis with all the items 
indicated no single factor accounted for more than 50% of the total variance in our 
data before rotation, indicating that there was no severe CMB problem. A Harman’s 
single-factor test of our data demonstrated that the first factor analyzed before 
rotation accounted for less than half of the total variance (i.e., 35%). This result 
suggests that CMB caused any of the significant relationships among our study 
variables. This finding shows that CMB was not a serious issue in this study.  
Second, as noted by Aiken, West, and Reno (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991), 
supported interaction hypotheses were less susceptible to CMB because respondents 
are unlikely to have “interaction-based theories” that could systematically change 
their responses and produce biased results. Our interaction hypotheses, if supported, 






Table 2.2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations of the 
variables examined in this study. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression were used 
to test the hypothesized direct effects and moderating effects. Table 2.3 shows the 
results of OLS regression models. Model 1 included only the control variables, 
while Model 2 added the independent variable of ERA and ECA to examine their 
direct effects on PES. Model 3 included the three dimensions of EO, namely, 
innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk-taking, as moderating variables, and Model 
4 included the interaction variables (the product of the three dimensions of EO and 
two dimensions of EA) to test the moderating effects of EO's three dimensions on 
the relationship between ERA/ECA and PES. In seek to reduce the potential of the 
multicollinearity, we mean-centered independent and moderating variables before 
the creation of the interaction terms (Aiken et al., 1991). Moreover, in the regression 
models, variance inflation factors (VIFs) were examined, and the maximum VIFs 
associated with each model ranged from 1.592 to 3.097, falling below the maximum 
acceptable value of 10. Thus, there was no significant multicollinearity among the 
explanatory variables in the above linear regression models. Moreover, endogeneity, 
defined as a correlation between explanatory variables and the error term in the 
regression, violates the classical Gaussian assumption and leads to biased and 
inconsistent parameter estimates in OLS. Briefly, omitted variables, referring to the 
very variables that need to be included in the vector of explanatory variables, are a 
significant source of endogeneity. Hence, for testing the endogeneity, Ramesy 
(1969)’s omitted-variable regression specification-error test was conducted and the 
results revealed that P-value was 0.0523, which was not significant at 5% level. The 
null hypothesis in Ramsey tests is having omitted variables. Therefore, rejecting the 
null hypothesis at 5% significant level means having no important missing variables. 
That is, no correlated omitted variables would appear in the error term. Thus it can 
be indicated that the regression models in Table 2.3 have no endogeneity from the 
point of important missing variables. 
H1 proposes that the ERA (H1a) and ECA (H1b) of top managers are positively 
related to PES. The results of Model 2 indicate that both ERA and ECA are 
positively related to PES (H1a: β=0.351, p<0.001; H1b: β=0.394, p<0.001), 




H2-4 postulates that the three dimensions of EO have moderating effects on 
the relationship between ERA/ECA and PES. H2a claims that the positive 
relationship between ERA (ECA for H2b) and PES is strengthened (weakened) for 
firms with a higher level of innovativeness. H3 argues that the positive relationship 
between ERA/ECA (H3a/H3b) and PES is stronger for firms with a higher level of 
proactiveness. H4a claims that the positive relationship between ERA (ECA for H4b) 
and PES is weakened (strengthened) for firms with a higher level of risk-taking.  
The results of Model 4 show that interaction of innovativeness and ERA (ECA) 
is significantly and positively (negatively) related to PES (H2a: β=0.189, p<0.05; 
H2b: β=-0.143, p<0.05), supporting H2. It also shows that the interaction of risk-
taking and ERA (ECA) is significantly and negatively (positively) related to PES 
(H4a: β=-0.136, p<0.05; H4b: β=0.132, p<0.05), supporting H4. However, the 
interaction of proactiveness and ERA/ECA is insignificantly related to PES (H3a: 











Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (N=228) 
Constructs Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1 PES 5.855 0.965 0.862a                 
2 ECA 5.380 1.149 .508** 0.864                
3 ERA 6.120 0.796 .510** .410** 0.892               
4 INN 5.155 1.287 .391** .227** .338** 0.878              
5 PRO 4.335 1.105 .209** .141* .271** .512** 0.884             
6 RIS 3.895 1.117 0.040 .137* .134* .275** .452** 0.820            
7 Firm Age 14.737 11.645 -0.007 -0.064 0.040 0.075 0.086 0.072            
8 Firm Size 4.633 1.792 0.027 -0.029 0.116 .167* .131* 0.061 .438**           
9 Chairman 0.158 0.365 -0.014 0.007 -.181** -0.021 -0.030 -0.060 -0.069 -0.058          
10 Secretary 0.022 0.147 .137* -0.032 0.091 0.067 0.108 0.050 0.068 0.010 -0.065         
11 CEO or G 0.294 0.457 0.087 -0.057 0.028 0.070 0.081 -0.011 -.145* -0.091 -.200** 0.035        
12 Plant Manager 0.202 0.402 0.038 -0.062 0.071 -0.055 -.159* -.142* 0.066 -.164* -.218** -0.001 -0.084       
13 Vice GM 0.197 0.399 0.002 0.034 0.082 0.063 0.073 0.096 0.066 0.097 -.185** 0.001 -.320** -.194**      
14 Gender of Respondents 0.996 0.066 0.013 0.119 -0.018 .198** 0.020 -0.026 0.050 0.031 0.029 0.010 0.043 -.132* 0.033     
15 Age of Respondents 43.746 9.103 0.008 -0.112 -.147* -0.002 -0.060 -0.080 0.048 0.032 .182** 0.087 0.037 -0.029 0.026 -0.002    
16 Tenure of Respondents 6.636 5.055 -0.062 -0.020 -0.100 -0.014 -0.003 -0.043 0.096 -0.013 .184** -0.055 -0.005 -0.074 -0.023 -0.005 .286**   
17 Origin of Respondents 0.719 0.450 0.018 0.091 -0.004 0.083 -0.076 -0.094 -0.033 -.179** 0.056 0.027 -0.047 0.022 0.065 0.106 0.120 .133*  
18 Local living Years 26.772 16.800 0.009 -0.037 -0.078 -0.015 -0.094 -0.126 0.042 -0.078 0.118 0.111 -0.004 -0.037 0.084 0.078 .430** .178** .465** 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




Table 2.3 Multiple regression analyses for testing hypotheses (DV=PES; N=228)  
Predictors and controls Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Firm Age -0.024 0.011 0.019 0.034 
Firm Size (Ln employee number) 0.062 0.013 -0.028 -0.040 
Chairman 0.061 0.097 0.075 0.093 
Secretary of CPC Committee 0.135* 0.108* 0.103* 0.126* 
CEO or GM 0.124 0.130* 0.103† 0.087 
Plant Manager 0.081 0.073 0.051 0.035 
Vice GM 0.062 0.030 0.020 0.009 
Gender of Respondents 0.010 -0.028 -0.077 -0.139* 
Age of Respondents -0.001 0.082 0.069 0.067 
Tenure of Respondents -0.057 -0.048 -0.049 -0.047 
Origin of Respondents 0.035 -0.028 -0.063 -0.087 
Local living Years -0.016 0.017 0.026 0.039 
ERA  0.351*** 0.288*** 0.304*** 
ECA  0.394*** 0.383*** 0.388*** 
INN   0.255*** 0.241*** 
PRO   -0.009 -0.007 
RIS   -0.112† -0.106† 
ERA*INN    0.189* 
ECA*INN    -0.143* 
ERA*PRO    -0.033 
ECA*PRO    -0.070 
ERA*RIS    -0.136* 
ECA*RIS    0.132* 
F Value 0.698*** 10.553*** 10.494*** 8.589*** 
R2 0.038 0.41 0.459 0.492 
Adjusted R2 -0.016 0.371 0.416 0.435 
Δ R2 - 0.372 0.05 0.033 
Δ F - 67.104*** 6.444*** 2.185* 
VIF-max 1.592 1.595 1.676 3.097 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 







Discussion and Conclusion 
The current study’s main findings suggest that both executives’ ERA and ECA 
play essential roles in driving corporate PES. This finding supports the dominant 
logic underlying the previous studies regarding the antecedents of PES, which 
emphasizes the role of managerial cognition is very important in predicting their 
environmental behaviors and performance (Bansal, 2003; Bansal & Roth, 2000; 
Gadenne et al., 2009; Peng & Liu, 2016; Severo, de Guimaraes, & Dorion, 2018; 
Zhang et al., 2015). Different from many previous studies, however, we stress the 
driving roles of ECA and ERA for PES because the PES not only involves pollution 
prevention but also carry the potential business opportunities.  
In addition, considering the diversity of cognition, we examine the moderating 
effect of organizational cognition, EO, on the relationship between individuals’ EA 
and PES. Our findings show that two of three EO dimensions (i.e., innovativeness 
and risk-taking) play a significant moderating role in the relationship between 
ERA/ECA and PES. In particular, the empirical findings suggest that the positive 
relationship between ERA (ECA) and PES is strengthened (weakened) for firms 
with a higher level of innovativeness or firms that are less oriented towards risk-
taking. Our explanation for these results is that such interactive effects depend on 
whether the underlying logic between individual and organization cognition is 
compatible. In the case of the interaction between ERA and the innovativeness and 
risk-taking of EO, ERA is more related to long-term orientation and concerned with 
the social role of firms in a community or in society. This idea is consistent with 
innovativeness, which centers on long-term business success and possesses the goal 
of changing the world and improving the social welfare. Thus it can be seen that the 
interaction term between ERA and innovativeness is positively related to PES. In 
addition, executives with higher ERA are environmentally risk-avoidant, while an 
organizational risk-taking orientation emphasizes the pursuit of high-risky projects 
with high return rates. Hence, these two kinds of cognition naturally conflict with 
one another, so their interaction is negatively related to PES. 
However, regarding the interaction of ECA and EO’s innovativeness and risk-
taking dimensions, in contrast to ERA, ECA focuses more on the economic return 




which is not compatible with the core ideas of an innovativeness orientation. 
Therefore, the interaction term of ECA and innovativeness plays a negative role in 
promoting PES. Interestingly, maximizing profit of ECA is just consistent with the 
concept of risk-taking, which stresses the high return rate in the context of running 
business. Thus, the interaction of ECA and risk-taking is positively related to PES. 
Unexpectedly, the interactions between proactiveness and two dimensions of 
EA do not significantly affect PES. In other words, a substitutive or complementary 
effect between EO’s proactiveness dimension and ERA/ECA on PES does not exist. 
One possible explanation for this finding is that proactive firms might be more likely 
to engage in pro-environmental behaviors regardless of the level of managers’ 
awareness of environmental risk and environmental cost-benefit. The proactiveness 
thereby does not provide a particular boundary condition. 
 
Theoretical contributions 
        The current study makes two main theoretical contributions by specifying and 
testing a model of individual-level factors that drive firms’ PES. First, going beyond 
the dominant institutional and macro-level factors in explaining the firms’ PES in 
developed countries (Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 2003), this study mainly examines 
the impacts of two activators of executives’ EA, namely ERA and ECA, on firms’ 
PES adoption, which significantly enriches the antecedents’ family of PES. Notably, 
prior scholarship on managerial cognition largely assume that only altruistic value 
could motivate firms to go greener which is based on the premise that human beings’ 
cognition of environmental issues is simplex. Unlike the past, this study insists on 
that individual cognition in nature is complex, and the compatible or even conflict 
types of cognition could reasonably co-exist within human beings or organizational 
values. Aligned with this thought, a good deal of environmental initiatives, so-called 
strategic environmental responsibilities combining with core business, not only 
improve environmental performance of firms but also build competitive advantage 
for firms by improving their production efficiency or product differentiation (Lantos, 
2001; Orlitzky, Siegel, & Waldman, 2011; Porter & Van der Linde, 1995a; Porter 
& Van der Linde, 1995c). Thus, firms might conduct environmental activities due 




present in prior research by integrating and extending another dimension of EA, so-
called ECA. Interestingly, the findings suggests that executives’ ECA significantly 
influences the adoption of PES in the firms, and the regression coefficient of ECA 
is higher than that of the effect the ERA having on PES. Such result therefore shows 
that executives’ ECA might be more significant than the ERA of managers in favour 
of firms’ PES. Hence, our study is the first scholarship to address the complexity of 
top managers’ cognition and their impacts on business activities. 
Second, our study contributes to the PES literature by examining how the three 
dimensions of firms’ EO, as a special kind of strategic orientation, interact with top 
managers’ cognition in PES adoption. Concretely, we identify EO’s innovativeness 
and risk-taking dimensions as two crucial moderators between ERA/ECA and PES. 
The findings imply that the positive relationship between ERA (ECA) and PES is 
strengthened for firms with a higher level of innovativeness and for those that are 
less oriented towards risk-taking. Thus, these findings highlight the roles of firms’ 
EO sub-dimensions playing in facilitating or weakening the direct impact of EA on 
firms’ PES. When the underlying logics of these types of cognitions are compatible, 
the interplay between them is positively associated with organizational behaviors. 
In contrast, the interplay between conflicting types of cognitions negatively affects 
the corporate actions. In this study, the underlying logic of managers’ ERA and the 
innovative dimension of EO as well as that of ECA and risk-taking are consistent. 
One possible explanation is that both ERA and innovativeness paid great attention 
to the socially responsible role of modern enterprises in society with the long-term 
orientation. Conversely, executives possessing ECA concerns green product project 
with a short-term economic return priority (Peng & Liu, 2016), while innovativeness 
suggests that firms need to increase R&D  investment that potentially sacrifice the 
short-term profits. Thus it can be concluded that the underlying logic behind ECA 
and innovativeness might be in opposition, and thus the interplay between these 
types of individual and organizational cognition is negatively related to PES. 
Similarly, the accurate idea behind ERA and risk-taking slightly conflict with 
each another. Indicatively, ERA emphasizes risk avoidance through conducting the 
PES (Peng & Liu, 2016), while the risk-taking of EO stresses high margin projects 




PES. Relatedly, both ECA and risk-taking are relatively short-term orientation and 
focus on the high return rate of risky projects. Hence, the interaction of ECA and 
risk-taking positively affects the firms’ adoption. 
In sum, this study considers PES’s predictors of individual and organizational 
cognition simultaneously, and documents that the interaction of different cognitions 
is negatively or positively influencing the dependent variable like PES depends on 
whether their underlying logic is compatible. This study provides insights for future 
studies concerning the multiple types of cognition on firms’ PES.  
 
Managerial implications 
This study also provides practical implications. First, top managers should pay 
more attention to environmental initiatives’ economic return beyond avoiding the 
environmental-risk rooted in government regulation. Meanwhile, if the board of 
directors favors PES, they should appoint a CEO with a higher level of ERA or ECA 
to effectively improve the firm’s environmental performance. Additionally, such a 
board should consider the cognitive consistency of its top management team and 
their firm’s strategic orientation. Specifically, firms with strong innovativeness 
orientation should appoint top management team with higher ERA to drive PES, in 
contrast, firms with higher risk-taking orientation should appoint top management 
team with higher ECA to promote PES. 
Second, our findings suggest that policymakers should promote policies to 
increase the managers’ ERA and ECA. In the traditional framework, governments 
often adopt regulation to intervene in firms’ environmental behaviors. According to 
our findings, governments may adopt other measures to improve managerial ERA 
and ECA, thus promoting PES. These measures can comprise conducting training 
of environmental knowledge for corporate executives and organizing case-sharing 
among firms that build competitive advantage by implementing PES. In addition, 
governments can subsidize individuals with higher ERA and/or ECA who have been 
entrepreneurs in environmental industries. Furthermore, governments can select 
executives in firms with R&D ratio to increase their ERA and choose high-profit 




In sum, policymakers should adopt different measures to help different types of 
firms build different cognitive configurations to enhance their PES. 
 
Limitation and future research 
The current study also has limitations that can be addressed in the future. First, 
this study has a cross-sectional design, which creates several limitations. Examples 
of such limitations is that we propose that both ERA and ECA are positively related 
to PES, the direction of causality might be reversed or be a two-way relationship. It 
is difficult to examine such issues with cross-sectional data. Furthermore, we use 
the self-reported data of a single set of respondents in this study, it is therefore 
improbable that CMB issues are perfectly eliminated by other pre and post-measure 
techniques. It would be beneficial for future studies to adopt the longitudinal design 
and/or utilize more sources of data in seek to eliminate the potential measurement 
error of CMB and further assess the causality of the hypothesized relationships in a 
comprehensive manner. Second, in our model, we limited the control variables to 
firm age and size, managers’ gender, age, tenure, origin, the local living year and 
position. It would be worthwhile to expand the controlling variables to include other 
variables that possibly affect the managers’ EA, such as the executives’ positions in 
the certain industry associations and so forth. Third, this study is based on a less-
developed province in China, and the findings thereby limits the generalizability in 
other contexts. Future studies could test the validation across various countries. 
Fourth, EO on the firm-level is regarded as a multidimensional construct in form of 
three independent dimension, innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking. 
However, EO also could be a unidimensional construct. Future research could treat 




Chapter 3: To Conform or To Escape? Top Managers’ Political 
Ties and Proactive Environmental Strategy 
 
Abstract: Corporate proactive environmental strategy (PES) has been received greater attention in 
academia and business practice. Previous research thereby discuss more about the drivers for firms’ 
PES at different levels and in various context. Drawing on social capital theory, this study examines 
the main effect of top managers’ political ties (PTs) on firms’ PES, and the contingent role played 
by executives’ environmental awareness (EA) in this direct relationship. Concerning about the both 
bright and dark sides of PTs, we propose two competing perspectives about top managers’ PTs and 
firms’ PES. Furthermore, the environmental risk awareness (ERA) and environmental cost-benefit 
awareness (ECA), two types of executives’ EA, have been argued to play the different role in the 
relationship between PTs and PES. Using the survey data collected from 228 manufacturing firms 
in China, the empirical results contend that executives’ PTs positively and significantly influence 
the firms’ PES, and such positive relationship would be strengthened when the top managers have 
higher ERA but lower ECA. 
 
Keywords: Political Ties; Proactive Environmental Strategy; Environmental Awareness; 
Environmental Risk Awareness; Environmental Cost-Benefit Awareness. 
 
Introduction 
The dramatic environmental degradation the world is currently facing has 
urged firms to utilize environmental strategies to manage its interface with the 
natural environment. However, environmental strategies may be both proactive and 
reactive. Proactive environmental strategy (PES) refers to a systematic patterns of 
voluntary practices, such as altering the product/process and preventing pollution at 
its source, going beyond regulatory requirements (Sharma, 2000). In contrast, firms 
adopting reactive environmental strategy (RES) merely follow the environmental 
regulations by taking end-of-pipe pollution control approach. Moreover, it is well-
argued that global environmental crisis can be solved only if firms voluntarily and 
proactively implement environmental initiatives (Shrivastava, 1995). As such, 




and most studies have explored the antecedents of PES at three distinct levels (Liu 
et al., 2015). 
Indicatively, the first level emphasizes the external institutional or stakeholders’ 
pressures from governmental regulations (Powell & DiMaggio, 2012), the concerns 
of local community (Banerjee et al., 2003), and the stakeholders’ norms (Delmas, 
2001; Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999) as PES’s determinants. The second stream 
centers on the organization-level drivers in favor of a firm’s PES pursuit, involving 
organizational capability (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Sharma & Vredenburg, 
1998), strategic orientation such as entrepreneurial orientation (EO) (Menguc et al., 
2010), and governance structures such as family ownership (Etzion, 2007), director 
interlock (Ortiz‐de‐Mandojana et al., 2012), and the female representation in the 
top management (Kumar & Paraskevas, 2018). The third research line identifies the 
individual-level motivators of PES encompassing managerial interpretation of 
environmental issues (Sharma, 2000), managers’ environmental-friendly mindsets 
(Liu et al., 2015), and CEOs’ demographics (Lewis, Walls, & Dowell, 2014). 
Although prior studies have provided important insights into PES’s motivators 
at institutional-, organizational-, and individual-levels, however, there still exists the 
remaining research gap well worth filling up. First, the institutional-level predictors 
over-emphasize the isomorphism effect that firms respond to institutional pressures 
(Berrone et al., 2013) and thereby neglect to undermine the mechanism of how top 
managers perceive and interpret the surrounding institutional pressures into a focal 
firm. Along with this thought, such institutional perspective could not satisfactorily 
explain the internally driven motivation for firm’s PES (Aragon-Correa & Sharma, 
2003). Second, internal resources have been evidenced as the key organizational- 
level predictor of firm’s PES. These studies, however, overlooked the managerial 
ties, a significant channel for developing firms’ core capabilities (Gu, Hung, & Tse, 
2008) and improving economic performance (Luo, Huang, & Wang, 2012), which 
could largely affect firms’ adoption of PES. Especially in the transitional economies 
like China, firms are more likely to act strategically in managing their relationships 
with the government (Marquis & Qian, 2014) due to the significant role of political 
actors in allocating critical resources. Undoubtedly, obtaining such scare resources 




investigation of micro-level factors would enable us to better understand the drivers 
behind the corporate environmental decision-making (Papagiannakis et al., 2014), 
these empirical studies tend to focus on factors endogenous to the executives (i.e., 
their background and characteristics). Since a firm is an open system and dependent 
on resources controlled by external stakeholders (Prefer & Salancik, 1978), hence, 
executives are more likely to establish the ties with the most salient stakeholders in 
seek to business success. Thus, it is no surprising that managers’ boundary spanning 
activities, referring to so-called managerial ties, provide a pervasive means to make 
business strategy (Kotter, 1982).  For instance, executives’ networking with political 
actors, especially in the transitional economy like China, plays a significant role in 
affecting corporate strategy (Keim & Hillman, 2008). Therefore, the effects of top 
managers’ personal networking with external entities on corporate PES have been 
largely ignored. 
Related to managerial ties, it generally consists of ties with governmental 
officials (Luo & Chen, 1997), and executives’ networking established with business 
leaders at other firms (Dubini, 1991). In essence, managerial ties, a critical type of 
social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002), play a significant role in conducting business 
in transition economies such as China characterized by weak institutional support 
and distorted information (Peng & Luo, 2000). More importantly, when addressing 
the role of networking in the context of institutional voids, the majority of literature 
predominantly focuses on managers’ political ties (PTs) (Faccio, 2006; Peng & Luo, 
2000), and thereby takes a political embeddedness view of firms. Taking China, a 
government-dominated nation, as a typical example, PTs have been highly received 
strategic emphasis and valued by managers in an greater effort to run the businesses 
(Boisot & Child, 1996), as governments often embody more social capital that might 
be essential to firms’ survival (e.g., governmental subsidies, business policies and 
industry development guidance) (Hillman et  al. 2009; Hoskisson et  al. 2000). Thus, 
effort to cultivate ties with officials at various levels of the government is the key 
strategy in seek to deal with environmental uncertainties (Prefer & Salancik, 1978) 
that derived from the government (Hillman, 2005). 
Furthermore, in the transitional economies, the predominant form of PTs is a 




distance patron-client relationships. In term of this relationship, the entrepreneurial 
client has been placed in a subordinate position in contrast to the political patron. In 
line with this premise, it is not surprising that a good deal of firms act strategically 
in building their relationships with Chinese political actors. This is largely because 
PTs is capable of determining firms’ business strategy and growth outcome (Keim 
& Hillman, 2008). By this very patron-client relationship, responding to government 
signals or meeting the governmental requirements is undoubtedly critical for firms. 
Call to focus on the worldwide hot issue, like environmental issues in China, 
this nation faces huge challenges to cope with environmental protections which has 
become the dominant affair on political agenda (Yuan et al., 2006). In this scenario, 
governments at various levels have been setting different regulations and market-
based approaches to compel firms to implement environmental practices (Lo & 
Fryxell, 2005). On the national level, the developing concept of “lucid waters and 
lush mountains are invaluable assets” has been further facilitated in the “Report to 
the 19th Communist Party of China National Congress”. More significantly, China 
has definitely proposed the determination to realize 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, achieve the peak of CO2 emission by 2030, and fulfill carbon neutral 
ahead of 2060. In this scenario, given the critical role of PES in reach the aforesaid 
goals in China, unknown is whether firms are reluctant or have greater willingness 
to adopt PES because of executives’ PTs. 
Overall, such a scarcity is extremely important to research. First, considering 
several scholars have highlighted the effects of managers’ political connections on 
organizations’ strategic decisions (Zhou, 2013), and executives’ networking with 
governmental officials is firmly argued to influence organizations’ strategic choices 
(Peng & Luo, 2000), little is known about whether and how the top managers’ PTs 
impact business strategy (Zhu & Chung, 2014), let alone identifying the untouched 
and significant business strategy, PES. Second, political embeddedness view 
indicates that entrepreneurs’ PTs yield not only opportunities but also the constraints 
for firms at a certain time (Okhmatovskiy, 2010). That is, executives’ networking 
with political actors and governmental officials might act as a double-edged sword 
for business. As such, PTs possibly have both bright side and dark side in pursuit of 




in their firms, aiming at improving corporate reputation or enhancing firms’ good 
image, facilitating the business-government relationship, and being elected to win a 
seat in Congress (Ma & Parish, 2006).  
        By contrast, some other politically connected managers have little incentive to 
voluntarily conduct environmental initiatives because of their easy acquirement of 
scarce resources like necessary operational licenses, permits and business project 
approval (Muttakin, Mihret, & Khan, 2018), obtaining political legitimacy, and even 
the avoidance of punishment for environmental pollution. In this case, top managers 
are inclined to adopt the passive end-of-pipe approach to meet environmental laws, 
or even worse ignore the negative impacts on the natural environment brought by 
their firms. Based on above assumptions, it is, therefore, worthwhile of addressing 
how the highly valued PTs affect firms’ PES adoption in response to competing 
theories (i.e., “helping hand/bright side” or “grabbing hand/dark side”). Unlike past, 
this study explicitly examines how top managers’ PTs influence the firms’ PES. 
        In addition, recent development in social network theory has highlighted that 
the effectiveness of ties might be subject to important contingencies (Li et al., 2008), 
such as firm- and market- level characteristics, and study centering on contingencies 
is crucial in the environmental management field (Schmitz et al., 2019). For instance, 
an empirical study based on a sample from China has contended that PTs have a 
monotonic and positive impact on domestic firms’ performance, which is contrary 
to the curvilinear effect for foreign firms (Li et al., 2008). In essence, managerial 
cognition and value are of significance in affecting business strategy (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984), suggesting that executives tend to devise strategies based on their 
personal cognition (Gavetti, 2005). Due to the complexity of managerial cognition 
towards environmental protection, two extremely distinct environmental awareness 
(EA) of top managers have been explicitly categorized into environmental risk 
awareness (ERA) and environmental cost-benefit awareness (ECA) in Peng and Liu 
(2016)’s empirical work, which is built on the earlier argument from Gadenne et al. 
(2009). Specifically, executives’ ERA reflects a certain extent to which they are 
conscious of negative environmental impacts caused by businesses, and the latter 
ECA refers to the executives’ prediction of cost reduction and/or profitability 




kinds of EA are derived from extremely distinct executives’ cognitions. Therefore, 
two managerial cognitions, ERA and ECA, could be viewed as the contingency of 
PTs in the pursuit of PES, because of the respective underlying managers’ values of 
moral and self-interest/value-driven. Even though scholars and practitioners insist 
that PTs matter, less examined is their contingent value (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). 
This unknown further motivates us to investigate the effectiveness or value of top 
managers’ PTs in favoring firms’ PES in the case of managers’ two different EA, 
ERA and ECA. 
        China presents an important yet idiosyncratic setting to study this issue. First, 
as ties are deeply ingrained institution in China over 5,000 years (Li et al., 2008), 
and economic activities are embedded in the connections and ties of interpersonal 
relations (Uzzi, 1997), top managers’ PTs (such as guanxi in China) thereby acts as 
an important means for Chinese firms to reduce the uncertainty and transaction costs, 
get access to valuable resources and government protection (Li et al., 2008), manage 
resource dependency and access to policymakers (Lux et al., 2011). Second, China’s 
reform-era economic system has been viewed as a ‘networked capitalism’ (Boisot 
& Child, 1996), and Chinese government is of significance for business survival and 
success (Wu, Wu, Zhou, & Wu, 2012) and plays a critical role in driving business 
strategy (Xu & Liu, 2020), which causes most managers to refer to ties as the 
‘lifeblood’ of business transactions (Xin & Pearce, 1996). Third, since 1978, China 
moved from planned economy to ‘hybrid’ economy, referring to both state and 
market simultaneously play the essential role in allocating resources and affecting 
firm behaviors (Zhang, Marquis, & Qiao, 2016). That means China has not become 
free markets yet (Zhang et al., 2019) due to less predictable and clear rules for 
market competition (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In this case, cultivating connections 
with politician and government officials have long been highly valued by Chinese 
entrepreneurs as a effective means of coping with institutional voids (Ge, Carney, 
& Kellermanns, 2019). Fourth, environmental issue has been on the political agenda 
in China (Yuan et al., 2006). The national governments at various levels heavily 
urge entrepreneurs to execute green behaviors (Lo & Fryxell, 2005). Thus, the 
governmental orientation to some extent can be appeared through firms’ 




a government-dominated transitional economy with severe environmental problems, 
offers an ideal quantitative case in study. 
        To our knowledge, this study is the first to establish the linkage between PTs 
of executives and firms’ PES. Our work contributes to the PTs and PES literature in 
the following ways. First, as several studies have examined the impacts of PTs on 
firm performance (Li et al., 2008), entrepreneurial investment (Zhou, 2013) and 
workplace fatalities (Fisman & Wang, 2015), this study enriches the PTs literature 
by assessing the direct linkage between such a type of micro ties and macro firms’ 
PES, indicating a direct and unambiguous link of the PTs and business strategy that 
(Zhu & Chung, 2014) called for. Moreover, guided by two competing perspectives, 
our study clarifies both positive and negative roles of entrepreneurs’ PTs playing in 
firms’ PES. The empirical findings indicate that politically-connected executives 
are inclined to conduct PES rather than escaping from it. Second, setting on the PES 
strand, our efforts to look at a relatively larger sample, care in testing the micro-
macro link of executives’ PTs and firms’ PES, and contend the positive utilization 
of this micro ties in terms of PES has represented that managers’ PTs being an 
individual-level factor could be involved into the PES’s antecedent family. Third, 
although scholars and practitioners state that ties matter, less addressed is their 
contingent value (Gulati & Higgins, 2003). In response to this call, this study thus 
suggests a necessity to examine two untested contingencies: top managers’ ERA vs. 
ECA, which may alter the value created from PTs utilization in supporting the PES. 
Through a contingency perspective, our finding indicates that the impact on PES of 
ties with governmental officials is more powerful for managers who are ethically 
motivated in managing business-natural environmental interface. 
        The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literatures and 
formulate the hypotheses. The methodology and data collection are outlined in next 
section, followed by empirical results in Section 4. The final section draws the main 
conclusions and explores the implications. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
For reference, we proposed the conceptual framework as shown in Figure 3.1, 




this model integrates executive’s EA, dividing into ERA and ECA as a contingency, 
into the abovementioned framework. 
 
Figure 3.1 The conceptual framework 
According to social capital theory, managerial actions are highly embedded in 
networks of interpersonal relations (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). As outlined 
earlier, PTs represents a firm’s senior managers’ personal networking with political 
actors, a variety of industrial bureaus, and regulatory authorities (Peng & Luo, 2000). 
Reliance on these relations helps obtain the scarce resources and information (Li et 
al., 2008), which is beneficial for cultivating competitive advantages and enhancing 
business performance by enhancing legitimacy. Despite these advantages, PTs are 
also associated with huge costs or downsides, such as government intervention on 
employment, blockage of information flow, reciprocal obligations, time-consuming, 
maintenance costs identified in the extant literature. 
Therefore, to better understanding the bright and dark sides’ effects of PTs, this 
study investigates the underlying mechanisms of PTs’ positive and negative effects 
in promoting PES. Recent studies argue that ties’ effectiveness might be contingent 
on important contextual factors (Li et al., 2008). This unaddressed gap motives our 
assessment of two distinct top managers’ EA (ERA vs. ECA) as contingencies that 
enrich the studies by tackling “how ties matter, under what circumstances, to what 
extent, and in what ways” (Powell, 1996). Extending the previous argument, we 
presume that different managerial cognition in terms of environmental issues may 





Political ties and PES 
The bright side of PTs 
As Chinese government dominantly manages and distributes scare resources 
and approves business projects (Wang, Jiang, Yuan, & Yi, 2013), it has been found 
that political connections have an ability to obtain governmental assistance, such as 
low-cost bank loans (Faccio, 2006; Khwaja & Mian, 2005), tax break and subsidies 
(Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, & Thesmar, 2004; Wu et al., 2012), government 
contracts (Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2009), and protection of property rights (Zhou, 
2013). Moreover, it is also likely to influence government policies and regulations 
(Lester et al., 2008). 
In line with earlier statement, PES consists of corporate actions going beyond 
compliance with environmental regulations and standard industry practices (Liu et 
al., 2015). Firms adopting PES should voluntarily integrate environmental concerns 
into entire business operations, consisting of innovation on manufacturing process 
and products (Klewitz & Hansen, 2014), and even local community (Jenkins, 2009), 
collaboration with a vast range of stakeholders (Liu et al., 2015). In essence, firms’ 
PES adoption is generally regarded as a source of incurring additional costs that 
probably damages the short-term profits (Lioui & Sharma, 2012). Meanwhile, the 
environmental investments always have a long-term scope and financial returns 
from inputs would take a long time. As such, executives regard pro-environmental 
behaviors are at high expense without the apparent financial benefits. However, PTs 
are beneficial for firms to obtain lower bank loan rates (Faccio, 2006), contract 
enforcement, licenses, tax reductions, land, and subsidies (Guo, Xu, & Jacobs, 
2014), which largely relax the financial constraints and lower firms’ capital costs to 
environmental investments. Furthermore, good networking with governmental 
officials also could share the potential risks from eco-technological innovations with 
the government (Zhang, 2017). 
        In addition, manager’s networking with politicians is beneficial for accessing 
the latest environmental policies, potentially helping grasp policymakers’ intentions, 
understand environmental regulations, make effective environmental decisions, and 
cultivate the first-mover advantage. More importantly, PES execution would act as 




maintaining and strengthening the business-government relationship and thereby 
enables firms to obtain the continued favoritism from government. Furthermore, the  
PES’s benefits, including corporate reputation/image and well-improved relations 
with stakeholders, would bring praise to organizations together with executives 
directly (Zhang, 2017). As such, top managers favored by government and public 
tend to be elected in Congress (Ma & Parish, 2006), like winning a seat in National 
People’s Congress (NPC), the only legislative body in China, or Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) as an advisory board for government. 
Consequently, these managers have a tendency to adopt PES, as a channel to obtain 
political legitimacy and promotion (Li, Song, & Wu, 2015). 
        Meanwhile, the managers developing good network with government are more 
likely to receive the government and public attention. Thus their firms are highly 
subject to greater monitoring by the nations, especially in the countries where their 
government officials have stronger influences on businesses by their administrative 
power (Qian & Chen, 2020). For instance, manages keeping network with politician 
are generally required by public with the expectations of higher moral standards and 
natural social responsibility (Zhang, 2017). These invisible expectations might urge 
executives to proactively introduce PES which is able to strengthen organizations’ 
alignment with public expectations and attention (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003). 
In light of the arguments above, we hypothesize the following: 
 
        H1: Top managers’ PTs are positively related to firms’ PES adoption. 
 
The dark side of PTs 
PTs have been assumed as a double-edged sword since it could jeopardize the 
firm value (Chen, Li, Luo, & Zhang, 2017). In terms of PES, strong PTs have higher 
possibility of enhancing firms’ political legitimacy by increasing their perceived 
conformity to regulations from government officials’ point, which greatly inhibits 
the motivation to adopt PES (Su & Yang, 2018). Depending on existed legitimacy, 
or the government officials’ assumption that firms’ actions are desirable and proper, 
reduces the firms’ need to demonstrate social worthiness by reacting to regulatory 




        Moreover, adopting PES requires huge investments in the processes, products, 
purchasing, employees’ training and so on (Buysse & Verbeke, 2003). As economic 
return from such invests may materialize in the long term, and showing a corporate 
citizenship seems to be an effective way for those nonpolitical-connected managers 
(Wang & Qian, 2011), the politically-connected managers are more likely to carry 
out the reactive environmental initiatives (De Villiers, Naiker, & Van Staden, 2011) 
or even worse, regard their PTs as the insurance and protection umbrella to obtain 
the environmental licenses and permits, mitigate the impacts of negative events (Yu 
& Zheng, 2019), lighten penalties (Zhang, 2017), or escape punishment from 
irresponsible behaviors (Muttakin et al., 2018). For example, managers in heavy 
polluting firms might bribe local government officials through their PTs to get away 
with environmental regulations (Zhang, 2017). A notorious instance of treating PTs 
as the protective umbrella is Zijin Mining’s environmental pollution event in 2010, 
which allowed businesses to evade emissions regulations.  
Besides, the abuse of power led by managers’ PTs is a serious issue facing 
regulators and business sectors (Luo, 2008). This implies that those managers could 
utilize PTs to informally influence authorities and avoid legal scrutiny (Wu, Johan, 
& Rui, 2016; Zhang, 2017). Reliance on strong PTs enables executives to lobby the 
officials to weaken environmental regulations (Zhang, 2017). For example, some 
unknown pollutants polluting the environmental that are strangers for policymakers 
(Lyon & Maxwell, 2008), executives might convey unverifiable or misleading 
information to policy makers that constrain regulators’ ability to set tough standards. 
For example, politically connected firms only need to pay lower environmental 
levies and are less likely to face regulatory enforcement actions (Wu et al., 2016). 
        Furthermore, China has a top-down political structure with the local officials 
are appointed by the central government (Lin, Tan, Zhao, & Karim, 2015).Therefore, 
governors’ primary interests are competing for political promotion (Lin et al., 2015), 
and their working achievements tend to be assessed by applying the gross regional 
product (GRP) as well as its growth rates. In this case, they are more likely to be 
incentivized to focus on the short-term local economic growth that is not compatible 
with long-term nature of organizations’ PES. The local politicians also have strong 




positions rotation across the department and geographic regions (Sheng et al., 2011). 
Hence, they may achieve the goal of working career by putting economic growth 
ahead of environmental protection. 
In light of the arguments above, we hypothesize the following: 
 
        H2: Top managers’ PTs are negatively related to firms’ PES adoption. 
 
Top managers’ EA as a contingency 
        Firstly, when top managers are fully cautious of the adverse impacts that firms 
acting on the environment, they are motivated to integrate environmental concerns 
into firms. However, because they are knowledgeable of environmental policies and 
the best environmental practices in industry (Gadenne et al., 2009), they would 
prevent environmental pollution in the first place rather than reactive end-of-pipe 
approach. Moreover, top managers’ PTs could help firms to obtain the less taxation 
and subsidies (Bertrand et al., 2004; Wu et al., 2012), debt financing from national 
banks (Li et al., 2008), and direct cash (Faccio, 2006), which hugely reduces the 
firms’ financial constraint in terms of environmental investments. In this case, PTs’ 
usage is able to serve as the incentives for PES. Secondly, because politically 
connected firms may be subject to greater government monitoring, the moral 
managers would have willingness to implement PES to build corporate reputation, 
improve relations with stakeholders, and show corporate citizenship in the society. 
Hence, managers’ ERA would strengthen the positive relationship between their 
PTs and firms’ PES. 
        In contrast, we predict that managers’ ECA would dampen the positive impact 
of PTs on PES. As ECA represents the belief that environmental initiatives would 
probably reduce the costs and/or improve profits, such self-interest executives are 
bound to place greater attention on potential economic benefits. In China, business 
environment tends to be highly complex and turbulent (Wang et al., 2013). Thus 
managers need to acquire the market-related information to cope with unexpected 
customer demands changing (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007) as well as the newest 




scenario. It is unrealistic for ties with politicians to directly assist towards market 
change, as knowledge about customer demand and information about competitors.  
        Consequently, managers would decrease the dependence on PTs to acquire 
external resources in seek to pursue PES. Second, as previously argued, political-
connected managers tend to be expected to have higher morality, and are under 
greater monitoring (Qian & Chen, 2020). Due to environmental management seems 
as a government-induced and desired activity in China, therefore, executives with 
ECA are less willing to adopt PES without a high possibility of financial returns. 
This implies that managers’ public images and moral expectations arising from their 
PTs would not be greatly noted, and they might merely use the end-of-pipe approach 
to control the pollution, which could show their environmental image outside. 
In light of the arguments above, we hypothesize the following: 
 
        H3a: The positive relationship between top managers’ PTs and firms’ PES 
adoption will be strengthened when top managers possess ERA. 
        H4a: The positive relationship between top managers’ PTs and firms’ PES 
adoption will be weakened when top managers possess ECA. 
 
Despite advantageous aspects, ties with politicians sometimes have dark sides 
in functioning as forceful insurance and a protective umbrella in managers’ eyes. In 
relation to environmental management, executives may utilize their PTs to migrate 
their businesses’ negative impact (Yu & Zheng, 2019). Also, highly embedded firms 
might be shielded from legal enforcement in response to unethical behaviors (Wu 
et al., 2016), and managers may provide distorted information to alter environmental 
policies through lobbying politicians (Yan & Chang, 2018). Besides, stronger PTs 
and government intervention could transform the company culture into being more 
hierarchical and cohesive among functional departments (Chung, Wang, Huang, & 
Yang, 2016). Such corporate culture is likely to hinder the management vision and 
lead to a worse working atmosphere, particularly in Asian firms. Furthermore, other 
PTs’ dark sides consist of governmental interference on recommending incompetent 
personnel in the firms (Chung, 2011), and blockage of information flow because of  




Concerning the dark sides led by PTs, the abovementioned argument suggests 
that managers would not pursue the PES. However, we posit that executives with 
ERA would negatively influence the effects of PTs on PES adoption. First, as ERA 
refers to the managers’ awareness of negative impacts on the natural environment 
result from their businesses, they thereby have strong impetus to adopt PES. While 
political affiliates commonly press firms to hire unqualified employees or employ 
unprofessional government bureaucrats in important positions (Chung, 2011), such 
as those posts in command of firms’ resource allocation or strategic management. 
In shortage of competent employees, moral manages cannot execute their internal 
management capacity (Chung et al., 2016), and the operational efficiency is destined 
to decrease due to weak communication. Such overwhelming personnel assignment 
undoubtedly interrupts the organizations’ PES proceeding. Second, although pivotal 
PTs are able to favor firms to take less social responsibility by functioning as firms’ 
protective umbrella, managers with higher morality would not abuse PTs as an 
effective means of gaining weak legal enforceability despite of sensitively unethical 
events. By contrast, these managers are keen on taking environmental responsibility 
and resist the abuse of the PTs. Thereby, the higher ERA of managers is more likely 
to weaken the negative influence of PTs’ dark side on firms’ PES. 
        However, we posit that managers’ ECA strengthens the negative effect of PTs 
on PES for the following reasons. Firstly, as such value-driven managers primarily 
emphasize economic interests, whereas relying on PTs could enable firms to get the 
nod of business projects even without disclosure of environmental costs and impacts 
(Lee & Ho, 2014). In doing so, firms’ immediate profit acquisition would divert the 
attention from gaining profits via environmental investments. Secondly, the 
officials enjoy substantial discretion over policies implementation, and particularly 
have right to terminate firms’ production if their activities disagree with government 
ideological preferences (Li, Meng, & Zhang, 2006). Because governmental officials’ 
primary interests center on improving their political performance which is assessed 
by economic performance, thus executives with ECA must take officials’ interface 
and have to meet the governmental needs. Thirdly, the employment of poorly skilled 
employees or unprofessional bureaucrats in firms could not predict market changes 




ECA need more professional employees to anticipate the customer demand in future. 
Thus, the higher ECA of managers strengthens the negative effects of PTs on PES. 
In light of the arguments above, we hypothesize the following: 
 
        H3b: The negative relationship between top managers’ PTs and firms’ PES 
adoption will be weakened when top managers possess ERA. 
        H4b: The negative relationship between top managers’ PTs and firms’ PES 
adoption will be strengthened when top managers possess ECA. 
 
Methodology 
Sample and data 
        To test our hypotheses, we distributed the surveys in Shanxi province situated 
in northern China. This region has been well-known for the natural resources such 
as coals (Zhang & An, 2018), and thereby the highly dependence of coal resulted in 
severe environmental degradation. Whereas the Shanxi government has been taking 
positive actions to handle the environmental pollution, and assigns the Department 
of Ecology and Environment of Shanxi Province to stringently monitor the firms’ 
manufacturing processes. In this case, top managers put greater effort in protecting 
environment recently. Thus, Shanxi province provides an ideal sampling locale for 
the empirical context. 
        Data for this empirical study originates from a questionnaire-based survey. To 
ensure validity, the standard research procedure was followed. An English-language 
version of the questionnaire was initially developed and then, after a double back-
translation process (Brislin, 1980) by two competent scholars, the Chinese version 
was formulated. Prior to data gathering, we conducted the in-depth interviews with 
12 executives from Shanxi manufacturing firms, asking them to provide suggestions 
for the survey in the first two weeks of April, 2019. Based on their recommendation, 
we revised the indicators to better clarify each sentence. Upon two-round revising, 
we finalized the Chinese version and converted it into the Questionnaire Star, a 
popular and effective online survey tool in China. To avoid social desirability bias, 
we phrased all questions with neutral words and promised respondents about the 




General results were promised to provide to respondents, involving top managers, 
vice presidents, chairpersons, and general managers.  
        As a whole, we conducted two-round survey from June to November 2019, and 
between February and May of 2020. All the participated firms were approached by 
our industrial network and local governmental support. The first-round survey was 
administrated with 234 responses in the end. To check the robustness of the results 
of the first survey, we conducted a second survey and obtained 230 responses. In 
total, we received a sample of 464 responses. We kept only one of the records if 
more than one respondent from a given firm filled out a questionnaire and removed 
the responses with completion times of less than 180 seconds and missing data. In 
the end, we obtain 228 effective samples. 
 
Measures 
All measures were established by previous studies. Multi-item measures were 
built upon seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  
        Political ties. In China, network structures are regarded as business secrets, so 
most managers are protective of this sensitive information (Peng and Luo, 2000). 
According to Peng and Luo (2000)’s study, the PTs were measured by three-items 
involving the manager’s utilization of connections with political leaders in various 
levels of government, official in industrial bureaus, and officials in regulatory and 
supporting organizations during the past three years. 
        Proactive Environmental Strategy. A three-item collected from Wagner and 
Schaltegger (2004)’s previous work was used to measure PES. 
        Environmental Awareness. We used six items from Peng and Liu (2016) to 
measure EA with two dimensions, namely, ERA and ECA.  
        Controls. We controlled for several firm-level and respondent-level variables 
based on prior studies and the potential disturbing variables influencing our study. 
The organizational-level control variables employed included firm age, measured 
by firms’ operating time, and firm size which was gauged by the logarithm of the 
number of full-time employees, ownership (state-owned enterprise=1 and nonstate-
owned enterprise=0). The respondent-level control variables included age, gender 




worked at current firm), origin (native=1 and nonnative=0), local living years, 
referring to the number of years that respondents had lived locally, and position (i.e. 
Chairman, Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) committee member, 
CEO or General Manager, Plant Manager, or Vice General Manager). 
 
Validity and reliability 
The validity and reliability of constructs are assessed through confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) using AMOS. The observed variables indicate an acceptable 
fit [χ2 = 67.508, p =.033; χ2/df = 1.406; GFI = 0.954; CFI = 0.991; IFI = 0.991; 
RMSEA = 0.042]. All the observed variables have a standardized loadings of more 
than 0.70 and are significant (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). The average variance 
extracted (AVE) estimates were all greater than 0.50 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). These 
two findings supported the convergent validity of the constructs. All the constructs 
were measured by reflective instead of formative indicators, we used the Cronbach’s 
α to evaluate the scales’ internal consistency (see Table 3.1). All constructs have 
reliability coefficients of more than 0.70. Additionally, the composite reliability (CR) 
values are all above the threshold value of 0.70. Taken together, the results of these 
tests implied that the measures had acceptable convergent validity and reliability. 
Table 3.2 shows the scale for the factor, the items’ standardized factor loadings, 
and the Cronbach’s α and CR values for each factor. All correlations between our 
study constructs were below |0.7|, demonstrating the distinctness of the measures 
and their discriminant validity. Besides, the correlations between two constructs are 
less than the square root of the AVE estimates of the corresponding constructs for 
all the pairs (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), indicating that these constructs had more 
internal correlation than external correlation and thus suggesting their discriminant 
validity. The results suggest that the constructs were distinct and that they exhibited 
evidence of discriminant validity. 
 
Table 3.1 Construct measurement and confirmatory factor analysis results (N=228) 
Constructs Measuring items Standardized loading α CR AVE 
Enterprises will strictly implement cleaner production 








Outlook on green development has incorporated into 
enterprise culture. 
0.911    
Enterprises input a large quantity of resources in 
development of environmental protection 
technologies. 
0.781    
Political Ties 
(PTs) 
Top managers at our firm have maintained good 
personal relationships with officials in various levels 
of government. 
0.946 0.954 0.954 0.875 
Top managers at our firm have developed good 
personal or social ties with officials in industrial 
administrative departments in charge. 
0.948    
Top managers at our firm have developed good 
connections with officials in regulatory and 
supporting organizations such as tax bureaus, state 
banks, and commercial administration bureaus. 




Top management team pays much attention to 
adverse impacts of our firm’s behavior on the natural 
environment. 
0.858 0.896 0.898 0.747 
Top management team is very clear about how 
environmental legislation is relevant to our business.  
0.861    
Top management team is very clear about what 
represents “best environmental practice” in our 
industry. 




Top management team thinks that adopting 
environmental initiatives can improve sales revenue. 
0.806 0.917 0.921 0.796 
Top management team thinks that adopting 
environmental initiatives can reduce costs. 0.921    
Top management team thinks that adopting 
environmental initiatives can improve production 
efficiency. 
0.943    
CFA Model Fit Summary: χ2 = 67.508, p =.033; χ2/df = 1.406; GFI = 0.954; CFI = 0.991; IFI = 0.991; 
RMSEA = 0.042 
Notes: All factor loadings of the CFA are statically significant. α = Cronbach’s alpha; CR = composite 
reliability; AVE = average variance extracted. 
 
Assessing common method bias 
As the independent and dependent constructs are measured in the questionnaire 
completed by a single respondent, common method bias (CMB) might be a serious 
issue. To control the CMB, we conducted design-related procedures and statistical 
techniques (Podsakoff, 2003). 
Of the design-related procedural methods, we followed three steps. First, we 
discussed our questionnaire with 12 executives and two experts. During this process, 
we refined the indicators to ensure all the items were clear enough to respondents. 




about environmental management. Second, the survey questionnaire was shortened 
to a reasonable length, and the questionnaire was distributed anonymously. We also 
promised that the data would be only used for academic research, and the findings 
would be sent to the respondents. Third, this survey was distributed relied on our 
social ties with the managers in target firms and received the support of the local 
government officials. The trust stemming from the personal ties between researchers 
and the respondents, as well as the authority, ensured the quality of our survey. 
        Two statistical control methods are conducted to measure the extent to which 
CMB is probably to affect our results. Using Harman’s single factor test, the results 
show that the first factor before rotation accounted for less than half of the total 
variance, indicating that there is no severe CMB problem. Also, the model with the 
unmeasured latent methods factor is found to have better fit indices than the actual 
measurement model. In sum, these findings show that the CMB was not a problem 
in this study. 
 
Results 
The descriptive statistics and correlations for our study variables are presented 
in Table 3.2. A multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was 
conducted to test hypotheses. Table 3.3 shows the empirical results from regression 
analysis. We first entered the control variables in model 1, and model 2 adds the 
PTs as independent variable to examine its direct effect on PES. Model 3 included 
the ERA and ECA as moderating variables. Model 4 included the interaction 
variables to test the moderating effects of ERA/ECA on the relationship between 
PTs and PES. 
To reduce the potential of the multicollinearity, we mean-centered independent 
and moderating variables before the creation of the interaction terms (Aiken et al., 
1991). In terms of the regression models, we examined the variance inflation factors 
(VIFs), and the largest VIF was no more than 3 (below the maximum acceptable 
value of 10) and also the average VIF was about 1.5. Thus, there was no severe 
problems involving multicollinearity. Regarding the endogeneity, Ramesy (1969)’s 
omitted-variable regression specification-error test was conducted and the results 




significant at 5% level. Hence, the regression models have no endogeneity from the 
point of important missing variables. 
Recall that our hypotheses focus on how firms’ PES is affected by managers’ 
PTs, and whether ERA and ECA of executives influence the relationship between 
PTs and organizations’ PES. H1 proposes that PTs is positively related to PES, and 
H2 is the competing hypothesis with H1. As Table 3.3 shows, there is a significant 
and positive effect of managers’ PTs on firms’ PES in Model 2 (β=0.402, p<0.001), 
supporting H1 instead of H2, which predicts that top managers are more likely to 
adopt PES regarding their stronger networking with politicians. H3a proposes that 
ERA will strengthen the bright effect of PTs on PES, and H3b hypothesized that the 
ERA is able to weaken the dark effect of PTs on PES. H4a proposes that ECA will 
weaken the PTs’ bright effect in favor of firms’ PES, and H4b hypothesized that the 
dark effect of PTs on PES would be strengthened by ECA. In model 4, the 
interaction of PTs and ERA shows a positive effect on organizations’ PES (β=0.135, 
p<0.05), which supported the H3a. In contrast, the negative interaction effect 
between PTs and managers’ ECA (β=-0.138, p<0.05) has indicated that the effect 
of managers’ PTs on PES adoption declines when managers’ ECA is much higher. 




Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (N=228) 
 Constructs Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1 PES 5.86 0.96 0.862a                
2 PT 5.16 1.29 .391** 0.935               
3 ECA 5.38 1.15 .508** .227** 0.864              
4 ERA 6.12 0.80 .510** .338** .410** 0.892             
5 Firm Age 14.74 11.64 -0.007 0.075 -0.064 0.040             
6 Firm Size 4.63 1.79 0.027 .167* -0.029 0.116 .438**            
7 State-owned enterprise 0.19 0.40 -0.034 0.088 -0.043 0.085 .344** .499**           
8 Chairman 0.16 0.37 -0.014 -0.021 0.007 -.181** -0.069 -0.058 0.002          
9 Secretary  0.02 0.15 .137* 0.067 -0.032 0.091 0.068 0.010 0.079 -0.065         
10 CEO or GM 0.29 0.46 0.087 0.070 -0.057 0.028 -.145* -0.091 -.145* -.200** 0.035        
11 Plant Manager 0.20 0.40 0.038 -0.055 -0.062 0.071 0.066 -.164* -0.080 -.218** -0.001 -0.084       
12 Vice GM 0.20 0.40 0.002 0.063 0.034 0.082 0.066 0.097 0.093 -.185** 0.001 -.320** -.194**      
13 Gender of Respondents 1.00 0.07 0.013 .198** 0.119 -0.018 0.050 0.031 0.032 0.029 0.010 0.043 -.132* 0.033     
14 Age of Respondents 43.75 9.10 0.008 -0.002 -0.112 -.147* 0.048 0.032 0.038 .182** 0.087 0.037 -0.029 0.026 -0.002    
15 Tenure of Respondents 6.64 5.06 -0.062 -0.014 -0.020 -0.100 0.096 -0.013 -.159* .184** -0.055 -0.005 -0.074 -0.023 -0.005 .286**   
16 Origin of Respondents 0.72 0.45 0.018 0.083 0.091 -0.004 -0.033 -.179** -.313** 0.056 0.027 -0.047 0.022 0.065 0.106 0.120 .133*  
17 Local live Years 26.77 16.80 0.009 -0.015 -0.037 -0.078 0.042 -0.078 -0.090 0.118 0.111 -0.004 -0.037 0.084 0.078 .430** .178** .465** 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




Table 3.3 Multiple regression analyses for testing hypotheses (DV=PES; N=228) 
Predictors and controls                Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Firm Age -0.010  -0.008 0.025 0.024 
Firm Size 0.090 0.022 0.017 0.014 
State-owned enterprise -0.078 -0.095 -0.103 -0.110† 
Chairman 0.064 0.048 0.087 0.095 
Secretary of CPC Committee 0.139* 0.113† 0.104* 0.107* 
CEO or General manager 0.117 0.066 0.096 0.104† 
Plant Manager 0.079 0.067 0.068 0.063 
Vice president 0.064 0.028 0.018 0.013 
Gender of Respondents 0.012 -0.058 -0.062 -0.109† 
Age of Respondents 0.005 0.006 0.079 0.072 
Tenure of Respondents -0.070 -0.068 -0.065 -0.064 
Origin of Respondents 0.015 -0.045 -0.080 -0.110† 
Local living Years -0.014 0.026 0.039 0.056 
PT  0.402*** 0.222*** 0.225*** 
ECA   0.371*** 0.379*** 
ERA   0.292*** 0.316*** 
ECA*PT    -0.138* 
ERA*PT    0.135* 
F Value 0.709 3.496*** 11.000*** 10.314*** 
R2 0.041 0.187 0.455 0.470 
Adjusted R2 -0.017 0.133 0.413 0.425 
Δ R2 - 0.146 0.268 0.016 
Δ F - 38.125*** 51.844*** 3.085* 
VIF-max 1.593 1.608 1.619 1.628 
***. Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 




Discussion and Conclusion 
Prior conceptual and empirical work demonstrates a number of personal-, firm- 
and institutional-level determinants of firms’ PES. However, our study advances 
extant PES studies by speculating managers’ PTs as a potential antecedent of PES. 
To make a better understanding of the bright side and dark side of PTs and determine 
the processes linking PTs to firms’ PES in transitional economies, we thereof have 
examined the underlying mechanism of PTs’ effects from its bright side and dark 
side. In addition, to capture the nature of relationship between PTs and PES pursuit, 
we draw on a contingency perspective in our examination of the moderating roles 
of managers’ EA that explicitly includes ERA and ECA (Gadenne et al., 2009; Peng 
& Liu, 2016). We select China as our research setting because the heavy influence 
of government and the longer tradition of tie utilization make PTs as the ‘lifeblood’ 
for business in China (Xin & Pearce, 1996). Furthermore, the rapid development of 
China’s economy as a miracle has come at the cost of environmental degradation 
over past decades (Qian & Chen, 2020). Guided by the conviction “lucid waters and 
lush mountains are invaluable assets”, the firms are largely obliged to take more 
environmental responsibility. As whole, China presents an ideal context to study the 
relationship between PTs and PES. 
Overall, our results endorse that managers’ PTs positively contributes to firms’ 
PES pursuit, indicating that Chinese manages tend to make good use of their PTs to 
obtain substantial benefits and favoritisms from the government (Faccio, 2010). We 
further find that managers’ ERA and ECA have different moderating effects on the 
impacts of PTs on PES. This finding is consistent with the arguments that PTs is the 
context specific (Sun, Mellahi, & Wright, 2012) and the effectiveness/value of ties 
depends on important factors (Li et al., 2008). Specifically, owning ERA by 
managers plays a significant role in facilitating the positive relationship of their PTs 
and organizations’ PES, whereas the managers’ ECA have a negative impact on the 
direct effect. Our findings offer a refined understanding of the contingent value of 




The first major implication of our study is that we advance the knowledge of 
antecedents of firms’ PES in China by unveiling the critical motive of managers’ 
PTs. Since these two constructs have been previously studied in individual research 
domain, our empirical study explores the relationship between executives’ PTs and 
firms’ PES adoption, and the result shows that the business leaders’ PTs could drive 
firms to embrace the PES. Thus, this study significantly enrich the family members 
of PES’s antecedents. 
Second, standing on the side of PTs, previous works largely focused on the link 
of PTs and firms’ market value or performance (Peng & Luo, 2000), and the inherent 
connections of executives’ PTs and business strategy has been overlooked (Zhu & 
Chung, 2014). This scant research is surprising given that executives’ PTs has been 
ensured to influence the strategic decisions (Faccio, 2006; Zhou, 2013). As such, 
this timely study also advance a new perspective that locates the crucial outcome of 
managers’ PTs, namely the firms’ PES. 
Third, through a contingency perspective, this study further identifies under 
what circumstances managerial PTs are more powerful with respect to firms’ PES 
adoption. In response to the recent call that effectiveness of ties might be contingent 
on particularly contextual factors (Li et al., 2008), and research on contingency is 
of significance in the environmental management field (Schmitz et al., 2019), two 
activators of managers’ environmental awareness (EA), namely executives’ ERA 
and ECA, have been employed as the contingencies in the direct linkage of PTs and 
PES. By doing so, our results thus suggest that managers’ PTs could strongly drive 
firms’ PES when managers possess the higher ERA, whereas the effect of PTs on 
PES becomes weaker as managers are in possession of ECA. 
Fourth, focusing on the context of China, government-business relations, as so-
called guanxi, might be more significant than that of other countries (Farashahi & 
Hafsi, 2009). During its transitional period, managers’ networking with government 
officials is prevalent because of the weak market supporting formal infrastructure. 
Regarding the environment protection, Chinese government has hugely stressed the 
developing concept named “lucid waters and lush mountains are invaluable assets”. 
However, as PTs constitute a double-edged sword for conducting the business, the 
deep insight from both bright and dark side might be beneficial for undermining the 
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mechanisms of how PTs influences the PES. Importantly, our findings theoretically 
and empirically highlight the positive role of managers’ PTs in motivating PES. 
 
Managerial implications 
The findings of the study reveal some key managerial implications. First, firms 
in transitional economies would greatly regard the political networking as a means 
for attaining useful assistance from the government. For example, networking with 
politicians could minimize the uncertainty and transaction costs, manage resource 
dependencies, easily get access to rare resources like debt financing, lighter taxation, 
bank loan with low interests, and relaxed regulatory oversight (Faccio, 2010; Lux 
et al., 2011). As such, for those managers lack informal government support in the 
context of transitional economies could positively cultivate and value the utilization 
of their interpersonal ties with government officials, with the purpose of succeeding 
the business. In China, formal institutions, including the regulations or laws, market 
competition and environmental uncertainty are not functional to the executives and 
businesses (Ge et al., 2019), the underdeveloped legal framework necessitated a 
strategy centered on developing PTs for the entrepreneurs (Peng & Luo, 2000). For 
Chinese practitioners interested in effectively implementing PES, they need to well 
establish and utilize their informal personal relations with political actors at various 
level of government and administration bureaus. By doing so, they are able to obtain 
valuable information, scare resources and the newest environmental regulations in 
relation to PES implementation. 
Second, for government officials in China, though they might create positive 
value of PTs in providing critical resources and timely information for the connected 
managers, they could not threaten managers’ control of business and exert political 
pressure on entrepreneurs for the sake of seeking rents (Faccio, 2006). In contrast, 
they need to elect and absorb the environmental responsible executives in two types 
of political congress, the National People’s Congress (NPC), the only legislative 
body in China, or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), 
an advisory board for Chinese government. Gaining a position in congress, those 
managers are more likely to make their firms go greener as a pioneer in certain 
industry, which would consciously influence other peers’ environmental behaviors. 
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Third, consistent with the argument that environmental management is not a 
universal prescription or a one-size-fits-all approach (Brammer & Millington, 2008), 
our data suggests that the moral managers are more likely to strengthen the effects 
of PTs on PES. Thus, for policymakers in the environmental management domain, 
the best approach to further environmental proactivity would be to inspire politically 
connected managers to unconsciously integrate environmental concerns into their 
business operation by undermining the incentive environmental subsidy mechanism. 
Meanwhile, to ensure the greater willingness of taking pro-environmental behaviors, 
policymakers could strive to stimulate managers to adopt proactive environmental 
practices in seeking for the cost reduction and long-term profitability to some extent. 
Fourth, with regard to concrete environmental policy designing, policymakers 
should continuously extend their expertise and knowledge in environmental domain. 
Given the positive impact of PTs on PES, policymakers could appoint some greener 
firms’ managers to effectively coordinate to participate the environmental standard 
setting, relying on their broad knowledge of particular pollutants. These managers’ 
ties with officials are more beneficial for strengthening environmental criteria in 
order to assess the performance of government officials and incorporate quantifiable 
metrics to evaluate environmental conditions. As such, these environmental policies 
would be more stringent for politicians to approve environmental licenses, permits, 
and business projects, and in turn firms’ environmental proactivity will be improved. 
 
Limitation and future research 
The study’s limitations provide opportunities for future research. First, we rely 
on top managers’ self-reporting by asking whether they have utilized personal ties, 
networks, and connections with external officials to measure PTs in our work. Such 
kind of PTs highlights the common relationship between business managers and 
politicians, which is costly and time-consuming to establish and maintain. However, 
corporate managers and politicians might be university classmates, best friends (Yu 
& Zheng, 2019), or involving family relationships, which to a larger extent may blur 
the boundary between governmental officials and business leaders. These different 
ties may bear different strengths and hence, may have distinct effects on firms’ PES. 
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Thus, it would be useful to find ways of identifying these particularly hidden ties, 
which deserves in-depth investigation of its impacts on firms’ PES. Second, besides 
the informal social relationships, boundary-spanning links between executives and 
political actors might generate the formal PTs such as managers serving officially 
in government organizations or vice versa. In stark contrast to informal PTs, formal 
interlocking PTs tend to be strong because the same person occupies two positions 
in business and political spheres (Lester et al., 2008), resulting in greater tie 
accountability by limiting principle-agent conflict (Mahmood, Chung, & Mitchell, 
2017). Thus, future studies of formal interlock PTs might have different effects than 
informal PTs in respect of PES. Third, the findings of this study are context-specific. 
In order to generalize the empirical results, future research could examine the micro-
macro link in other major transitional economies, such as Russia or India. Fourth, 
some researchers insist that the utilization of ties is in fact a dynamic process (Chen 
& Chen, 2004), suggesting that a longitudinal studies on the complex link between 
















        To date, a PES is defined as the anticipation of environmental regulations and 
social trends, and the alternation of business operations, processes, and products to 
prevent negative environmental impacts (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003). Given 
the possibility of PES to solve the global environmental issues (Shrivastava, 1995), 
scholarly interest in examining “why” some firms embrace PES has been growing 
substantially during the last two decades. A better Understanding of the motives that 
impact a firm’s pursuit of PES is critical for two reasons. First, this understanding 
could assist organizational theorists to predict firms’ voluntarily ecological behavior. 
For example, if corporates conduct environmental practices merely to meet the legal 
obligations, then firms would engage in those mandated activities (Bansal & Roth, 
2000). Second, this understanding could expose the mechanisms that foster greener 
organizations, allowing managers and policy makers to determine the efficacy of 
command and control mechanism, and market measures.  
 
Overview of this thesis 
        Researchers have studied the antecedents of PES at different levels of analysis 
and in varied context (Sharma & Sharma, 2011), through the lens of various theories 
and paradigms (Etzion, 2007). One camp based on the institutional and stakeholder 
theories explored the significant roles of government-enforced regulations (Powell 
& DiMaggio, 2012), stakeholder norms (Darnall et al., 2010; Henriques & Sadorsky, 
1999), and the concerning of local community (Banerjee et al., 2003). Another camp 
investigated endogenous motives of PES at firm- and individual-levels. On the firm-
level, organizational capability (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; Sharma & 
Vredenburg, 1998) such as organizational learning, shared vision, cross-functional 
integration, strategic proactivity, and continuous innovation (Aragón-Correa, 1998; 
Christmann, 2000; Hart, 1995; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998) has been identified as 
critical drivers of a firm’s PES. Research exploring the individual factors shows that  
managers’ mindsets (Flannery & May, 2000), environmental leadership (Egri & 
Herman, 2000), managers’ interpretation of environmental issues (Sharma, 2000), 
and business ties (Jiang et al., 2020) are associated with firms’ PES. 
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        Although a notable progress has been made in investigating the PES’s drivers 
at institutional-, organizational-, and individual-levels, their ability to predict PES 
is limited. First, the institutional perspective focused primarily on the influence of 
exogenous factors, and inevitably over-emphasize the isomorphism effect (Berrone 
et al., 2013). Such perspective neglects the underlying mechanisms of how manager 
develops and transfers their subjective representations of external pressures into the 
focal firms. For example, the firms in an emerging market like India (Singh et al., 
2014), lack the incentives to adopt PES because of the governmental pressures. The 
study conducted by Wang et al. (2018) implied that the existence of institutional 
void and the priority of economic development in local government have relaxed 
Chinese firms’ environmental burden. Furthermore, the variability in the corporate 
environmental strategy (CES) has been shown among firms involving in similar 
institutional context (Aragón-Correa, 1998) and within the same industry (Sharma 
& Vredenburg, 1998). Thus it can be seen that neither institutional nor stakeholder 
perspectives could explains the internal motivations for a firm’s PES, as pro-
environmental initiatives extend much beyond the mandated requirements. 
        Second, firm-level’s motivators, such as organizational capabilities (Aragón-
Correa & Sharma, 2003), have put more emphasis on internal resources possessed 
by focal firms currently. However, building good relationships with suppliers might 
help the focal firm obtain the quality materials, better services, and timely delivery. 
The connection with buyers might spur customer loyalty, sales volume, and reliable 
payment (Peng & Luo, 2000). Moreover, getting access to government assistance is 
seen as important conduits on firms’ core capabilities (Gu et al., 2008) and economic 
performance (Luo et al., 2012). Thus, the social capital embedded in organizations 
from resource-based view can be viewed as a rare, unique, and intangible resources 
leading to significant advantages (Tsang, 1998), which might play a more crucial 
role in affecting PES. For example, corporate managers’ networking with political 
actors, particularly in transition economy such as China, significantly influence the 
business strategy (Keim & Hillman, 2008). Yet research examining the drivers on 
the firm-level need to emphasize the effect of boundary spanning activities, referred 
to so-called managerial ties, on firms’ PES. 
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        Third, calling for the microfoundations of corporate sustainability (Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012) and greater attention should be given to the individuals who should 
be responsible for the environmental decision-making (Papagiannakis et al., 2014), 
scholars have long argued for a significant relationship between managers’ beliefs 
and values towards PES. Because managers are likely to devise strategies based on 
their cognition (Gavetti, 2005), and profiles of organizations to some extent reflect 
the characteristics and processes of executives (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), these 
studies tend to explore endogenous factors of top managers (i.e., their background 
and personal characteristic). However, using demographic data as proxies for testing 
managerial cognition of executives in these amplified studies is seemly limited in 
providing insights into knowing the effects of managerial cognition on the decision-
making. Moreover, previous studies paid little attention to the constraints imposed 
by organizational cognition, which can be reflected as company culture or strategic 
orientation like entrepreneurial orientation (EO). The most cited work from Aragón-
Correa and Sharma (2003) indicated that the corporate approach to prevent pollution 
need to be integrated into the entrepreneurial dimension of the firm. In other words, 
firms are not likely to pursue the PES unless they emphasize entrepreneurial activity. 
        Along with aforesaid arguments, this thesis built on three separate articles is in 
an effort to examine the antecedents of PES, filling out the worthwhile gaps on this 
subject. The first study examines the differential incentives for PES in ten case firms 
with three different ownership. The second study, drawing on upper echelons theory, 
investigates the direct impact of two dimensions of managerial environmental 
awareness (EA) on PES, and the moderating role of three individual dimensions of 
firms’ entrepreneurial orientation (EO), namely, innovativeness, proactiveness, and 
risk-taking. Based on social capital theory, the third study examines the effects of 
managers’ political ties (PTs) on PES, and integrates two dimensions of managers’ 
EA, ERA and ECA, as the contingent roles in the analysis.  
        Moreover, China, the second largest economy in the world, presents an ideal 
setting for this study. First, a number of studies tend to examine this topic in Western 
societies (Delmas & Toffel, 2008). Since it is well-suggested that the antecedents of 
PES have the different influence on PES in China versus Western countries (Walker 
et al., 2014), due to the significant role of traditional cultural, historical factors and 
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market systems (Li & Peng, 2008). Second, increasing concerns of environmental 
degradation have emerged as a ‘hot’ issue in business practice and academic settings 
in China (Peng, Tu, Elahi, & Wei, 2018). In March 2019, the Second Session of the 
13th National People’s Congress has further advocated the “green development”, 
and addressed the “corporate social responsibility” (CSR), as Premier of the State 
Council Li stated in “REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE GOVERNMENT”:  
 “Green development is a critical element of modernizing an economy; it is also a 
fundamental solution to pollution. As the primary actors in pollution prevention and 
control, enterprises must fulfill their responsibility of protecting the environment 
according to law.” 
        Therefore, firms should fulfill their civic responsibility by minimizing negative 
environmental impacts (Walker, Di Sisto, & McBain, 2008). Third, China might 
embody more useful social capital in compensating for its weak institution system, 
because the Chinese government has maintained a central role in guiding economic 
transition (Luo, 2003). It is thereof no surprising that Chinese managers refer to ties 
as the “lifeblood” of business (Xin & Pearce, 1996). As Environmental issues have 
currently been on the political agenda in China (Yuan et al., 2006), business leaders 
are bound to react to governmental signals to protect the environment. 
 
Theoretical contributions 
        This thesis makes threefold contributes. First, the industry peer, as suggested 
in the first study, and managers’ PTs, as well as two dimensions of EA, namely ERA 
and ECA in the subsequent two studies have been indicated to play the critical roles 
in affecting PES, adding the new variables in the family units of PES’s antecedents. 
Specifically, our first analytic induction applied to data collected from 10 case firms 
revealed the key motivation for private-owned enterprises (POEs) is executives’ 
long-term orientation, whereas guanxi with local government would incentivize the 
PES pursuit of provincial state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in contrast to competitive 
motivation in another SOE affiliated to state-owned key enterprise. Two foreign-
invested enterprises (FIEs) largely motivated by ecological responsibility are bound 
to adopt PES, whereas another FIE is in favor of PES merely because of competitive 
advantage. Upon comparing with prior studies, the differences have been suggested 
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as (1) whether the positive impact of competitiveness on firms’ PES built on the 
premise of being motivated by ecological responsibility, and (2) whether PTs plays 
as the driver or barrier for firm’s PES. Moreover, our second study offers an explicit 
analysis of the impacts of ERA and ECA, and of the ways in which three dimensions 
of EO (i.e., innovativeness, proactiveness, risk-taking) moderate the connections 
between ERA/ECA and PES. With respect to PTs, it has been implied to positively 
affect PES, rather than the negative role of PTs playing in PES. By introducing the 
contingent roles of ERA and ECA, the findings acknowledge that managers’ PTs 
can strengthen firms’ PES when managers are ethical and moral, whereas the impact 
of PTs on PES becomes weaker as managers possess competitive motivation. 
        Second, our paper advances the managerial cognition theory by distinguishing 
between two important types of managers’ EA, ERA and ECA. Prior studies on EA 
largely assume that human being’s cognition is simplex and only altruistic values 
could motivate firms’ greener practices. Thus, existing studies tend to treat EA as a 
one-dimensional construct. In nature, the complexity of individual cognition allows 
the conflict or compatible types of cognition to co-exist within one individual values. 
The two types of EA have distinct contents, work through different mechanisms and 
thus, vary in the degrees of their influential effects on PES. Our empirical findings 
further suggest that ECA works better than ERA in driving firms’ PES. 
        Third, our study offers an integrative view on the individual and organizational 
cognitions by showing that the two positive relationships between ERA (ECA) and 
PES is strengthened for firms with higher innovative orientation and for those that 
are less oriented towards risk-taking. Empirical findings imply that the impact of 
individual cognition on business strategy is constrained by organizational cognition, 
depending on the contradiction or compatibility between their underlying logics. An 
explanation of aforementioned mechanisms is that the underlying logic of ERA and 
innovativeness of EO as well as that of ECA and risk-taking is consistent, while the 
ideas behind ERA and risk-taking, as well as those behind ECA and innovativeness 
is slightly conflict with one another. 
Finally, we enrich the extant studies on PTs by substantiating the contingencies 
that may alter the values of ties, namely, managers’ ERA and ECA. Although prior 
studies indicate that the value of ties is contingent on firm- and market-level features, 
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such as the firm ownership (i.e., domestic vs. foreign firms), and market forces (i.e., 
market competition and uncertainty) in Li et al. (2008)’s work, studies addressing 
the contingency on the individual level are few. Our work indicates that the effect 
of PTs on PES is contingent on the managerial cognition toward environmental 
issues. Employing two distinct contingencies, executives’ ERA and ECA, into the 
direct micro-macro linkage, our results suggest that managers’ PTs can strengthen 
firms’ adoption of PES when those managers own greater ERA, while such main 
effect will become weaker as managers possess higher ECA.  
 
Managerial implications 
This thesis has some important practical implications. First, managers’ long-
term orientation is significantly related to private-owned firms’ PES. Therefore, for 
those leaders of private-owned or family business pursuing long-term development 
need to align environmental orientation to their strategic values and visions salience. 
As industry peer plays an influential role in affecting firms’ PES, the environmental 
policymakers could encourage the leading or listed firms to go greener first, through 
which the entire industry might become environmental-friendly. Moreover, though 
the motive of competitive advantage is related to one foreign corporation and a state-
owned enterprise, it is therefore feasible for managers to regard PES as opportunity 
(Sharma, 2000). That is, managers could be inspired of seizing market opportunities 
from addressing environmental issue (Margolis & Walsh, 2003).  
        Second, executives should place more emphasis on environmental initiatives’ 
economic return beyond merely avoiding environmental risk rooted in government 
regulation. In other word, if the board of directors prefer PES, they should appoint 
a special CEO with greater ERA or ECA to improve environmental performance. 
Moreover, concerning the cognitive consistency of managers and the firm strategic 
orientation need to be emphasized. For those firms being innovative, they could 
arrange executives with higher ERA to execute PES, whereas for firms with higher 
risk-taking, appointing managers with higher ECA to promote PES would be more 
appropriate. On the side of policymakers, governments could take some measures 
to improve executives’ ERA and ECA, such as environmental training for corporate 
executives and regularly organizing the case-sharing of firms that benefit from PES. 
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More importantly, subsidizing someone possessing higher ERA or ECA to be an 
entrepreneur in environmental industries.  
Third, for Chinese practitioners interested in effectively implementing PES, 
they need to well establish and utilize their informal personal relations with political 
actors. While for government officials in China, though they might create positive 
value of PTs in providing critical resources and timely information for the connected 
managers, they could not threaten managers’ control of business and exert political 
pressure on executives for seeking rents (Faccio, 2006). Conversely, they can absorb 
environmental responsible executives in two types of political congress, the 
National People’s Congress (NPC), the only legislative body in China, or the 
Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), an advisory board 
for Chinese government. Consistent with the state that environmental management 
is not universe or a one-size-fits-all approach (Brammer & Millington, 2008), and 
aligned with the suggestion that moral managers are more likely to strengthen the 
effects of PTs on PES, policymakers in the environmental management domain can 
inspire politically connected managers to integrate the environmental concerns into 
their firms’ operation relying on the incentive environmental subsidy mechanism. 
Moreover, policymakers should continuously extend their expertise and knowledge 
in environmental domain, and appoint some greener firms’ managers to effectively 
coordinate to participate the environmental standard setting, relying on their broad 
knowledge of particular pollutants. As such, these environmental policies would be 
more stringent for governmental authorities to approve environmental licenses, ect. 
 
Limitation and future research 
        The general limitations of this thesis provide anchors for future research. First, 
the geographical context of China limits the generalizability of the conclusions. The 
research related to each study across various countries would generalize our results 
in the future. Second, in a cross-sectional study, this thesis lacks a confirmation of 
cause-and-effect relationships between studied constructs, and reverse causality is 
a possibility. Thus, cross-sectional designing and using the self-reported data from 
single respondents encourage a longitudinal design and/or usage of data from more 
sources to avoid the potential measurement error of common method bias (CMB). 
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Specifically, some researchers insist that ties’ utilization is in fact a dynamic process 
(Chen & Chen, 2004). This implies that a longitudinal study on the complex link of 
managerial PTs and PES need to be further investigated. Besides, drawing upon the 
evolutionary theory, future study related to first topic would probably offer a holistic 
picture of how the motivators of PES evolve over a certain period. Third, strategic 
formulation requires the involvement of managers at all levels (Mintzberg, 1990), 
the opinions from middle-level and front-line managers, therefore, is beneficial for 
our better understanding of each topic. Fourth, this study’s results demonstrate the 
driving forces that positively influence firms’ PES. However, the effects of barriers 
that hinder the PES development has gained little attention (Murillo-Luna, Garcés-
Ayerbe, & Rivera-Torres, 2007). Future studies could examine the internal obstacles 
on the relationship between independent and dependent variables. For example, the 
simultaneous effects of managers’ EA to promote PES and the existence of barriers 
that bring the difficulties in favoring PES need yet to be examined. Fifth, in terms 
of EO in the second study, EO could be also regarded as unidimensional construct 
that three dimensions co-exist. A greater progress can be made by regarding EO as 
a unidimensional construct. Moreover, we adopt the working experience between 
manager and government officials, the business leaders and politicians might be 
university classmates or friends (Yu & Zheng, 2019). As such, those subtle informal 
political connections could be measured in the future. Additionally, responding to 
the argument that PTs are a double-edged sword (Chen et al., 2017), in entailing 
both advantages and disadvantages (Sun, Mellahi, & Thun, 2010), the dark side of 
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Appendix 1. Interview Questions 
1 How do you describe PES in business? or What is the meaning of PES in business? 
2 Please describe the significance of PES in your organization. 
3 What factors do you consider when making pro-environmental strategic decisions? 






















Appendix 2. Invitation to Participate in Survey 
Dear Mr. / Ms. _________, 
 
I am sincerely asking for your help to complete a questionnaire. This survey is the 
culmination of my program for Doctorate at University of Liverpool, UK. The aim 
of this study is to investigate the “what factors lead firm’s embrace of proactive 
environmental strategy?” The empirical findings may benefit the top managers, the 
organizations, as well as policymakers. 
Your participation is, of course, voluntary, and your reply will be anonymous. Any 
publication will present only results aggregated from all surveys, with no indication 
of individuals or firms. A summary of the results will be provided, at no cost, to all 
the participants who request it. 
Your participation will be valuable and is greatly appreciated. We hope that it will 
help to understand the effective management of proactive environmental strategy. 
The questionnaire contains several questions where you check off choices that best 
agree with your preferences. It normally takes no more than 20 minutes for you to 
complete. Data will be collected using the Internet. 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in the survey. Please feel free to ask 
questions regarding this study. My email address is Zhiwei.yan@xjtlu.edu.cn, and 








Appendix 3. Informed Consent Form 
 
Purpose: 
This study is in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for 
the degree of Doctor in Philosophy for Zhiwei Yan, at University of Liverpool, UK. 
 
Participation Requirements: 
You are asked to complete a questionnaire about the environmental situation of your 
firms. The survey will take approximately 6-8 minutes to complete. The survey will 
begin when you provide informed consent. 
 
Potential Risk/Discomfort: 
There are no known risks in this study. Some of the answers provided for the survey 
may be personally sensitive. Your responses will remain anonymous. There is no 
anticipated risk or harm to you, your e-mail account, or your computer. 
 
Potential Benefit: 
There are no direct benefits to you for participating in this study. No direct financial 
compensation will be paid to participants. However, if you choose to participate and 
complete the survey, you may choose to obtain the research findings. 
 
Anonymity/Confidentiality: 
The data collected in this study and with the survey will remain confidential to the 
extent allowed by law. All data will be coded so that individual participants are not 
associated with specific data.  
 
Right to Withdraw: 
You have the right to withdraw from this survey at any time without penalty.  
 
Research Panel: 
        If you have any questions, please contact: 
        Zhiwei Yan, 139 3414 9340, Zhiwei.yan@xjtlu.edu.cn 
        International Business School Suzhou (IBSS) 
        Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University 
        8 Chongwen Road 
        Suzhou Dushu Lake Science and Education Innovation District 
        Suzhou P.R.China 
        215123 
Zhiwei Yan 
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Appendix 4. Questionnaire Survey 
Part 1:  
Basic Information and Company Profile 
1) Gender              □Male            □Female         
2) Position             □Chairman    □General Manager    □Factory Director    □CEO    □Secretary 
3) Political Status □Communist Party Member    □League Member    □Public People                 
4) You are □Deputy to National People’s Congress    □Member of the China People's Political  
Consultative Conference National Committee 
5) Highest Education Degree □High School    □Bachelor    □Master    □PhD    □other                                  
6) Do you have overseas studying or working experience?  □Yes    □No 
7) Firm Size             □Small          □Middle-Sized          □Large 
8) Firm Ownership □POE            □SOE            □FIE            □Joint Venture 
9) Years of Operation □Less than 10 years    □11-20 years     □21-30 years    □More than 30 years 
10) Number of Employees □Less than 200    □201-500           □501-1000        □More than 1000 
 
Part 2:  
Items measuring environmental awareness 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1 = “strongly disagree”, 
7= “strongly agree”) 
1) Top management team pays much attention to adverse impacts of our firm’s behavior on the 
natural environment. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
2) Top management team is very clear about how environmental legislation is relevant to our 
business. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
3) Top management team is very clear about what represents “best environmental practice” in our 
industry. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
4) Top management team thinks that adopting environmental initiatives can improve sales revenue. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
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5) Top management team thinks that adopting environmental initiatives can reduce costs. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
6) Top management team thinks that adopting environmental initiatives can improve production 
efficiency. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
 
Items measuring entrepreneurial orientation 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1 = “strongly disagree”, 
7= “strongly agree”) 
1) In general, our firm favors a strong emphasis on R&D, technology leadership and innovations. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
2) Our firm favors “tried-and-true” procedures, systems, and methods. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
3) Our firm is willing to try new ways of doing things and seeks unusual, novel solutions. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
4) Our firm is among the first in the industry to introduce new products or services. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
5) Our firm is the first to initiate actions to competitors, for which the competitors then respond. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
6) Under uncertainty, our firm always adopts an adventurous and active attitude. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
7) Our firm strongly prefers high-risk projects (with chances of very high return). 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
8) Because of the nature of the environment, our firm always takes bold, wide-ranging strategic 
actions rather than making minor tactical changes 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
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□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
9) When confronted with decisions involving uncertainty, our firm always adopts a bold posture 
to maximize the probability of exploiting opportunities 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
 
Items measuring proactive environmental strategy 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements regarding your firm’s 
environmental practice? (1 = “strongly disagree”, 7= “strongly agree”) 
1) Enterprises will strictly implement cleaner production even without external supervision. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
2) Outlook on green development has incorporated into enterprise culture. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
3) Enterprises input a large quantity of resources in development of environmental protection 
technologies. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
 
Items measuring political ties 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? (1 = “strongly disagree”, 
7= “strongly agree”) 
1) Top managers at our firm have maintained good personal relationships with officials in various 
levels of government. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
2) Top managers at our firm have developed good personal or social ties with officials in industrial 
administrative departments in charge. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree           
3) Top managers at our firm have developed good connections with officials in regulatory and 
supporting organizations such as tax bureaus, state banks, and commercial administration bureaus. 
□Strongly Disagree   □Mostly Disagree    □Somewhat Disagree    □Neither Agree nor Disagree 
□Somewhat Agree    □Mostly Agree         □Strongly Agree          
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